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# THE WARSAW PACT
# 1955-1968

HUGH COLLINS EMBRY

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# THE WARSAW PACT
# 1955-1968

by

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Graduate School of Public Affairs
University of Washington
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the degree requirements for the
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The Warsaw Pact on military defense, which was signed by the socialist countries, unites all of its participants in the single aim of defending the accomplishments of socialism in their countries from imperialist aggression.--V. D. Sokolovskii in Soviet Military Strategy.

CONTENTS

I BACKGROUND . . . . . .1

II THE PACT IS FORMED . . . . . .9

III CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . .20

1955 . . . . . .20

1956 . . . . . .23

1957 . . . . . .29

1958 . . . . . .30

1959 . . . . . .31

1960 . . . . . .33

1961 . . . . . .35

1962 . . . . . .41

1963 . . . . . .44

1964 . . . . . .46

1965 . . . . . .47

1966 . . . . . .52

1967 . . . . . .60

1968 . . . . . .67

IV TWO CRISES . . . . . 78

HUNGARY, 1956 . . . . . 78

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968 . . . . . .82

V COMMENT . . . . . .94

NOTES . . . . . 105

SOURCES CONSULTED . . . . . 120

APPENDIX A - Texts of Warsaw Treaty and Declaration Establishing a Joint Command of the armed forces . .A-1

APPENDIX B - Declarations, Communiques, and Statements of the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee . . . . . .B-1

First Meeting (1956) . . . . . B-1

Second Meeting (1958) . . . . . .B-6

Third Meeting (1960) . . . . . .B-16

Fourth Meeting (1961) . . . . . B-30

Fifth Meeting (1962) . . . . . .B-34

Sixth Meeting (1963) . . . . . .B-36

Seventh Meeting (1965) . . . . . .B-36

Eighth Meeting (1966) . . . . . B-40

Ninth Meeting (1968) . . . . . .B-60

APPENDIX C - Miscellaneous Documents C-1

Text of the Soviet-Polish Agreement on the Stationing of Troops (1956) . . . C-1

Text of Communique of Meeting of First Secretaries of Communist Parties of Warsaw Pact Nations (August, 1961) . . . . . C-7

Texts of Warsaw Pact Communique on Berlin and East German Decree on Berlin (August, 1961) . . . . . C-8

APPENDIX D - Tables showing strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries by country and military branch . . . . . D-1

Table 1 (1959) . . . . . D-1

Table 2 (1960) (Missing) . . . . . D-2

Table 3 (1961) . . . . . D-3

Table 4 (1962) . . . . . D-4

Table 5 (1963) . . . . . D-5

Table 6 (1964) . . . . . D-6

Table 7 (1965) . . . . . D-7

Table 8 (1966) . . . . . D-8

Table 9 (1967) . . . . . D-9

Table 10 (1968) . . . . . D-10

# I

## BACKGROUND

The bitter aftermath of World War II brought to Eastern Europe a new order--an order marked by the red star of the Soviet Army and the growth of political control by Moscow. As the first postwar decade wore on, Soviet political, economic, and military hegemony over most of the area became entrenched, and the ideological map of Europe became somewhat stabilized. Events beginning in the 1950's, however--probably not initiated but certainly accelerated by the death of Stalin--revealed that the Soviet Union's hold on its client states was not total. The suppression by force of Hungary's attempt in 1956 to establish her independence followed other difficulties within the bloc and indicated a bankruptcy of Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe. Since 1964 there have been determined moves by Rumania to extricate herself from Soviet entanglements. Again, in 1968 the Soviet Union felt it necessary to suppress with force the activities of an ally--the increasingly liberal regime of Czechoslovakia. Since its inception in 1955, the Warsaw Pact has played a significant role in the political maturation, diplomatic strategy, and military development of the East European-Soviet bloc.

Eastern Europe is a difficult region to characterize. Though the term could be used to include such countries as Greece, Finland, and European Turkey, it has since World War II come to mean Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, states which after World War II became dominated--or in the case of Yugoslavia, strongly influenced--by the Soviet Union. Encompassing over 600,000 square miles and over one hundred millions of population, the region is divided by intense ethnic and language differences and by geographic, social, and economic diversity. Nationalism has been and continues to be a strong force in the political life of the area, posing problems for the minorities which exist within each country. Having at various times in history fallen under Turkish, Austrian, German, and Russian influences,[1] Eastern Europe has during this century constituted a buffer zone between Germany and Imperial Russia and today constitutes such a buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

While the military might of the Soviet Union did not play a crucial part in the post-World War II takeover of every East European country, its role was significant in most. Between December 12, 1943, and April 6, 1948, the Soviet Union signed treaties of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with each of her present allies and with Yugoslavia, then a close ally. Each alliance prohibited the signatories from participating

in coalitions against the Soviet Union.[2] The armistice agreements signed with the defeated powers of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania provided the Soviets with a superior position to that of the other Allies in administration of each country during the period of armistice implementation. The peace treaties signed with each of these countries confirmed the superior position of the Soviets on the respective Allied Control Commissions.[3] An even more powerful position accrued to the Soviet Union in its zone of occupation of Germany, now the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Predominantly Soviet liberation of Czechoslovakia and Poland endowed the Soviet Union with privileged status in their postwar development. Only in Yugoslavia and Albania, liberated primarily through indigenous partisan movements (though Yugoslavia was assisted by Soviet troops), did the Soviet Army fail to become an important factor.

While the presence of the Red Army was important, other elements contributed to the Soviet position of strength in postwar Eastern Europe. Among these was the interpretation of Western actions by many East Europeans as apparent indifference to the area. Historical ties to Russia remained in the legacies of some states. Poland desired a guarantor of her western border, of the territory given her (by the Soviets) from the Soviet zone of Germany, and Czechoslovakia similarly needed protection from German claims to the Sudetenland. In Yugoslavia, Tito's partisans were committed to Communist ideology and desired close

alliance with the Soviet Union. Further, in the postwar coalition cabinets Communist Parties--banned in each of the East European countries except Czechoslovakia prior to the war--held strong positions; many of the incumbents had been trained in Moscow during the war.

Prior to 1948 it was not certain that the East European Communists would follow the Soviet model. As the political development in the area moved from true coalitions toward Communist "people's democracies" (though with puppet coalitions in some instances), there were strong indications that the East European countries would adopt a form of socialism tailored to their own specific needs and conditions.[4] In the early postwar years--apparently at the initiation of Yugoslavia--Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia were building an alliance system that was oriented to Eastern Europe and not necessarily tied to the Soviet Union. While probably not designed to be anti-Soviet, it was possibly aimed at preventing further Soviet penetration of their political integrity.[5] In January, 1948, the Soviet Union intervened and reorganized the East European treaty network to satisfy its own desires. The following month a Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia completed the institution of political control over Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. In June of that year Tito's Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) for "nationalist

deviations," in effect removing Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc.

By April, 1949, the Soviet Union had completed its bilateral alliance structure in Eastern Europe.[6] (The use of bilateral agreements represented a Communist continuation of former Russian distrust of multilateral groupings along her borders.[7]) In September and October, 1949, the Soviet Union and the other East European countries unilaterally denounced their alliances with Yugoslavia. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union continued to be tied together by various bilateral treaties, though Albania was formally linked only to Bulgaria and, with East Germany, remained without Soviet guarantees of assistance in case of attack. It should be noted that the alliance structure complemented other Soviet methods of political domination, including penetration of the secret police and Interior ministry organizations and utilization of the Communist parties in each state.

From April, 1949, until the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 no further defense treaties were signed within the Soviet bloc. Principal military activity concentrated on development of the armed forces of the various states. Albania received modest Soviet military assistance.[9] In East Germany 7500 regular police were transferred to special Alert Units in 1948. By 1950 the strength of these Units had grown to 50,000 and Sea and Air Police units had been formed. These forces were renamed Garrisoned People's Police in 1952, with ground, sea, and air force sections,

and by 1953 reached a total strength of 100,000 men.[10] For the Soviet bloc to allow East Germany to form a Defense Ministry and designate its forces an Army remained in the future. The armed forces of the remainder of the East European states, except Yugoslavia, were subjected to intense Sovietization. They were built up, reorganized, and re-equipped with Soviet arms and equipment. Numerous Soviet advisors assisted in indoctrination of armed forces personnel along Soviet Army lines and, in some instances, Soviet military regulations were adopted wholesale.[11] Yugoslavia recieved military aid and assistance from the United States following her expulsion in 1948 from the Soviet orbit. The flow of military goods to Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union did resume after the 1955 Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement (though Yugoslavia has yet to return to a close military affiliation with the Soviet Union).

In the fall of 1954 the Soviet Union became extremely concerned over the drafting of the Paris accords which would permit the rearming of West Germany and would allow for its admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[13] In the official Soviet view, the Paris accords were seen as the revival of a revenge-minded, Hitler-inspired West German military machine instigated by American militarists bent on new adventure, a combination of German imperialism and American monopoly capital, and an obstruction to German reunification.[14] At a conference of the USSR and her allies in Moscow in December, 1954, it was announced that the bloc would take steps to unify their armed forces

if the Paris accords were ratified.[15] On January 15, 1955, the Soviet Union demanded talks concerning reunification of Germany--and on the condition that the West reject the Paris accords.[16] Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in a speech in Moscow on February 8, re-emphasized the Soviet contention that ratification of the Paris accords would become a major obstacle to German reunification,[17] and on March 21 the Soviet news agency Tass announced that the Communist bloc nations had completed negotiations and reached agreement for "friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid" and the organization of a unified military command "in the event of the ratification of the Paris agreements."[18]

While declaring in a speech on April 21 that peaceful coexistence was the only sensible direction for Communist-capitalist international relations to take, Party Secretary Khrushchev reiterated the intention of the East European bloc to create a new military organization to oppose what he termed "German militarism."[19] Although the Soviet and East European fear of Germany as a military power is well grounded in historical fact, it is perhaps difficult to fully comprehend the extent to which this fear controls the passions of the East European peoples. The destruction and misery caused by, and suffered at the hands of, Hitler's Germany will not be soon forgotten by Europe's peoples. Nor will they be prepared to make again the mistake of the 1930's when Germany was allowed to grow militarily strong while the remainder of Europe remained

weak. The fear that the Germans will seek revenge, as they did after the First World War, has prevented other Europeans from being totally rational concerning Germany, her freedom, or her sovereignty.

## II

## THE PACT IS FORMED

On May 14, 1955, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed in Warsaw, Poland. The Treaty and the accompanying declaration, Establishment of a Joint Command, formed the text of the Warsaw Pact agreements.

The Warsaw Pact is significant for several reasons: (1) it organized a unified military command to oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (2) it provided justification for the presence of Soviet troops in East European countries; (3) it marked the first time since World War II that the Soviet Union had deviated from its policy of bilateral military agreements and ventured into a multilateral agreement with other socialist countries; and (4) it created an institutional link in the integration of the Communist bloc through which the Soviet Union could influence the foreign policy of the East European countries.

The Pact was in part required by the power vacuum left in the wake of Stalin's death. While Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev each had fought to establish his political supremacy in 1953, 1954, and 1955, the European bloc nations had suffered from the lack of political and economic

direction from Moscow.[20] The extra-organizational and personal political ties that had served Stalin so well required formalization. This was also necessary because the possibility of absorbing the East European countries into the Soviet Union, if ever a Soviet objective, was gone.[21]

With the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, one day after the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, the original justification for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania no longer existed.[22] These troops had been stationed to protect the lines of communication of the Red Army between the Soviet Union and the Soviet troops stationed in eastern Austria. The previously executed bilateral treaties of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" did not provide the desired juridical basis for the presence of Soviet troops in the East European states.[23]

While the German question and the Paris accords--addressed by the East European-Soviet bloc in 1954 and early 1955--provided the opportunity, the creation of the Warsaw Pact appears to have been intended primarily as a vehicle through which the Soviet Union could negotiate with NATO.[24] Just as the Soviet Union had attacked the Marshall Plan, the concept of the European Defense Community, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviets saw in the formation of a bloc military alliance a tool with which to attack

Western unity through diplomatic and political maneuvers. For the same purposes, the Soviet Union in 1954 had asked to join NATO.[25]

By April, 1955, press reports indicated that the feeling in Washington, D.C., was that a unified East European military command under Soviet leadership would be announced at about the time the Austrian State Treaty was announced. Analysts felt that the Soviet Union already had a unified command of the armed forces of the satellite countries through infiltration and mutual assistance treaties but that the new treaty would clearly provide the right for Soviet troops to be on satellite soil. At this time it was estimated that approximately 1,120,000 Soviet troops were in Hungary, Rumania, Poland, East Germany, and Austria. The expected treaty was also seen as a method to keep East German military development under control.[26]

On May 11, 1955, the conference in Warsaw, termed by the Soviets the "Second Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe,"[27] was convened. Soviet Premier Bulganin opened the conference with a speech in which he stated that the USSR's foreign policy was guided by the "Leninist principle" of coexistence and that the Soviet Union was struggling for peace and reduced international tensions. He announced that on May 7 the Supreme Soviet had annulled the treaties of alliance made by the Soviet Union with Britain and France during World War II as a result of those countries' having entered into military alliance with Germany contrary to the commitments of the

treaties. An attack on United States policies, a claim that the Soviet Union had always stood against West German rearmament and for German reunification, and mention of a vague proposal for disarmament followed. Bulganin then appealed for joint East European defense, embodied in a unified command, and called attention to the fact that the treaty draft submitted to the conference was in complete accord with the United Nations Charter. He suggested that joint action by the East Europeans would be just retaliation for the military bloc (NATO) set up against them.[28]

The conference was concluded after three days. The Treaty* is composed of introductory paragraphs, eleven articles, and the signatures and seals of the representatives. An accompanying declaration established a joint command of the armed forces.

The introductory paragraphs of the Treaty point to the threat to peace caused by the ratification of the Paris accords, the desire of the peaceful European states to preserve peace, the need of the signatory states to take measures for their own security, the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the desire for closer ties of cooperation as the bases upon which the Treaty is founded. These principles are incorporated into articles One, Two, and Eight in which the signatories obligate themselves to refrain from using force or the threat of force in their relations, to cooperate in international efforts to safeguard

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*See Appendix A.

peace and to work toward disarmament, to base their relations with each other on a spirit of friendship and cooperation, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the others.

Articles Seven, Ten, and Eleven provide the administrative details of the Treaty. Each representative pledges that his country will not participate, and is not participating, in any alliance inimical to the agreements of the Treaty; the Treaty is made subject to the ratification of the several states; and the operable period of the Treaty is established as twenty years with provision for its extension for an additional ten years if not denounced by at least one signatory nation one year before its original tenure expires. Of particular interest, provision is made for the Treaty to be made inoperative if a general European collective security agreement is formed.

The really operative paragraphs of the Treaty are found in articles Three, Four, Five, and Six. Article Three establishes that the participants will consult with each other on all important international issues affecting their common interests and further specifies that they will immediately hold joint consultations in the event of threat of armed attack to any member. Article Four provides for collective defense in the event of armed attack on any member and requires that the requisite reports be made to the United Nations. Article Five makes provision for, but does not establish, a joint command of the armed forces

of the member states. (The actual establishment of the command is made in the accompanying Declaration.) Article Six stipulates that a Political Consultative Committee be established for the purpose of the joint consultations envisioned by the Treaty and, additionally, for investigation of any questions arising from the operation of the Treaty.

Article Nine, which leaves the Treaty open to membership to any nation desiring to join, deserves special mention. The Soviets viewed this article as demonstrating the peace-loving nature of the participating nations and the peaceful intent of the agreements.[29] This was later to provide considerable propaganda value.

The Warsaw Conference was attended by the top leaders from each country. The representatives signing the Treaty were: Premier Mehmet Shehu of Albania, Premier Vylko Chervenkov of Bulgaria, Premier Viliam Siroky of Czechoslovakia, Premier Otto Grotewohl of East Germany, Premier Andras Hegedus of Hungary, Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz of Poland, Premier Georghe Georghiu-Dej of Rumania, and Premier Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin of the USSR. Attending also was General Peng Teh-huai, Defense Minister of the Chinese People's Republic who, though not signing, fully supported the Treaty.

The declaration establishing the Joint Command of the armed forces of the signatory states appointed Soviet Marshal I. S. Konev, regarded at the time as the number

three man in the Soviet Union's military organization,[30] Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces. It provided that the Minister of Defense or other military leader of each state would serve as a Deputy Commander-in-Chief and would be in command of the forces provided to the Joint Command by his country. The question of military participation by East Germany was postponed. All questions relating to the organization or strengthening of the Joint Armed Forces were referred to the Political Consultative Committee. Provision was made for the establishment of a Staff of the Joint Armed Forces to be headquartered in Moscow and to include representatives from the General Staffs of the participating nations. The final paragraph stipulated that the disposition of the Joint Armed Forces would be subject to defense requirements and agreement among the states.

The striking similarity between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact's Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance should be noted. It would appear that the North Atlantic Treaty was deliberately taken as the model for the alliance signed in Warsaw. Though the wording differs and the participants are different, the principles espoused and objectives sought are, on paper, the same. With the single exception of Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty in which the parties agreed to establish a Joint Command, each article of the Pact has its counterpart in the North Atlantic Treaty. It is significant

that the Warsaw Pact's Joint Command was actually established by an accompanying Declaration, not by the Treaty itself.

The Communists were able to use the memories of World War II and the prospect of German revanchism plus the provision for Pact dissolution in the event that NATO was also dissolved to: (1) demonstrate that Soviet military relationships are defensive and peaceful; (2) show that the USSR was protecting East Europe; and (3) gain some support within the Warsaw Pact countries for local Communists.[31] The Treaty was portrayed as excluding the domination of some countries by others and as giving the Soviet bloc nations "greater resources than before for defending their freedom and independence in case the imperialist seekers after the wealth of others make an attempt upon them."[32] The possibility of conflict between the signatory states was disregarded on the basis that the ideology of socialism made their principles and objectives identical.[33]

> The absence of contradictions between policy and strategy in socialist coalitions assures the harmonious correlation of the international and national aspects of the military strategies of the different countries. The common interest in the defense of the socialist camp from attacks by imperialist aggressors not only assumes military co-operation among the armies of the socialist countries, but also a unity of strategic views.[34]

With the depositing in Warsaw on June 2, 1955, by the Soviet Union of its ratification papers of the Warsaw Pact, the ratification by all eight signatory nations was

completed.[35] On June 5 Warsaw radio reported that the Treaty had come into force.[36]

The Political Consultative Committee was officially organized at its first meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on January 27 and 28, 1956. It established two subordinate bodies: (1) a Standing Commission whose task is to draft recommendations on foreign policy problems, and (2) a Joint Secretariat, composed of representatives from each signatory state. Both are headquartered in Moscow.

In the analysis of at least one commentator, Hanson W. Baldwin, in May, 1955, the Conference in Warsaw appeared more important politically and psychologically than militarily; solidarity was of internal importance, particularly to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, due to the emergence of a rearmed West Germany. Its military value was limited as the satellites had the same, rather than complementing, strengths and weaknesses that the Soviet Union had--strong in manpower and geographic position, weak in sea power--and were dependent on the USSR for air power and equipment. The satellite armies varied in size and effectiveness but contributed approximately two million men and two thousand tanks to the joint forces. The best armed forces seemed to be the Bulgarian and Hungarian; the Polish armed forces were the largest but the Soviets apparently felt them to be politically unreliable. It was felt that the Warsaw Treaty would formalize and tie together the already existing military and political arrangements.[37]

Despite the military overtones of the Warsaw Treaty, its political significance is the greater. It is the "single most important formal commitment"[38] binding the East European countries to the Soviet Union. It represents a departure from bilateralism in that it requires the joint consultation--and thus the possible Soviet domination--of the members on foreign policy issues; in so doing it limits independent action.[39]

Nearly a year would elapse after the Warsaw Pact's formation before Stalin would be denigrated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Until that time, the Warsaw Pact operated in an atmosphere of uncertainty, a combination of: the foreign policy inherited from Stalin and formalized at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952; the attempts to overcome that stagnant policy; the significant changes in domestic policy taking place within the Soviet Union; Malenkov's conservative approach to foreign policy; and the uncertainty caused by Malenkov's replacement in early 1955. In October, 1952, the Kremlin was still waiting for economic crisis in the Western countries and planned to continue its buildup of military potential while doing so.[40] In the Central Committee Report to the Nineteenth Congress, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was presented as an agressive, not defensive, bloc and the United States' anti-Communist stance as a "smokescreen" for imperialist designs. German reunification, speedy

conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany were cited as objectives;[41] continued strengthening of the Soviet Union's defensive capability was defined as one of the Party's tasks;[42] and the USSR promised to continue rendering aid to the socialist countries and to strengthen and develop them in accordance with the treaties of mutual aid.[43]

# III

## CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

### 1955

On August 12, 1955, Premier Georghiu-Dej of Rumania announced that Soviet troops would remain in Rumania in accordance with the Warsaw Pact to assure "Rumania's security." This move was not surprising to Western observers as such action had been expected from both Rumania and Hungary.[44] In reply to an inquiry, Georghiu-Dej stated that these measures would not have been required had foreign troops of Western nations been removed from European states and Western military organizations liquidated. By pursuing two of the Warsaw Pact's central objectives--undermining of Western alliances and the removal of United States' troops from Western Europe--Georghiu-Dej exhibited the adherence to Pact policy expected of a member state in its foreign policy statements.

The Soviet Union on August 13 announced a 640,000-man reduction of its armed forces, giving as the reason the relaxation of international tensions.[45] Between August 24 and September 20 the remainder of the East European bloc with the exception of East Germany announced armed forces cuts: Czechoslovakia, 34,000 men;[46] Poland, 47,000 men;[47]

Albania, 9,000 men;[48] Hungary, 20,000 men;[49] and Bulgaria, 18,000 men.[50] Prior to the effect of any cuts, Western estimates of Communist bloc military strength placed the total bloc strength at approximately 5,000,000 men divided as follows*:

Soviet Union: 175 divisions, not all at full strength, totaling 3,500,000 men;

Poland: 16-20 divisions, totaling 400-600,000 men;

Albania: 2-3 divisions, totaling 50-60,000 men;

Czechoslovakia: 12-15 divisions, totaling 200-250,000 men;

Rumania: 15-20 divisions, totaling 250-300,000 men;

Hungary: 12 divisions, totaling 165-180,000 men;

Bulgaria: 11-16 divisions, totaling 165-195,000 men;

East Germany: the equivalent of 6-9 divisions, totaling 150,000 men (East German forces were not organized as an East German Army).[51]

Interpretation of the announced cuts in armed force strength varied from the belief in Washington, D.C., that reductions would cause no decrease in military might to the views of some former residents of East European countries that the cuts would not take place. Consideration was given to the fact that the reductions could be absorbed by substituting civilians in staff and support units thereby decreasing the number of men in uniform while

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*All estimates of the strength of armed forces include Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine (as applicable) personnel unless otherwise specified.

in no way reducing the number of personnel actually participating in the work of the armed forces.[52]

During his brief tenure as Premier, Malenkov had felt that possession by the United States coupled with acquisition by the Soviet Union of the hydrogen bomb had provided a mutual deterrence between the East and West which would prevent a world-wide holocaust and that the major portion of military expenditures should be directed toward further development of conventional forces.[53] Khrushchev, however, strongly disagreed with Malenkov's position and the direction of development of the Soviet Union's military forces under Khrushchev was to be toward nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems, particularly missiles.[54] The reductions in conventional forces, announced by the bloc in August and September, were consistent with this change in tactical emphasis.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23. In his speech he called for disarmament, citing Soviet troop reductions as an initial contribution to such a move, and pointed to foreign military bases as a main cause of international tensions. After calling attention to the Soviet withdrawal from Port Arthur, he stated that once the pending withdrawal from Porkkala in Finland was completed, the Soviet Union would have no military bases on foreign soil. The presence of the Soviet Army in the East European states was ignored. Molotov suggested an

all-European collective security organization, without regard to the social or political systems of the member states, with United States' participation, and with subsequent termination of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Paris agreements, and the Warsaw Treaty. The Paris agreements were singled out as the chief factor in aggravating Europe's tensions and Molotov suggested that an all-Europe collective security system would encourage German reunification.[55]

In late October, at Geneva, the Western powers offered a proposal for the reunification of Germany. The USSR countered with a proposal establishing a collective security organization, requiring the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but only vaguely referring to German reunification. British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, at that point, stated that the West did not consider NATO and the Warsaw Pact as equals and would refuse to trade one for the other in negotiations.[56] The Western powers were attempting to make progress on German reunification, European security, arms limitations, and improved East-West contacts without defining the military-political status quo.[57]

1956

On January 18, 1956, the East German Parliament approved the creation of an East German Army and a Ministry of the Defense. The Soviet Union had in September, 1955, restored East German sovereignty[58] and these acts of the

East German Parliament provided the legal basis for transformation of the East German Garrisoned People's Police into a recognized armed force to provide the nucleus of the new Army. It was estimated that the People's Police consisted of 95,000 ground troops and 15,000 airmen and naval personnel.[59] On January 20, Willi Stoph was appointed Defense Minister.[60] The creation of the East German Army was designed to allow East German participation in the military structure of the Warsaw Pact.

The Political Consultative Committee met for the first time on January 27-28,1956, in Prague, Czechoslovakia. In addition to the signatory nations to the Treaty, the Chinese People's Republic was represented by an observer. Two items were on the agenda: recommendations for strengthening the alliance and common actions required by the Warsaw Treaty.[61] The Communique* issued by the conference stated that: organizational problems of the armed forces had been solved; the East German Army had been accepted into the Joint Armed Forces and the East German Defense Minister would become a Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Pact forces; it had been decided that the Committee would meet whenever necessary but no less than twice annually; the Standing Commission for foreign policy recommendations and the Joint Secretariat had been established; and the members had issued a joint declaration on the international situation. The accompanying Declaration* called for

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*See Appendix B.

negotiations instead of force in settling disputes, emphasizing the formation of such "aggressive" military blocs as NATO and SEATO--and the resultant arms race--as increasing the threat of war. Support of the decisions reached by the Asian and African countries at the Bandung conference was enunciated. The Declaration also stated the readiness of the members to cooperate in measures to strengthen European security. Included in its proposals were: a European collective security system; withdrawal or reduction of foreign military units in both Germanies; the establishment of a zone of restricted armaments in both Germanies; banning of nuclear weapons from both Germanies; and disarmament.[62]

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in February, 1956, revealed that the goals of the Communists were still those of Stalin but that their tactics in international affairs were changing. At the Congress Khrushchev attempted to make this clearly evident to the satellites to prevent their assuming that the basic goals were being revised.[63] He identified the West's "positions of strength" policy with "economic and political pressure, threats, and military provocations . . .,"[64] called for a united front, and indicated tolerance for non-USSR socialist programs.[65] The expressed tolerance for other socialist programs, an offer of rapprochement with Yugoslavia, was emphasized in a special section of the keynote speech in which Khrushchev addressed questions concerning international development principles.[66] He

officially recognized the existence of different forms of transition to socialism. In the same section, Khrushchev raised the theory of peaceful coexistence to a position of dogma and, revising Lenin's doctrine, announced that war was no longer inevitable, that due to the strength of the USSR and the socialist bloc the possibility existed for preventing war in the present era.[67] Commenting on armed strength Khrushchev stated that,

> Compelled to pool their forces and resources, our states have concluded the Warsaw Pact, which is an important stabilizing factor in Europe. They are fully resolved to employ all their forces to protect the peaceful life of their peoples and to prevent the outbreak of another conflagration in Europe.[68]

Khrushchev identified the Party's further tasks in the foreign policy sphere:

1. to pursue peaceful coexistence;

2. to strengthen relations within the Communist bloc and with Yugoslavia;

3. to strengthen friendship with countries who refuse to join blocs, such as India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and others, and with Finland, Austria, and other neutrals;

4. to improve relations with the West and its allies;

5. "To follow vigilantly the intrigues of circles that do not want a relaxation of international tension; to expose in good time the subversive activities of the enemies of peace and the security of nations; to take necessary measures for further strengthening the defense potential of our socialist state; to maintain our defenses

at the level demanded by present-day armaments and science, and to ensure the security of our socialist country."[69]

The Twentieth Congress made explicit the restoration of flexibility and innovation taking place in Soviet foreign policy.[70] The design to relax East-West tension, the tentative steps toward detente embodied in the emphasis on peaceful coexistence, seemed to indicate the direction of the new Soviet tactics. The relaxation, however, coupled with Stalin's denigration in Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" and the sanctioning of Tito's heresy, was to prove in the future to have produced undesired effects: the satellites were soon to begin moving toward more nationalistic forms of communism. The dissolution of the Cominform in April further indicated the softer policy line that the Soviets were pursuing.

NATO analysts of Communist bloc strength estimated in April that, within thirty days of mobilization orders, the Soviet-East European bloc could have 400 mechanized divisions with 6,000,000 men in the field. It was estimated that 3,000,000 men were already in the field, of which twenty-two divisions were based in East Germany, posing a threat to NATO defenses in Europe.[71]

On June 30 East Germany announced a cut in its armed forces of 30,000 men to a new total of 90,000 men.[7] This followed an announced cut by the Soviet Union of 1,200,000 in May and the reductions announced by the bloc in 1955.[72]

Events in Poland beginning in June and culminating in a bloodless revolution in October, 1956, served to bring to Poland a more liberal government and gave increased sustenance to Polish nationalism.[73] Soviet military units, including tanks and naval ships, deployed to tactical locations during the unrest, were removed from their threatening positions--either returning to Polish bases or leaving Polish territory completely.[74] As a result of the October events, on December 17 the Soviet Union and Poland signed an accord covering the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland.* The strength and disposition of Soviet forces in Poland were made subject to agreement between the two states; movement within Poland of Soviet troops was made subject to Polish consent; Polish jurisdiction over Soviet troops in Poland was defined; and Soviet financial support of Soviet troops in Poland was specified.

On October 23, 1956, students demonstrated in Budapest, among other grievances against the presence of the Soviet Army in Hungary.[75] Fighting broke out between the students, police, and military troops, and quickly spread throughout the country. As a result of Hungarian attempts to establish independence, repudiate the Warsaw Pact, establish neutrality, and gain Western support, the Soviet Union intervened. By November 4, the Red Army had crushed the revolt.+

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*See Appendix C.

+For a more complete discussion of the 1956 Hungarian crisis, see Chapter 4.

In response to a declaration by the Soviet Union during the Hungarian crisis of its willingness to discuss the status of Soviet troops on satellite soil, Rumania on November 1 stipulated that Soviet withdrawal of troops would have to be negotiated on the basis of "strategic security considerations" by Warsaw Pact military authorities.[76] Thus hopes by the East European bloc or by Western states for early removal of Soviet troops from any of the bloc nations were dashed.

In December Western estimates of Soviet troop strength in satellite nations were: 19-27 divisions in East Germany, 5-7 divisions in Poland, 12 divisions in Hungary, and 2 divisions in Rumania.[77]

1957

In testimony given on February 19, 1957, by Major General Bela Kiraly, formerly an Hungarian Army officer, it was revealed that the East European bloc military forces had conducted in 1956 a mock Communist attack on the West. He reported that during the exercises Marshal Zhukov, Defense Minister of the USSR, had noted glaring weaknesses--the lack of mechanization and mobility--in the bloc armed forces.[78]

On March 27 the Soviet Union announced that decisive strengthening of the Warsaw Pact was required in view of the Western policy of maintaining military blocs.[79] A joint Polish and East German declaration, issued on June 20, expressed their preparation to strengthen their Warsaw Pact

ties but also expressed the desirability of normalizing relations with West Germany.[80]

In March, April, and May, the Soviet Union concluded "status-of-forces" agreements with East Germany, Rumania, and Hungary, respectively. These were similar to the agreement made with Poland* in December, 1956.[81]

1958

The Political Consultative Committee met for the second time on May 24, 1958, over two years after its first meeting. The Chinese People's Republic was again represented. The Committee's Communique+ stated that it had: heard a report by Marshal Konev concerning new reductions of the armed forces of the Pact states and on the withdrawal from Rumania of Soviet troops; announced that it would reduce the strength of the combined armed forces of the member countries by 419,000 men in 1958; approved the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Rumania "in the near future" and the reduction by one division of Soviet troops in Hungary; made decisions on unspecified armed forces organizational questions; adopted a resolution proposing a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement; and issued a declaration analyzing the international situation. The Declaration+ stated that the Warsaw Pact acted as a deterrent to the aggressive activities of the Western military alignments, particularly NATO, and expressed

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*See Appendix C.

+See Appendix B.

apprehension over West German "military preparations" and concern over the interference by Western powers in the affairs of Asian and African countries. It condemned NATO activities, pointing to the unilateral troop reductions by Pact members as an indication of their good will and desire to cooperate; proposed a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, including both Germanies; condemned the attempt to put German reunification on the agenda of an anticipated summit conference "over the heads" of the two Germanies; and, noting the Western rejection of a proposal to include all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the summit meeting, recommended including three or four states from each bloc. The Declaration also called for reductions in forces and armaments by NATO countries and fully discussed the proposed non-aggression pact for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

1959

The Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in January, 1959. Discussing the international situation, Khrushchev reaffirmed the conclusion of the Twentieth Congress that war was not fatally inevitable. He offered to withdraw Soviet troops not only from Germany but also from Poland and Hungary if the NATO countries would withdraw their troops from foreign countries and abolish military bases on foreign soil, an offer that the Soviets had made before. He also discussed the German question, emphasizing the militarism

and revanchism of Western Germany, suggested reduction or complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, and made a plea for German reunification. Claiming Soviet superiority in rocket technology, Khrushchev called for banning the production, testing, and use of nuclear weapons, including destruction of existing stockpiles; supported reduction of armaments in Europe; supported universal disarmament; and emphasized the need for peaceful coexistence.[82]

On April 27-28, a conference of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, with a Communist Chinese representative observing, was held in Warsaw. Before the meeting convened, it was viewed in the West as a dress rehearsal for the Geneva foreign ministers conference, scheduled for May, and an opportunity for the USSR to explain its position to its allies.[83] The conference proved to be a show of strength; there was no joint hammering out of decisions in preparation for Geneva.[84] The Communique issued stated that agreement had been reached on the convening of foreign ministers and summit conferences, restated the suggestion of a German peace treaty, called for a free city of Berlin, and noted that the questions of a German peace treaty and Berlin should not depend on a solution for European security.[85] It also included a "moderate" view of the world situation, specifically "moderate" for the purpose of encouraging flexibility in the West in its attitude toward negotiating with the Soviet bloc.[86]

At that time Western estimates of troop strength in Warsaw Pact nations were:

East Germany: 150,000 East German plus 400,000 Soviet troops; total, 550,000 men;

Poland: 310,000 Polish plus 30,000 Soviet troops; total, 340,000 men;

Hungary: 90,000 Hungarian plus 60,000 Soviet troops; total, 150,000 men;

Czechoslovakia: 200,000 men, all Czechoslovak;

Albania: 35,000 men, all Albanian;

Bulgaria: 160,000 men, all Bulgarian;

Rumania: 250,000 men, all Rumanian;

USSR: 1,250,000 men, all Soviet.*

1960

The third meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was held in Moscow on February 4, 1960. All members were represented and representatives of the Chinese People's Republic, North Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, and North Vietnam attended as observers.[88] The Communique† issued by the meeting announced that with a unilateral reduction in armed forces by the Soviet Union--then in progress--of 1,200,000 men, the total armed strength of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member states would be reduced to 3,796,500. It also stated that the representatives had

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*For Soviet strength by military branch, see Appendix D, Table 1.

†See Appendix B.

discussed major international problems, heard a report from the USSR on its new armed forces reductions and on its position at the pending summit conference, coordinated plans for relaxing international tension, and adopted a Declaration. The Declaration began with a Pact analysis of the world situation which underlined such efforts as: promotion of peaceful coexistence by talks between leaders of Warsaw Pact states and "such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea and others";[89] agreement on peaceful use of the Antarctic; and establishment of a permanent United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Exploration of Outer Space. NATO was accused of increasing its military strength, with particular emphasis placed on West German "militarism." Continuation of the arms race by NATO, SEATO, and CENTO and the nature of Western propaganda as instilling mistrust and hatred were cited as obstacles to peace. The Declaration called for disarmament, reductions in forces by NATO countries, the creation of an effective control system to enforce disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and--stressing West German revanchism--a German peace treaty. The threat of signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany, if efforts for a German peace treaty failed, was made. The proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact was again made. The Declaration ended by proposing disarmament, a German peace treaty, a nuclear test ban, and East-West relations

as subjects for the pending summit meeting. Western observers believed that at the conference the East had developed and solidified its position for the summit talks.[90] Despite the apparent unanimity shown at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the Sino-Soviet dispute broke into the open during the spring of 1960 as the Chinese began to challenge Soviet foreign policy and ideology.[91]

On July 24 the Warsaw Pact nations announced the replacement of 62-year-old Marshal Konev by Marshal Andrei A. Grechko as the supreme military commander of Pact forces. Konev's health was reportedly failing.[92] Grechko also replaced Konev as Soviet First Deputy Minister, directly under Defense Minister Malinovsky.[93] He had been closely associated with Khrushchev since the beginning of World War II.[94]

1961

The Political Consultative Committee met for the fourth time in Moscow on March 28-29, 1961, for the purpose of studying the crisis in Laos and issues such as disarmament, the Congo, and Berlin, and to formulate a bloc economic plan for the next twenty years.[95] In addition to the member states, the Chinese People's Republic, North Korea, and the Mongolian People's Republic were represented by observers. The heads of the Albanian government and Communist Party were absent and Albania was represented by personnel of lesser rank and position.

In its Communique,* the Committee stated that it had been "guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of the November Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Worker's Parties" and that new successes had been scored in the camp of socialism since its last meeting. It attacked NATO, West Germany, and military intervention by the West in the Congo, Algeria, Angola, and Laos, and the activity directed against Cuba. Emphasis was placed on West Germany as the "chief center of war danger in Europe."[96] The need for a peace treaty with both Germanies and the demilitarization of West Berlin were particularly stressed. By spotlighting the German question, the Committee was evidently trying to divert world attention from Laos and the Congo.[97]

Although the process had begun the year before, it became quite apparent in 1961 that the nature of the Warsaw Pact was changing significantly. The alliance was being tightened to improve its "collective military efficiency" and to strengthen the "political cohesion" of Eastern Europe.[98] By summer, it was fully evident that the Soviet Union was in the process of upgrading the contribution to Soviet military planning made by the armed forces of the East European nations. The role of the other Pact forces was being changed from collaboration in air defense--the only significant contribution of the non-Soviet forces during the first five years of the Pact's existence--to

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*See Appendix B.

participation in tactical theater operations and the Soviet Union was taking an interest in training the other Pact forces and equipping them with modern arms.[99]

One significant factor causing the shift to greater reliance on the forces of the other Pact states was Khrushchev's desire to economize by reducing the size of the Soviet armed forces and relying on the deterrent ability of the Soviet Union's missilery.[100] By 1961 Khrushchev had moved to a position solidly in favor of strategic deterrence at the expense of conventional warfare, causing considerable dissension among Soviet Army marshals. Konev had disagreed with Khrushchev in the balanced forces-strategic missiles controversy which in no small measure had contributed to Konev's replacement by Grechko in 1960.[101] In 1960-61, Khrushchev seized on the possibility of developing the other Pact forces as conventional warfare units, allowing reductions in Soviet troop strength and the release of resources to Soviet strategic forces.

It was also recognized that under nuclear war conditions it would be difficult, if not impossible, to deploy ground troops from the Soviet Union to Europe. The alternative of stationing a larger number of Soviet units in the East European states was recognized as unacceptable and the solution, therefore, was to develop the armed forces of the other Pact states into effective units. A coincident benefit was seen in the more subtle management of Soviet garrisons in East Europe through

closer Warsaw Pact ties between the Soviet Union and the host countries.[102]

Another factor contributing to the new direction of development of the Pact was, in the face of growing polycentrism, "the need for organizational means to maintain discipline and political unity among the Communist countries of East Europe."[103] Additionally, the Soviets needed evidence of successful military cooperation as an example to hold up to the Chinese People's Republic in the deepening rift between the two countries.[104]

In early June the Soviet and East German armies completed joint maneuvers in East Germany near the West German border. East German newspapers noted that the games were held in accordance with Pact plans and that Marshal Malinovsky joined Marshal Grechko in attending the conclusion of the maneuvers.[105]

On August 3-5, a meeting of the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Warsaw Pact states was held in Moscow. Though no mention was made of the countries represented, it is probable that Albania was absent.[106] The conference emphasized the urgent need for a German peace treaty; declared that the Pact states were determined to conclude such a treaty by the end of the year, even if a treaty with East Germany alone was required; and

> instructed the appropriate competent bodies to prepare all necessary foreign political and economic measures ensuring the conclusion of a German peace treaty and observance of its provisions, including those provisions which refer to West Berlin as a free city.[107]

On August 13 the Warsaw Pact issued a Communique on Berlin.* It stated that NATO aggression and West German re-militarization, the failure of the West to "normalize" West Berlin, the refusal of the West to accept Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty, and the use of West Berlin's borders for purposes of gathering intelligence and waging economic warfare on East Germany made necessary measures for the security not only of East Germany but of the other Warsaw Pact states. It proposed to East Germany the adoption of control and security measures along the West Berlin border which

> would securely block the way for the subversive activity against the Socialist camp countries, so, that reliable safeguards and effective control can be established around the whole territory of West Berlin including its border with Democratic Berlin.[108]

The Communique specifically prohibited interdiction of traffic and communication between West Berlin and West Germany. On the same day, East Germany issued a Communique* accepting the proposal and adopting a decree specifying control measures along the West Berlin-East German border. The Berlin wall started up and Soviet troops were used to assist the East Germans in enforcing the closure of the border.[109] The resultant tension between East and West gave added impetus to the development of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact.[110]

A meeting of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries was held in Moscow on September 8-9. It

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*See Appendix C.

was announced that the participants "discussed specific questions concerning enhancement of military preparedness of the troops belonging to the joint armed forces" and that the chiefs of the general staffs were "instructed to work out practical measures toward further strengthening of the defense of the Pact states stemming from the agreement reached at the meeting."[111] It is doubtful that any representative from Albania was present as Albania's participation in the Pact appears to have ended in March, 1961, the result of an ideological split with Moscow. Soviet-Albanian differences and Chinese-Albanian ties can in part be traced back to 1957, the time of a renewed Soviet-Yugoslav break. At that time Albania took a strong stand on Yugoslav revisionism. The Chinese also took an ideological position on revisionism, and on Yugoslav revisionism in particular, that was stronger than that of the Soviet Union or of any East European state except Albania.[112]

Soviet-Albanian relations progressively deteriorated. As a result, the Soviet Union was forced to evacuate its Naval base at Valona.[113] The words of Walter Ulbricht, East German Communist leader, at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, calling for Albania to accept Warsaw Pact decisions were interpreted by some observers to mean that Albania had been expelled from the Pact.[114] At the Congress, Khrushchev emphasized that the Warsaw Pact had grown stronger

and declared that due to the increased defense strength of the Soviet Union, the "imperialist" aggressive designs had been checked and peaceful coexistence assured.[115]

In October East European armed forces began moving into positions for war games. It was estimated by the West German Army that a total of twenty-eight divisions participated: twenty Soviet, six East German, and one each Czechoslovak and Polish.[116] The maneuvers were held in November in Poland and East Germany. The size and scale of the games indicated that they served a military preparedness purpose in addition to being a political demonstration in the face of the Berlin crisis. The Warsaw Pact nations had announced that their purpose was to strengthen readiness.[117]

It was estimated that the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in 1961 was 4,762,500 men.* This figure does not include the Albanian armed forces or any reserve and para-military units.[118]

1962

The Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries (less Albania) concluded a three-day conference in Moscow on February 1, 1962. Discussion had centered on the strength of the combined armed forces and it was reported that the decisions reached, which were undefined, would be submitted for ratification to the Political Consultative

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*For strength by country, see Appendix D, Table 3.

Committee at its next meeting.[119] On February 8 Albania protested to the Warsaw Pact nations her exclusion from the conference.[120]

The Soviet Union, Rumania, and Hungary conducted joint military maneuvers in April. Tass reported that the games confirmed the participating countries' readiness and combat power.[121]

The Political Consultative Committee held its fifth conference in Moscow on June 7. Albania did not attend. Some reports indicated that the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union did attend as an observer.[122] The Communique* of the meeting reported that the Committee heard a report by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko concerning Soviet-United States talks on a German peace settlement; fully supported the Soviet position in the talks, declaring it to be the Pact's general stand; and agreed on the necessity for continuing the talks. It stipulated that further talks should center on a determination of the West's willingness to seek a "concerted solution" to the German question and on the "main" question of withdrawal of occupation troops from Berlin. The intention of signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if necessary was reiterated. A general statement of the Pact's desire for solving problems through peaceful negotiation was made but the Committee concluded with the statement that,

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*See Appendix B.

> In the event that the answer to their peaceful policy is in the form of actions directed against the interests of their security, against the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and against the interests of peace, they are determined to defend their security in a worthy manner and to defend peace with all the means at their disposal.[123]

In June General Pavel I. Batov succeeded General Antonov as Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and as Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff.[124] General Antonov had died on June 18. General Batov was a career Army officer, twice decorated Hero of the Soviet Union, who had been a late-comer to the Communist Party, joining in 1929.[125]

Prague radio announced on October 1 that Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German troops had participated in large-scale maneuvers in Czechoslovakia during the preceding week under the Warsaw Pact's training program.[126]

On October 9 the Polish press agency announced that Soviet, East German, and Polish forces had been conducting joint training maneuvers in East Germany and western Poland for ten days.[127] These games were ceremoniously ended with a parade in Szcaecin (Stettin), Poland. Attending were Marshal Grechko; Wladyslaw Gomulka, Poland's Communist chief; Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz; and Polish Defense Minister General Marian Spychalski. No figures concerning participation were released but units of six different divisions were known to have been involved.[128] The increased frequency of joint maneuvers and the recognition accorded them, evidenced by the stature of the

officials attending the closing ceremonies of the exercises in Poland, further confirm the commitment made to develop the Warsaw Pact into a viable military alliance.

In response to the declaration of intended quarantine of Cuba by the United States, it was announced in Moscow on October 23 that Marshal Grechko had placed all Warsaw Pact forces on alert and issued instructions for a posture of increased readiness.[129] During the crisis, there were several communication exchanges between Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy and among the Soviet proposals was one for a NATO-Warsaw Pact detente. President Kennedy assured Moscow that the United States would be interested in any useful proposal, and Khrushchev welcomed Kennedy's willingness to discuss the matter.[130] No resolution of the detente was, however, forthcoming. On November 21, after the crisis had subsided, General Grechko ended the alert of the Pact forces.[131]

The estimate of the combined armed forces strength of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1962 was 4,549,500 men.* This figure is exclusive of reserve and para-military units.[132]

1963

The Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states (less Albania) met on February 27-28, 1963.[133] The Communique issued at the conclusion of the conferenc

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D., Table 4.

indicated that the conference had centered on the condition of the joint armed forces and the coordination of training during 1963.[134]

The heads of government and Party First Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact states with the exception of Albania met in Moscow in July, 1963. A statement issued at the end of the conference approved the agreements reached by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain on a limited nuclear test ban treaty.[135] Shortly thereafter, the Political Consultative Committee convened for its sixth meeting on July 26 in Moscow. Little information is available on this conference but the Communique issued stated that the Committee heard a report from General Grechko on, and reviewed questions concerning, the state of the Pact armed forces. It reported that "appropriate decisions were adopted as a result of the review and exchange of views on these questions" and that the session "was held in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and agreement."[136] Albania did not attend the meeting, nor were any observers known to attend.

On September 2 Moscow radio announced that Albania had broken with the Warsaw alliance. In the broadcast the Soviets accused Albania of attempting to seize Soviet military property during the Soviet evacuation of the naval base at Valona, Albania, in 1961.[137]

It was estimated that the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1963 was 4,319,000

men.* This figure does not include reserve or para-military units.[138]

1964

On September 23, 1964, the Soviet press reported that the Warsaw Pact forces had conducted maneuvers during the preceding week and that in the maneuvers Rumanian troops had distinguished themselves.[139]

Indications appeared before Khrushchev's replacement in October that the need for improvement of conventional force capabilities was receiving attention within the Soviet Union.[140] Soviet Army leaders apparently were successful in persuading the government to retain the option of conventional force and in preventing a planned reduction of ground troops. A contributing argument was the possibility of a protracted, Vietnam-type, land war in which strategic forces would be of little use.[141] When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed command, the defense posture was not significantly changed. Reliance continued to be placed on strategic military capability but other military capabilities began to receive more attention than they had under Khrushchev.[142]

The Soviet equivalent of the United States Marine Corps, their marine forces, were reactivated and training started again in 1964. The size of these forces was

NAVAL INFANTRY

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 5.

modest but the Soviet Union was demonstrating its potential for amphibious assault.[143]

Late in the year, Rumania began making efforts designed to loosen the alliance. In a statement made on November 19, in Bucharest, a government spokesman emphasized that Rumania was continuing its policy of independence in the dispute between the Soviet Union and Red China. He also announced that Rumania was opposed to all military pacts, including the Warsaw Pact.[144]

In 1964 the strength of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries (less Albania) was estimated to be 4,373,000 men.* This figure does not include reserve or para-military forces.[145]

1965

Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the Soviet Union continued its efforts to integrate the East European armed forces into Soviet defense plans. Emphasis continued to be on joint exercises and re-equipment of the Warsaw Pact forces. The increasing participation of the East European states, however, appears to have had the undesired (by the Soviet Union) effect of encouraging their independence from Moscow.[146] Indications appeared in 1965 that the East European nations were demanding a greater voice in the determination of Pact policy and were also

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 6.

balking at the expense burden required of them in supporting the Pact's forces.

The seventh conference of the Political Consultative Committee was held in Warsaw on January 19-20, 1965. This was the Committee's first meeting following Khrushchev's downfall. Albania did not attend. It was convened primarily to discuss NATO's plans to form a multilateral nuclear force. The Committee's Communique* stated that it would consider a NATO multilateral nuclear force a grave threat to peace, specifically as a proliferation of nuclear arms. The creation of such a force was defined as a ploy by the United States to ensure hegemony over Western Europe. It further stated that access to nuclear weapons by the West German "militarists" would only stimulate German revanchism and that West German participation in the force would put to an end any hope of German reunification. Western provocations throughout the world in general, and in Cuba and Vietnam in particular, were condemned. The Communique then made the following proposals: a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, a conference of European states on collective security, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a German peace settlement, legal recognition of existing national boundaries, renunciation of the use of nuclear arms by both Germanies, a world conference on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and a world conference on

*See Appendix B.

disarmament. It appears that at the conference the East European countries, and particularly Ulbricht of East Germany, pressed the Soviet Union for nuclear sharing within the Pact.[147] As early as 1960 the Soviets had decided to arm East Germany with missiles and in 1961 had made the same decision with respect to the remainder of the former satellites.[148] Thus the East European states had the vehicles for delivery of nuclear war-heads but presumably the Soviet Union retained possession of the nuclear weapons themselves.

On February 3 Albania published a letter to all signatories of the Warsaw Pact in which she called for condemnation of the Soviet Union and the correction of errors made under Khrushchev. Albania also disclosed her rejection of an invitation to participate in the Political Consultative Committee conference just concluded. The letter was interpreted by some observers as a rejection by China, to whom Albania was quite close, of a Soviet attempt at reconciliation. In the letter, Albania made it very clear that she considered herself still a member of the Pact, that she had been illegally excluded, and she listed the conditions which she required be met before she would return to the bloc:

> Condemnation by the Warsaw Pact members of the "illegal and hostile" Soviet actions against Albania, and the restoration of Albania's "legitimate rights" in the organization.
>
> The Soviet Government's return of all Albanian military equipment and payment for Albanian defense costs that would have been covered by Soviet military aid.

Payment for damage caused to the Albanian economy through the aid cutoff.
An official Moscow admission of Soviet "errors."
Cessation of Soviet arms shipments to Yugoslavia and India.[149]

It was reported on May 16 that the Rumanian government had circulated among Warsaw Pact states a note declaring that the presence of Soviet troops in other states was no longer justified and that Rumania was no longer willing to share in the cost of maintaining such troops. Although Soviet troops had been removed from Rumania in 1958, it was estimated that there were approximately twenty-four Soviet divisions in East Germany, four or five divisions in Hungary, and about 20,000 troops in Poland at that time. It was also reported that the Rumanian note criticized the continuity of Soviet command over the joint forces of the Warsaw Pact since its inception.[150]

On May 18, 1965, a nine-day meeting of Defense Ministers and armed forces chiefs of Warsaw Pact states (less Albania), held in Carpathia in the Ukraine of the Soviet Union, was concluded. According to Tass, tactical exercises were conducted and military armaments were shown at the meeting.[151]

Rumania continued the process of quietly reducing its role in the Warsaw Pact. In 1964 the Rumanians had decreased the length of obligated military service from twenty-four to sixteen months and allegedly had reduced its armed forces from 240,000 men to 200,000 men. Although Rumania outwardly gave the appearance of continued

participation in the Pact, since 1964 she had taken a position against all military pacts. The last joint exercises in which the Rumanians had participated were maneuvers with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1964.[152]

On September 14 in a speech in Moscow, Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev stated that the East European Communist nations were planning to strengthen the Warsaw Pact military alliance.[153]

Tass reported on September 26 that joint maneuvers involving troops from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would be held in October.[154] On October 16 the war games began in Thuringia in southwestern East Germany. Western officials viewed the maneuvers as a demonstration of Soviet bloc military might.[155] On October 23 the large-scale maneuvers were completed.[156]

Tass announced on November 23 that Soviet General Mikhail I. Kazakov had succeeded General P. I. Batov as Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.[157]

A high-level conference of Warsaw Pact nations concerning military training opened in Warsaw on November 24.[158] On November 25 the two-day meeting of Defense Ministers and Army commanders ended, and the Polish press agency announced that battle readiness of the Warsaw Pact member armies had been agreed upon.[159]

The estimate of the combined armed forces strength

of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1965 was 4,223,000 men.* This figure is exclusive of reserve and para-military units.[160]

1966

In March, 1966, at the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Party Secretary Brezhnev stressed the need for strengthening the "might and solidarity" of the Communist bloc. He emphasized the role played by the treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance and noted the growing strength and perfection of the Warsaw Pact, its capability to "rise in awesome force to the defense of the socialist system."[161] He also devoted considerable effort to outlining: the "revanchist" designs of West Germany; the complicity of the United States--alone and in conjunction with the other NATO nations; and a reminder of the warning against West German possession of nuclear weapons given in the Political Consultative Committee Communique in January, 1965.[162]

By May, 1966, Rumania's participation was at its lowest point since the founding of the alliance. Not only had Rumania been boycotting joint maneuvers since 1964, but no Rumanian military units were under the military command of the Pact.[163] In a speech in Bucharest on May 7, Rumanian Communist Party Leader Ceausescu

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 7.

complained of Soviet interference in Rumanian affairs and condemned military blocs, both in the East and West. Most observers felt that the Warsaw Pact was at the bottom of Ceausescu's discontent.[164] Though some suggested it, few felt that Rumania would leave the alliance. Fear, throughout East Europe, of a resurgent Germany and recognition of Soviet military strength were the major factors holding the Pact together. Ceausescu's speech was interpreted as a voice for national independence and an effort to stem Soviet demands for strengthening the Pact--which would make stronger the Soviet voice in the policies of the other states. Rumanian officials did not deny the Western interpretations of the speech[165] and Rumania pointedly ignored the Pact's eleventh anniversary.[166]

Rumanian diplomats, elaborating on the Rumanian efforts, indicated that Rumania's demand was for the Soviet Union to relinquish its monopoly of control over Warsaw Pact forces. The sources admitted that costs of supporting Soviet troops in other East European countries was not a significant issue. What was desired was that each member have autonomy over its own national forces, greater opportunity to participate in the planning of Warsaw Pact strategy, and a veto power over the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons quartered in its country.[167] Rumania denied, on May 18, any desire to leave the Warsaw Pact or seek its dissolution but did make clear that it was opposed to the strengthening of the Pact demanded by the Soviet Union.[168]

The Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states (less Albania) held a conference in Moscow on May 27 reportedly to plan for a summit meeting of the East European governments. Secrecy surrounded the meeting but it was understood that the summit was planned for July in Bucharest. Both the time and place were in doubt due to Rumania's opposition to Soviet efforts to centralize and strengthen the alliance.[169]

On May 31, in a statement made in Prague to the Thirteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev called for a strengthening of the Warsaw Pact.[170] On June 3, three days after his statement in Prague, Brezhnev delivered a speech in the Slovakian capital of Bratislava in Czechoslovakia in which he strongly urged unity and strengthening of Communist positions. This speech was interpreted in the West to be a warning to Rumania against continuing its policy of attempting to loosen the bonds of the Pact.[171]

The Foreign Ministers of the East European Communist countries held a conference in Moscow on June 6-9, reportedly to coordinate a joint position for an attempt to thaw East-West European relations. This was evaluated as an effort to capitalize on the uncertainty caused by France's withdrawal from the North Atlantic military system. The conference was seen as another planning session for an expected July summit.[172]

On June 11, in a speech in Rumania, Ceausescu called for the abolition of military blocs in the strongest public statement he had at that time made. In it he referred to the North Atlantic and Warsaw alliances by name and specifically called for their dissolution. He stated, however, that as long as NATO existed, Rumania would fully support the Warsaw Pact.[173] These remarks were interpreted as a compromise of the Soviet-Rumanian dispute and a concession by Rumania to the Soviet Union.[174]

Military leaders of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union met with East German leader Walter Ulbricht on June 12. The East German news agency reported that "questions of mutual interest" were discussed. Analysts felt that the meeting might imply plans for changes in the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.[175] East German and Czechoslovak air force units had been participating with the Soviets in maneuvers over East Germany and there was speculation following the meeting that the East Germans and Czechs might be preparing to take over some of the tasks assigned to the Soviet Union.[176]

Hungarian Communist Party leader Janos Kadar arrived in East Germany for a state visit on June 13. In greeting Kadar, East German leader Walter Ulbricht's remarks stressed the importance of the Warsaw Pact and were seen as a warning against suggestions for Pact dissolution. Ulbricht declared,

> Together with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact, the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic will fulfill their contributions to overcome the threat of war and to secure peace to turn Europe into a peaceful continent.[177]

In his reply, Kadar ignored the alliance.[178]

On June 17 the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries concluded a twelve-day, originally scheduled as a three-day, meeting in Moscow. The Soviet news agency Tass reported that European security and other questions of mutual interest had been discussed. There were rumors that there had been differences between the ministers, particularly regarding Rumania's line of independence. It was also announced that the Warsaw Pact summit meeting would be held in July in Bucharest. At the same time that this meeting was being conducted, Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China was visiting in Rumania.[179]

In Bucharest on July 4 the eighth meeting of the Political Consultative Committee began unceremoniously with a conventional welcome by host Rumanian Premier Ceausescu. Within an hour, the problem of conflict between Rumania and the Soviet Union apparently emerged, as the delegates from the other five states left the meeting. (Albania was not represented.) The Soviet delegation, led by Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin, and the Rumanian delegation remained for three hours, evidently deep in discussion.[180]

On July 5 the Committee signed a lengthy declaration*

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*See Appendix B.

on European peace and security. The declaration noted the participating countries' desire for lasting European peace and security, placed the responsibility for the failures of post-World War II international relations on Western "aggression," and expressed their belief that the European states' relations must be based on

> the renunciation of the threat of force or the use of force, from recognition of the need to solve international disputes only through peaceful means, on the principles of sovereignty and national independence, of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, on respect for territorial inviolability.[181]

Imperialist aggression, embodied in the United States, was seen as a prominent feature of the international situation. U.S. policy, supported by West European reactionaries--and particularly in collusion with militarist, revanchist Germany--was presented as a significant threat to Europe's peace. The idea of a NATO multilateral nuclear force was again denounced and again the Pact declared its intentions of taking the requisite defensive measures. The declaration appealed to the Germans to quit their territorial claims (this referred to German claims on territory taken from Germany and given to Poland by the Soviets after World War II). Recognition of the actual European situation, the existence of two Germanies, was called for. The Committee stated that because almost half of the European countries were socialist, joint efforts by all European countries could ensure European security. They called for normal East-West relations and specifically for relations between East and West Germany. The Committee declared that the

Pact countries favored speedy strengthening of European security and that they were ready to cooperate with other states toward that end. They then proposed the following specific measures: (1) development of "good-neighbor" relations between all European countries; (2) simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact or, failing that, liquidation of the respective military organizations of the two alliances; (3) partial measures toward a European military detente including liquidation of bases, withdrawal of foreign troops, reduction in the forces of both Germanies, creation of denuclearized zones, and cessation of nuclear-armed flights over and port visits of nuclear-armed naval vessels in European territory; (4) the definite precluding of Western German access to nuclear weapons; (5) recognition of existing national boundaries, including the Polish-German frontier; (6) conclusion of a German peace settlement, based on the existence of two Germanies and leaving the question of reunification to the "gradual rapprochement" of the two German states; and (7) the convening of "an all-European conference to discuss questions of ensuring security in Europe and establishing all-European cooperation."[182]

The conference ended on July 6. On the final day the delegates completed a communique* in which they stated that they had signed a statement on Vietnam.* The statement declared condemnation of the United States' participation in the Vietnamese war, supported the "fraternal

*See Appendix B.

people of Vietnam in defense of freedom and independency, for the unity and integrity of their homeland,"[183] called for the immediate end of U.S. aggression, and gave support to the programs of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The Pact then specifically: (1) warned the U.S. of its responsibility in the conflict; (2) promised moral and political support and material aid to North Vietnam; (3) offered to send "volunteers" to assist in the struggle against the U.S. if requested by North Vietnam; and (4) condemned U.S. actions spreading the war to Laos and Cambodia.

The Soviet Union declared on July 11 that it had instructed all agencies of its government to carry out the Warsaw Pact pledge of increased aid to North Vietnam. This included both economic and military assistance.[184]

On September 18 the Warsaw Pact forces finished preparations to begin the largest Communist bloc maneuvers since the end of World War II. Countries participating were the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It was reported that new weapons were to be tested including limited nuclear attack defense measures.[185] The war games opened on September 19 with Exercise Vltava, a mock battle in which the bloc forces repelled a Western attack that included both nuclear and conventional weapons.[186] The maneuvers ended on September 22.[187]

Leaders of the Pact armed forces held a conference in Budapest, Hungary, from November 13 through November 17.[188]

In 1966 the strength of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) was estimated to be 4,233,000 men,* not including reserve and para-military forces.[189]

1967

In January, 1967, Rumania established unconditional diplomatic relations with West Germany. On February 2 it was announced that a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries would open in East Berlin on February 6. Western analysts expected the meeting to be a display of solidarity with East Germany on the question of diplomatic relations with West Germany. In addition to East Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland had shown displeasure over giving West Germany a stronger base in East Europe. It was expected that East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Poland would try to obtain an agreement from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria to extract political concessions from Bonn before establishing diplomatic ties. The conditions desired were: recognition of the Polish-German frontier, disassociation from sharing nuclear weapons, and recognition of East Germany. East Germany, additionally, wanted political ties between West Germany and West Berlin severed.[190]

The Soviet Union announced in Warsaw, also on February 2, its intention to withdraw 50,000 Soviet

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 8.

troops from East Europe for use along the Soviet-Chinese frontier. At the time, Western experts estimated that there were 500,000 Soviet troops in bloc countries with the majority in East Germany.[191] The United States and West Germany disavowed any knowledge of the Soviet plan to withdraw troops.[192]

On February 3 the East German press criticized Rumania for having established diplomatic relations with West Germany. On the same day Rumania declined to send her Foreign Minister to the scheduled Pact foreign ministers' meeting, stating that she would instead send a lesser official.[193] On February 6 it was announced that the meeting, originally scheduled for Berlin, had been shifted to Warsaw. This was interpreted as an attempt to placate Rumania who by this time had declared her intention to boycott the meeting.[194] The Polish press announced on February 7 that the foreign ministers or their deputies would meet in Warsaw within the week. It was understood that Rumania had accepted an invitation and would send a deputy minister.[195] The meeting opened on February 9. It was expected that in addition to the demands desired by East Germany and Poland a demand for closer consultation on political questions in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty would be made.[196] The conference ended on February 10 and all indications were that it was a failure from the East German and Polish points of view. The communique issued mentioned nothing specific;

it was limited to general statements that the conference had reviewed and exchanged views on European peace and security. Rumania was the only state not represented by her foreign minister.[197]

In a speech in Moscow on March 10, Party Secretary Brezhnev supported the East German and Polish positions on diplomatic relations with West Germany and rejected Bonn's attempts at rapprochement with East Europe. He pointed to the February Foreign Ministers' meeting as the genesis of a "new state in concerting the foreign-policy efforts of the Socialist states."[198]

A two-day conference of Communist Parties of Europe at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, issued a statement on April 26 calling for dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and replacement of them by a general European plan for peace and security. The statement also recognized the growing military strength of West Germany and urged non-aggression pacts among all European states and recognition of West Berlin as a separate political entity.[199]

In early June, the Soviet Union began a naval build-up in the Mediterranean Sea which reached a peak of forty-six ships during the summer.[200] Included in the vessels dispatched to the Mediterranean were tank and troop landing ships,[201] making explicit the newly-developed Soviet capability for amphibious assault. By the end of 1967, the Soviet's permanent Mediterranean fleet would be at a level of thirty-five, five to ten

more than the preceding June and representing a four-fold increase over two years.[202] Though initially interpreted as a response to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the build-up was later evaluated by most observers as a long-planned Soviet move to develop its naval capability. As Hanson W. Baldwin suggested,

> For the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution, Communism has demonstrated an appreciation of the economic, political, psychological, diplomatic, and military importance of sea power.[203]

Although a unilateral effort, the enlarged Soviet Mediterranean fleet contributes substantially to the Warsaw Pact's military posture.

In a news conference held on June 25, following talks between Soviet Premier Kosygin and United States President Johnson at Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin called attention to the lack of NATO acceptance of proposals for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement.[204] On July 17 at a news conference in The Hague, Netherlands, Premier Maurer of Rumania urged dissolution of both alliances stating that Europe would be safer if both were discarded.[205]

Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, First Deputy Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, was named Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact on July 7. Yakubovsky succeeded Marshal Grechko who had in April become the Soviet Defense Minister following Marshal Malinovsky's death.[206]

In an article on July 23 Pravda, while not mentioning her by name, urged Rumania to resume a full role in the Pact.

The Rumanian National Assembly, expected to make a major policy decision on Pact participation, was scheduled to open on July 24. The timing of Pravda's words,

> Fraternal countries of socialism consider their participation in the Warsaw Treaty not as a formal membership but as a vital, creative working cooperation in military and political questions[207]

was clearly aimed at Rumania.[208]

On July 24, contrary to predictions that Rumania was about to increase its separation from Moscow, Party Secretary Ceausescu emphasized that cooperation with other Communist countries was the cornerstone of her foreign policy and called for increased consultation among Communists. Speaking to the National Assembly, Ceausescu also reaffirmed Rumania's participation in the Warsaw Pact. He did express a difference of opinion with the USSR on the question of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and on nuclear disarmament. In speaking of the Middle East hostilities, he said,

> But we wish honestly to tell our Arab friends that we do not understand and do not share the position of those circles which speak in favor of the liquidation of the state of Israel.
>
> We do not wish to give advice to anybody, but the lessons of history show that no people can achieve their national and social aspirations against the right to existence of another people.[209]

Many observers regarded Ceausescu's speech as an attempt to maintain Rumania's independent position while presenting his policy in a manner which would be acceptable to the Soviets.[210]

Rumania's resumption of participation in Warsaw

Pact maneuvers after failing to participate for three years was interpreted to be an attempt to reassure the Soviet Union that she recognized her obligations to the bloc. Rumania realized that her actions of unilaterally recognizing West Germany in January and refusing to adopt the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli crisis might have caused deep concern in the Soviet hierarchy which the Rumanians desired to alleviate. Rumania's prime objective in her move for independence was economic, not ideological.[211]

The West German Defense Ministry, on August 24, announced that the Warsaw Pact states had 807 naval vessels in the Baltic, considerably outnumbering the 97 warships that members of NATO had stationed there.[212]

Joint exercises involving Soviet, Bulgarian, and Rumanian forces--both ground and naval--were completed on August 27. The maneuvers were held in Bulgaria with the ships operating in the Black Sea and were concluded with a military review in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.[213] This marked the first time that Rumania had participated in Pact exercises since 1964, indicating a resumption by Rumania of Pact responsibilities. A similar exercise had been held earlier in August by USSR and East German forces.[214]

East German, Polish, and Soviet troops held joint maneuvers in Poland on the night of August 31. The maneuvers were interpreted as an effort to bolster Polish confidence in the Warsaw Pact's effectiveness. Confidence

had started wavering as a result of the quick Israeli victories over Arab forces equipped with Soviet arms in the summer's Middle East crisis.[215]

On October 10 Rumanian Foreign Minister Malitza called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central and eastern Europe and the removal of all United States, British, and Canadian troops from Europe.[216]

In a speech on October 12 U.S. Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland stated that the United States was determined to maintain NATO even if the Warsaw Pact were dissolved within the next two years. Ambassador Cleveland indicated that mutual dissolution would not bring peace and he emphasized the "political necessity" of the Western alliance.[217]

In Moscow on December 12 after two days of consultations, East German leader Ulbricht and Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin issued a communique in which they denounced West German aggressiveness and called for strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. The activities against which the statement was aimed were West Germany's policies toward East Europe and the growth of a strong political right in West Germany. Some observers believed that this was the initial step in a Soviet effort to return the German question to the center of the world stage.[218] At the same time it was alleged that Rumanian leader Ceausescu was delaying the renewal of a Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty due to the inclusion in the treaty of a standard Soviet warning concerning Germany.[219]

In 1967 the strength of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states (less Albania) was estimated to be 4,271,000 men.* This did not include reserve and para-military forces.[220]

1968

Having recognized West Germany, having failed to concur with the Soviet Union's stand on the 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict, and having blocked Soviet attempts to transform the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) into a regional economic planning device, Rumania came under attack from some of the more orthodox Communist leaders. After such an attack, the Rumanian delegation on February 28, 1968, walked out of a 66-nation conference of Communist Parties being held in Budapest, Hungary.[221] Following the walkout, the expectation in Bucharest was that while the Soviet Union would probably bring increased pressure on Rumania to conform, military intervention would not be contemplated--due in part to the fact that, after the Soviet Union and Albania, Rumania was domestically the most tightly controlled state in Eastern Europe.[222]

On March 6, shortly after Rumania's walkout, the ninth meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact was convened in Sofia, Bulgaria.[223] The Conference ended the following day and Rumania was

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 9.

apparently successful in maintaining its divergent position without provoking an open clash with the Soviet Union.[224] Three statements were issued by the Committee: the usual Communique,* a Declaration on Vietnam, and a Statement* concerning the nuclear nonproliferation treaty being considered by the world's nuclear powers. The Communique named the meeting's participants, reported that Vietnam and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty had been discussed, and stated that the "American imperialists" had been unanimously condemned for their "criminal actions" in Vietnam. The Declaration on the Threat to Peace Created as a Result of Expansion of American Aggression in Vietnam elaborated on the Committee's condemnation of the United States and support of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam. Unanimous support for and recommended approval of "the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that was submitted by the Soviet Union on Jan. 18, 1968, for the consideration of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee"*[225] was expressed in the Statement on nuclear nonproliferation by the signatory nations. Rumania, however, was not among the Statement's signatory nations; for the first time in the history of the Warsaw Pact, the Political Consultative Committee had issued a document that had not been unanimously endorsed by all participants at a meeting. Furthermore, after the conclusion of the meeting Rumanian officials expressed ignorance of even

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*See Appendix B.

the existence of the Statement. While some doubt should be attached to Rumania's "ignorance," it is probable that issuance of the document without Rumania's concurrence was a move on the part of the Soviet Union to isolate Rumania from the Communist camp.[226]

Communist leaders from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria met in Dresden, East Germany, on March 23.[227] By this time, leaders of the other bloc states--particularly the Soviet union, East Germany, and Poland--had become concerned with the "democratization" process in Czechoslovakia initiated by Alexander Dubcek who in January had replaced Antonin Novotny as Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Among the steps taken in the "democratization" process, Dubcek had earlier in March lifted media censorship. The communique issued by the Dresden meeting declared the participants' determination to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and to consolidate its armed forces;[228] Czechoslovak leaders were successful, however, in preventing the planning of joint maneuvers by Pact forces in Czechoslovakia.[229] Rumania, who had not been invited to Dresden, later declared that she would not consider herself bound by any decisions made in her absence; the Soviet-Rumanian split was deepening.[230]

During early May Soviet and Polish troops conducted major military exercises along the Czechoslovak border in Poland and East Germany.[231] Prague stated that it

had been informed in advance that "regular maneuvers of the Warsaw Treaty countries in the region of southern Poland" would be conducted.[232] The movements were not in fact Warsaw Pact maneuvers;[233] the operations were designed to apply psychological pressure on Czechoslovakia in an attempt to moderate its "democratization" process and its new, liberal "Action Program" adopted in early April.* By May 12 the Polish press began attacking the Czechoslovak regime.[234]

In a speech on May 22 Czechoslovak President Svoboda stressed the importance and desirability of continued alliance with the Soviet Union[235] and on May 24 it was announced that Warsaw Pact exercises would be held on Czechoslovak and Polish territory in June. The agreement to the maneuvers was interpreted as a gesture by Czechoslovakia to convince the Warsaw Pact of her loyalty to the bloc; it apparently had been extracted by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko during a visit earlier in the week. Czechoslovakia, however, had been successful in resisting proposals, probably transmitted by Grechko, that 11,000 Soviet troops be stationed in her western areas and that a "military Cominform" political department be created within the Warsaw Pact structure.[236]

Warsaw Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia on May 31 for announced staff exercises. The number of troops exceeded the expectations of the host country.[237]

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*For more discussion of the Czechoslovak crisis, see Chapter 4.

On June 4 it was reported that Soviet tanks had joined the "staff" exercises.[238] By June 18 it was known that several thousand Soviet and Polish troops, including signal units and motorized infantry, had entered Czechoslovakia. Marshal Yakubovsky, in Prague on that date, assured the government that the maneuvers involved only command units and would include forces from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.[239] The maneuvers were completed by the end of June but the Pact forces--under a variety of pretexts--remained in Czechoslovakia; these forces totaled an estimated 16,000 men, 4500 vehicles, 70 tanks, and 40 airplanes.[240] It was not until early August, after tension resulting from the Warsaw Letter* had dissipated and apparent resolution of Soviet-Czechoslovak differences had been obtained at the Cierna and Bratislava conferences,* that the Pact forces finally left Czechoslovakia.

On August 4 General Sergei M. Shtemenko replaced General Mikhail I. Kazakov as Chief of Staff of the joint Warsaw Pact forces. The 68-year-old Kazakov, Chief of Staff since 1956, was reportedly retiring for reasons of health.[241]

It was announced on August 10 that military maneuvers in areas bordering Czechoslovakia and involving Soviet, East German, and Polish troops, had ended. Simultaneously, it was announced that joint communications

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*See Chapter 4.

exercises involving troops from the same three countries had begun in Poland, southern East Germany, and the western Ukraine of the Soviet Union.[242] Soviet military leaders, including Defense Minister Grechko, visited southwestern Poland to discuss Warsaw Pact maneuvers with the Polish Army leaders.[243]

While the Čierna and Bratislava agreements had calmed the Soviet-Czechoslovak dispute, not all tension had disappeared. On August 18 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, through Pravda, charged that the Czechoslovak leadership was losing control of the country.[244] The Czechoslovak news agency, C.T.K., announced on August 19 that Czechoslovak Army divisions would hold maneuvers in Bohemia on August 21 and 22 with observers from other Warsaw Pact states attending.[245]

On August 20, at approximately 11 P.M., troops of five Warsaw Pact countries--the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria--invaded Czechoslovakia. Occupation was quickly effected. The Soviet Union announced in Moscow that the action had been requested by Czechoslovak leaders. This was denied by the Czechoslovak government but the government did ask the Czechoslovak people not to resist and to continue to report for work.[246] Active resistance was slight and scattered;[247] it was quickly overcome. The invasion force was initially estimated at about 200,000 troops[248] but by the time all occupation troops had arrived in Czechoslovakia estimates

were revised upwards, varying from 500,000 to 650,000. The Soviet Union apparently had second thoughts on the role of East German forces participating in the invasion and quietly withdrew them during the first three days.[249]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia greatly increased tension in Rumania and on August 21, the first full day of invasion and occupation, Rumanian leader Ceausescu pledged that any similar invasion of Rumania would be met with armed resistance. The following day, in an effort to remove any excuse for the Soviet Union to consider such an invasion, Ceausescu obtained unanimous parliamentary approval for his "program of national sovereignty combined with strict adherence to socialism."[250]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia was decided on by the Soviet Union and supported by the other four Warsaw Pact states due to their feeling that Dubcek had failed to meet secret agreements made at Cierna.[251] On August 27 a compromise was apparently reached in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders. The Czechoslovaks returned to Prague, Soviet tanks withdrew from strategic positions in the city, and the Czechoslovak United Nations delegation--having originally protested the invasion--announced that it would no longer participate in debate concerning the occupation of Czechoslovakia.[252] The following day President Svoboda informed his cabinet that withdrawal of the occupation troops would take several months and that at least two divisions would remain permanently stationed on the West German border.[253]

On August 31 the United States charged that the Soviet Union had, by massing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, upset the military balance in central Europe.[254]

Western observers of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia concluded that: (1) staff planning, probably begun six months before the invasion, was near perfect; (2) execution of the operation was as smooth as that within the capability of any Western nation; (3) communications equipments were first rate; (4) logistics were smooth and efficient; and (5) Soviet troop discipline and morale were superb.[255]

Tirana radio in September reported that Albania had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact.[256] The announcement had little effect as Albanian participation in the Pact had effectively ended in 1961.

Pressure was applied to Rumania by the Soviet Union in September to live up to Warsaw Pact commitments and to allow joint maneuvers on Rumanian territory. These proposals had probably been made earlier in the year but shelved due to the Czechoslovakia crisis.[257] In mid-September, Marshal Yakubovsky made a tour of the East European capitals, advocating the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact and particularly emphasizing a military build-up in the Balkans.[258]

On September 17 the United States warned the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that any intervention by them in West Germany would result in collective

response by NATO. The purpose of this warning was to calm fears in West Germany caused by a Soviet note of July 5 in which the Soviet Union contended that under Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter, it and its allies could intervene in West Germany "against renewal of aggressive policy by a former enemy state" of World War II.[259] Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, on August 16, West Germany had offered to declare the 1938 Munich Pact null if such a move would facilitate the establishment of West German-Czechoslovak relations.[260] Czechoslovakia--well aware of the strong opposition by the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany to such a move--had immediately responded that while Czechoslovakia did not exclude it as a possibility, establishment of relations with Bonn remained far in the future.[261] After the United States issued its warning in September, Pravda and Izvestia continued their propaganda campaign against West Germany but Western officials agreed that a Warsaw Pact move across the West German border was highly unlikely.[262] On September 27 Czechoslovakia requested Britain to declare the 1938 Munich agreement null.[263]

Following acquiescence by Czechoslovakia to Soviet demands early in October,[264] a treaty was signed between the two countries on October 16 concerning the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.[265] The treaty provided for the "temporary"--but for an unspecified length of time--garrisoning of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia,

pledged that the troops would not interfere in internal affairs, and made them subject to Czechoslovak law. While the authorized troop strength was not disclosed, it was estimated that the Soviet garrison would number about 100,000 men. While discussing ratification of the treaty, Czechoslovak Premier Černik told the National Assembly that the other Warsaw Pact troops could be expected to leave Czechoslovakia in about two months.[266]

On October 30 a two-day meeting of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact was concluded. The purpose of the meeting had been the discussion of methods of strengthening the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia was represented by a Deputy Defense Minister.[267]

Speaking at a Polish Party Congress on November 14, Rumanian Politburo member Stoica declared that Rumania would fulfill its duty if Rumania or any other Socialist country were attacked by imperialism. He also stated that Rumania would strengthen her defenses in order to meet Warsaw Pact membership requirements. Mention of Czechoslovakia or revisionism was carefully avoided.[268]

A military conference of the Warsaw Pact states opened in Bucharest on November 26 to "analyze problems of combat training."[269] During the meeting, the Rumanians apparently yielded to Soviet pressure and agreed to the conduct of joint maneuvers in Rumania. Though no date for the maneuvers was set, observers suggested that they would probably be held in the spring or summer of 1969. The meeting ended on November 29.[270]

The estimate of the combined armed forces strength of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1968 was 4,273,000 men.* This figure is exclusive of reserve and para-military units.[271]

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*For strength by country and military branch, see Appendix D, Table 10.

# IV

# TWO CRISES

## HUNGARY, 1956

The unsuccessful Hungarian Revolution of October, 1956, was in large measure initiated by events of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February of that year. Khrushchev's denigration of Stalin, the open tolerance of Tito, and the explicit recognition of "different roads to socialism" produced almost immediate effects in Hungary. Former Interior Minister Rajk, executed in 1949 for "Titoism," was quietly rehabilitated in March. The Stalinist Communist Party chief Rakosi was openly criticized in May and replaced by Erno Gero in July. Despite a tougher Soviet position in July following the Polish Poznan riots, and a Soviet secret directive instructing the satellites to use the Soviet Union, not Yugoslavia, as a model for development, Hungary continued to de-Stalinize and de-Sovietize. Former Premier Imre Nagy, expelled from the Party in 1955 for "Titoism," was reinstated in October.[272]

On October 21 university students began demanding more personal and national freedom. The following day similar demands circulated among the population and demonstrations called for the release of incarcerated Cardinal

Mindszenty and for the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The ban on public assembly was lifted on October 23 due to pressure by the demonstrators, and the demonstrations became more intense. Finally the secret police fired on the crowds in Budapest and the demonstrations became violent and uncontrolled. At this point, Party chief Gero, Premier Hegedus, and Party Secretary Janos Kadar returned from visiting Yugoslavia.[273]

By October 24 Soviet armed forces, requested during the night by Gero, and an appeal by Nagy, who during the night had succeeded Hegedus as Premier in an effort to calm the populace, appeared to have quelled all rioting except in a few scattered places.[274] Fighting continued, however, and Kadar, who replaced Gero as First Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's (Communist) Party on October 25, promised to negotiate with Moscow for the removal of Soviet troops as soon as order was restored. United States' President Eisenhower denounced the Soviet intervention and declared that the action proved that the Soviet Union had remained in Hungary to continue its occupation, not for protection of Hungary from aggression.[275]

The revolt spread to the countryside by October 26 and there was fierce fighting between Hungarian patriots and the Red Army. The United States, Britain, France, and other nations attempted to find some way to appeal the Soviet intervention. The U.S. State Department confirmed that the Soviets had the right to be in Hungary

under the Warsaw Pact but suggested that the legitimacy of putting down an internal rebellion could be questioned. It should be emphasized, though, that at the time the Soviet troops were being used at the Hungarian government's request.[276]

In an effort to halt the revolt, Premier Nagy held out hope to the Hungarian people of early departure of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil.[277] A new Hungarian government was formed on October 27 and on October 28 Nagy announced that he would "seek complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary,"[278] recognized a "new" army and police, and abolished the secret police. The following day he announced that free elections would be held.[279] It appeared that the Soviet troops were leaving Budapest; and at the same time the Soviet Union announced that it was willing to discuss with the satellite states the matter of Soviet troops stationed in their territories.[280] The Revolution had all but obtained its objective. A Soviet statement, drafted on October 30 and printed in Pravda on October 31, declared:

> Since it considers that the further presence of Soviet army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for an even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet Government has instructed its military command to withdraw Soviet Army units from Budapest . . . (and) is ready to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.[281]

On October 31, however, Soviet leaders appeared in Budapest to seek a stabilization of the situation. The

offer was made to immediately withdraw all Soviet troops from Hungary except those stationed there under Warsaw Pact agreements and to submit the removal of those forces to negotiation by the Warsaw Pact members. The new Hungarian Minister of State Affairs, non-Communist leader Tildy, refused the offer; he demanded immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops and declared that Hungary, in any case, would definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarians and Soviets then agreed to the establishment of a joint commission to discuss the Soviet withdrawal.[282]

The Soviet leaders, shocked by the Hungarian government's determination to repudiate the Warsaw Pact, probably consulted with Moscow during the night of October 31 and reached the decision to intervene.[283] While Hungary alone would not have been particularly significant, the Soviet fear was that such cracks in its buffer-zone defense might spread to more strategic states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany.[284] The Soviet leaders met with Kadar the following morning and it is probable that at that time plans were made for the formation of a new Hungarian government that would request Soviet military assistance. The Soviet leaders then left Budapest.[285]

Soviet troops began pouring into Hungary. On November 2, Premier Nagy demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet reinforcements. In a note to Secretary-General Hammarskjold of the United Nations, Nagy informed the U.N. that Hungary had repudiated the Warsaw Treaty,

declared her neutrality, and turned to the U.N. and the great powers for defense of her neutrality.[286] The Soviet Union apparently reassured Nagy concerning the Soviet troop movements, indicating that they consisted of nothing more than simple regrouping. On November 3 Hungarian spokesmen (including Defense Minister Maleter and General Staff Chief Kovacs) met with Soviet military representatives in the Soviet Army's Budapest headquarters. Nagy appealed by radio for their return on November 4 but nothing was heard of them until the Hungarian government, two years later, announced their execution. Nagy's radio appeal came only hours before Soviet units, including armored forces, crushed the Hungarian revolt.[287] News of the formation of Kadar's "Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants'" government and of Kadar's appeal for Soviet intervention was broadcast to the Hungarian people during the morning of November 4.[288] In May, 1957, the Soviet Union and Hungary signed a "status of forces" agreement, legitimizing the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Hungary.[289]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968

Events leading to the August, 1968, invasion of Czechoslovakia--by five of her allies--began with the October, 1967, clash between reform-minded Alexander Dubcek and Stalinist Antonin Novotny at a plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee.[290] On January 5, 1968, Dubcek replaced Novotny as Secretary

General of the Party and began a program of liberalization, a "democratization" process embracing both economic reform and civil liberties.

Early in March, Dubcek lifted media censorship. By late March, the Czechoslovak leaders were beginning to feel pressure from Communist leaders in allied states. Some pressure was exerted at the Dresden meeting of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria on March 23. After the Czechoslovak Communist Party adopted its new "Action Program" in April, the pressure increased. On May 3 Dubcek and the new Czechoslovak Premier Cernik met with Soviet leaders in Moscow where the Soviets apparently demanded that Czechoslovakia not withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or allow the liberalization to undermine Communist Party strength and that censorship of the press be restored--thus stopping liberal Czechoslovak attacks on orthodox Communism and on Muscovite intervention in Eastern Europe.[291] Having witnessed the Hungarian experience twelve years earlier, it is unlikely that Dubcek even considered severing Warsaw Pact ties; in his public statements throughout the year he emphasized Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the bloc.

Communist leaders of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria held discussions in Moscow on May 8 concerning the growing Czechoslovak problem.[292] Soviet troop movements, begun the next day along the Czechoslovak border in Poland, were noted in Prague but interpreted

as psychological pressure.[293] During May top Soviet leaders--including Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister Grechko--visited Prague and Dubcek agreed to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia in June.

Laying groundwork for later Soviet intervention, on May 25 the Soviet armed forces newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, published an editorial implying "that the United States was engaged in sabotaging socialism in Eastern Europe through subversive activities in Czechoslovakia."[294] On May 30 Novotny was expelled from the Central Committee and suspended from the Czechoslovak Communist Party.[295] In June Warsaw Pact maneuvers were held in Czechoslovakia; at the completion of the exercises, however, Soviet troops remained in the country.

Early in July the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria called for an East European summit meeting to discuss the events in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak leadership rejected the proposal.[296] A short time later, a meeting in Warsaw was announced. Though boycotted by Czechoslovakia, representatives of the other five states met on July 14 and 15 and discussed Czechoslovakia's democratization movement. The Warsaw Five issued a letter to the Czechoslovak leadership charging them with tolerating counterrevolutionary activity and demanding that the liberalization be reversed.[297] At the same time, Czechoslovakia on July 15 called for a revision of the Warsaw Pact, specifically for a rotation of the top

commander's post and for an amendment to the treaty to prevent its being used for political ends rather than military purposes.[298] On July 18 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a reply to the letter received from the Warsaw Five in which determination to continue the reforms was declared.[299]

While allegations of the discovery of a U.S. weapons cache in Czechoslovakia were being published, the Soviet Politburo demanded a meeting with the Czechoslovak Presidium on July 22 or 23 in either Moscow or the Ukraine.[300] On July 22 the Soviets agreed to have the meeting in Czechoslovakia and at the same time revived their demand that Warsaw Pact troops be stationed in Czechoslovakia along the West German frontier.[301] On the same day the Soviets announced that military maneuvers were being held in the western parts of the USSR, including the Ukraine and near the Czechoslovak border, and that the exercises were scheduled to continue until August 10.[302]

The Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium met in Cierna, Czechoslovakia, from July 29 to August 1. The Soviets demanded

> reimposition of censorship in Czechoslovakia; the suppression of anti-Communist political activities; the ouster of so-called ultraliberal Communists from leading positions; a tightening of border security and controls; and a limitation on relations with West Germany.[303]

It appeared that the Czechoslovaks held firm and that the Soviets finally gave in. The only announced result of the conference was that the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders

would meet on August 3 in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, with leaders from Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.[304] In a radio broadcast on August 2 Dubcek announced that the Soviet Union had acquiesced to the liberalization program.[305]

The meeting in Bratislava lasted only one day. It appeared that the only concessions made by the Czechoslovaks was that press articles criticizing the Soviet Union would be discontinued.[306] Soviet troops, present in Czechoslovakia since the end of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in June, departed. Following the Cierna and Bratislava conferences, the Soviets abandoned their attacks on Prague.[307] In mid-August Yugoslav leader Tito and Rumanian leader Ceausescu each visited Dubcek, implying their support of his position.

On August 16 after three weeks of silence the Soviet press began again attacking the Czechoslovak leadership.[308] A Pravda article on August 18 charged that they had lost control of the country and allowed the resumption of anti-socialist, subversive activities. The same article announced that the Czechoslovak people could depend on their Communist neighbors for help to "rebuff the intrigues."[309]

On August 20 forces from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia.[310] On August 21 the following Soviet statement was distributed in New York:

> Tass is authorized to state that party and Government leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have asked the Soviet Union and other allied states to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people

urgent assistance, including assistance with armed forces. This request was brought about by the threat which has arisen to the Socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia and to the statehood established by the Constitution--the threat emanating from the counterrevolutionary forces which have entered into a collusion with foreign forces hostile to Socialism.

The events in Czechoslovakia and around her were repeatedly the subject of exchanges of views between leaders of fraternal Socialist countries, including the leaders of Czechoslovakia. These countries are unanimous in that the support, consolidation and defense of the peoples' Socialist gains is a common internationalist duty of all the Socialist states. This common stand of theirs was solemnly proclaimed in the Bratislava statement.

The further aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and other Socialist states, the interests of the security of the states of the Socialist community. The threat to the Socialist system in Czechoslovakia constitutes at the same time a threat to the mainstays of European peace.

The Soviet government and the Governments of the allied countries--the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic--proceeding from the principles of inseverable friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the existing contractual commitments, have decided to meet the above-mentioned request for rendering necessary help to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.

This decision is fully in accord with the right of states to individual and collective self-defense envisaged in treaties of alliance concluded between the fraternal socialist countries. This decision is also in line with vital interests of our countries in safeguarding European peace against forces of militarism, aggression and revanche which have more than once plunged the peoples of Europe into wars.

Soviet armed units, together with armed units of the above-mentioned allied countries, entered the territory of Czechoslovakia on August 21. They will be immediately withdrawn from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as soon as the obtaining threat to the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia, the threat to the security of the socialist countries, is eliminated and the lawful authorities find that further presence of these armed units there is no longer necessary.

The actions which are being taken are not directed against any state and in no measure infringe state interests of anybody. They serve the purpose

of peace and have been prompted by concern for its consolidation.

The fraternal countries firmly and resolutely counterpose their unbreakable solidarity to any threat from outside. Nobody will be ever allowed to wrest a single link from the community of socialist states.[311]

The text of the Prague radio announcement of the invasion, as monitored in the United States, was:

To the entire people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic:

Yesterday, on 20 August, around 2300 (11 P.M.), troops of the Soviet Union, the G.D.R. (East Germany), the Hungarian People's Republic and the Bulgarian People's Republic crossed the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

This happened without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee.

In the evening hours the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee (had) held a session and discussed preparations for the 14th Czechoslovak Communist party congress.

The Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee Presidium appeals to all citizens of our republic to maintain calm and not to offer resistance to the troops on the march. Our army, security corps and people's militia have not received the command to defend the country.

The Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee Presidium regard this act as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between Socialist states but also as contrary to the principles of international law.

All leading functionaries of the state, the Communist party and the National Front: Remain in your functions as representatives of the state, elected to the laws of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Constitutional functionaries are immediately convening a session of the National Assembly of our republic, and the Presidium is at the same time convening a plenum of the Central Committee to discuss the situation that has arisen.

PRESIDIUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE[312]

On August 21 the invading forces continued to consolidate their occupation of the country. Radio Prague

went off the air at 11 A.M. but shortly thereafter resumed broadcasting from a clandestine location.[313] At the United Nations the Czechoslovaks demanded the withdrawal of the invading forces.[314] Many Communist leaders throughout the world, and including Tito and Ceausescu, condemned the invasion.[315] Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and President of the National Assembly Smrkovsky were arrested,[316] and it appeared that the Soviets were searching for a conservative group to form the hard core of a new government.[317]

Dubcek was attacked by name for the first time on August 22 in the Soviet press.[318] That evening a secret congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected a new Central Committee and Presidium,[319] each dominated by liberals. The congress also named Venek Silhan, an economist, to act in place of Dubcek and issued a demand for the withdrawal of all occupation troops and the release of the arrested Czechoslovak leaders.[320] While active resistance was slight, the solidarity of the Czechoslovak people with Dubcek was demonstrated through passive resistance and through the large number of clandestine radio stations broadcasting opposition to the occupation.[321]

Czechoslovak President Svoboda was flown to Moscow on August 23, apparently to discuss replacement Party and government leaderships.[322] The Soviets, embarrassed by their inability to find a conservative base in Czechoslovakia, were forced to bring Dubcek, Cernik, and Smrkovsky into the negotiations.[323] On August 25 leaders from

East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria joined the discussion.[324] On August 27 a compromise was agreed upon and the Czechoslovak leaders returned to Prague.[325] A communique issued by the meeting revealed little but it was later determined that agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of the occupation troops and on other conditions: (1) Czechoslovak political development was to be changed to be more in accordance with the Soviet type of socialism; (2) the 14th Czechoslovak (secret) Party congress declarations were to be invalid; (3) press censorship in Czechoslovakia was to be strengthened; (4) a declaration of counterrevolutionary activity was proposed but protested by the Czechoslovaks and not required; (5) the Czechoslovak mass media were not to criticize allies; (6) removal of Soviet troops was to be accompanied by the removal of other Soviet security forces; (7) Czechoslovak Interior Minister Pavel was to be relieved; (8) reparations were requested by the Czechoslovaks; (9) the international situation was to be adjusted in accordance with the Bratislava agreement; (10) the Czechoslovak government was to issue a declaration that it had not requested the United States and would not request the United Nations to discuss the invasion; (11) Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Sik and Foreign Minister Hajek were to be removed; (12) the Czechoslovaks were to issue a declaration that the Czechoslovak-West German border was not secure and would have to be secured by allies; (13) the results of

the Moscow negotiations were to remain secret and not be published; and (14) friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist camp were to be strengthened by Czechoslovakia.[326]

Upon returning to Prague both President Svoboda and Dubcek addressed the Czechoslovak people. Their speeches stressed normalization of life in Czechoslovakia, the need for calm, and the avoiding of provocation of occupation forces. Continued commitment to the liberalization program was pledged. Agreement on the withdrawal of the invading troops was reported but it was emphasized that their presence had to be accepted as "a political reality."[327]

On August 29 Smrkovsky announced to the nation that "certain measures" of press censorship and the disbanding of non-Communist political groups would be the first steps in restraining the liberal reform.[328] The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party met on August 31 for the purpose of reorganizing the Czechoslovak leadership to meet Soviet demands. Liberal General Pavel was replaced by moderate Jan Pelnar as Interior Minister.[329] The Central Committee elected a new, enlarged Presidium. Surprisingly, only two of its members were staunch Soviet supporters and they had been members of the old Presidium. Seven of the sixteen new members came from the Presidium elected by the secret Party congress, which the Soviet Union had declared illegal.[330]

During September other liberal Communist officials

were replaced including Sik, who had engineered the economic reforms, and Foreign Minister Hajek.[331] On September 6 Pravda printed a definition of the conditions required before occupation troops would be withdrawn:

> The process of normalization means, first of all, the complete exposure and stamping out of the subversive activities of the right-wing, antisocialist forces, the elimination of their influence on a part of the population and especially youth, the resolute strengthening of the leading role of the Communist party in the activities of the state agencies, in the ideological and public spheres, in the whole life of the country.[332]

Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders continued to meet throughout September, negotiating and discussing the "normalization." On September 11 most Soviet armor was withdrawn from Czechoslovak cities but the countryside remained an armed camp.[333] On September 13 the National Assembly reimposed direct censorship, re-established certain unspecified police measures, and announced the formation of a State Defense Council for the purpose of strengthening the Warsaw Pact and the Czechoslovak Army.[334]

Dubcek, Cernik, and Deputy Premier Husak went to Moscow on October 3 for negotiations.[335] On October 4 the Czechoslovaks apparently agreed to Soviet demands. The talks ended and the communique issued stated that Czechoslovakia had agreed to more vigorously work to ensure the agreements made in Moscow between August 23 and 26 and that

> They will step up efforts to raise the leading role of the Communist party, will intensify the struggle against the antisocialist forces, will take the necessary measures to place all the mass information

> media at the service of socialism, will reinforce the party and state organs with men firmly adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletariat internationalism.[336]

The two states agreed to sign a treaty concerning the permanent stationing of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia and indicated the need for a reliable barrier against the "mounting revanchist strivings" of West Germany.[337] The "status of forces" treaty was signed on October 16.[338]

On October 28 tens of thousands of Czechoslovaks merged celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic with the biggest anti-Soviet demonstrations since the first days of the occupation. The demonstrations constituted the first anniversary celebration held since the Communist coup d'etat in 1948. In addition to protesting the Soviet occupation, they also demonstrated support of the Czechoslovak leadership.[339]

Despite the demonstration, by November the Soviet Union had substantially curbed the Czechoslovak reform program. While Dubcek, due to popular support, could not be removed as Nagy had been in Hungary, efforts were being made to politically isolate him.[340]

# V

## COMMENT

The members of the Warsaw Pact explained its creation as a response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the re-arming of West Germany; the West tended to view the new alliance as an attempt to hasten military integration of the bloc and to provide justification for Soviet troops remaining in satellite countries.[341] Each of these reasons partially explains the Pact's existence. Of greater importance, underlying the military commitments made at Warsaw in May, 1955, a formal institutional framework was created that provided the Soviet Union with a channel for dominating bloc foreign affairs and a vehicle for attacking Western unity.

The Russians have historically had ambivalent feelings toward the Germans, both admiring and fearing them, and Russia has always desired a buffer zone between the two nations. Post-World War II domination of the East European states has given the Soviets such a buffer and military integration has increased the value of the zone. As a result, the "northern tier" of the Pact's countries--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany--has received the greatest portion of the Soviet Union's attention within the Warsaw alliance.[342] These three countries

provide a geographical barrier to land invasion of the USSR not only by Germany but by any Western power. In addition, the "northern tier" would be pivotal during a military campaign in central Europe.[343]

The only real military significance of the Warsaw Pact initially was that it provided justification for the quartering of Soviet troops throughout the bloc. The presence of the Red Army helped install Communist regimes in most of the East European states. The presence, use, or potential use of Soviet troops has since World War II been used by the Soviet Union--and by the client states--as a method of maintaining discipline and Communist control in Eastern Europe. The bilateral treaty network executed within the bloc did not provide any justification for the presence of Soviet troops within the territories of the East European states; the Warsaw Pact agreements did provide such justification. After the Polish and Hungarian experiences in 1956, the USSR concluded more definitive agreements with the other bloc countries, as with Poland, concerning the status of Soviet troops within their territories.[344] A similar agreement was made with Czechoslovakia in 1968 after Soviet troops occupied and remained within that country.

The Warsaw Pact may also be interpreted as having crystallized a Soviet "sphere of influence."[345] It has presented a barrier to national autonomy[346] and has contributed to keeping the bloc together.

The Political Consultative Committee has been a forum through which the Soviets could direct the foreign policy efforts of the bloc. The guise of mutual consultation among the members made this domination more palatable to both the puppet governments and their peoples. After the Cominform was dissolved in April, 1956, the framework provided by the Warsaw Treaty became the only permanently existing device through which the Soviets could bring pressure to bear on the collective external politics of the East European countries.

The communiques of the Political Consultative Committee have been used to express unanimity, thereby providing considerable propaganda value both within and outside the bloc. Statements favoring solution to such issues as disarmament, a German peace treaty, German unification, and de-nuclearized zones in Europe have appeal throughout the world. Constant reinforcement of the position that the Communist countries are peace-loving, oppose aggression, and favor non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries will certainly convince some communities, world events not withstanding. Such reinforcement is afforded in the Committee's communiques.

The political meetings of the Warsaw alliance have been used to bestow collective blessing on Soviet foreign policies, as in Cuba in 1962; to demonstrate unity in the face of crisis, as in Berlin in 1961; and to exert pressure on member states, as in the issue of diplomatic relations

with West Germany in 1957. They have also been used to denounce alleged Western aggression, particularly United States and NATO actions, and to time and again criticize the rearmament of West Germany. Two purposes are served by criticism of the West and particularly of West Germany: world opinion is encouraged against Western military power and unity, and the East Europeans are made to feel the necessity of their alliance with the Soviet Union for defense. In a similar manner, the political statements of the Pact are used to mobilize world opinion in favor of certain bloc aims, as recognition of the Polish-German frontier--which would sanction the illegal Soviet action of transferring German territory to Poland after World War II.

The Soviets have, since its formation, made every effort to enhance the status of the Warsaw Pact. The rank of the delegates to the Warsaw Conference in 1955, the composition of the Political Consultative Committee, and the naming of top Soviet military men as Commander-in-Chief of the united Pact forces are evidence of these efforts. The object of these endeavors has been to create an organization equal to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to prepare the way for a trade-off between the two alliances in East-West negotiations. The proposal for an all-encompassing European collective security organization--which would remove some of the barriers to messianic Communism--dates back in Warsaw Pact history to the initial meeting

of the Political Consultative Committee in 1956. The proposal for a non-aggression agreement between the two alliances is almost as old, having been formulated at the Committee's second meeting in 1958.

In the pursuit of equal status with NATO, the Warsaw Pact has neared attainment of its goal. While in 1955 British Foreign Secretary Macmillan could state that the West did not consider NATO and the Warsaw Pact equals and would not trade one for the other in negotiations and while even as late as October, 1967, U.S. NATO Ambassador Cleveland could state that even if the Warsaw Pact were dissolved in the next two years, the United States was determined to maintain NATO, the same statements could not be made in 1968. On June 14, 1968, in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council of NATO at Reykjavik, Iceland, the members "stressed the need for the alliance to maintain its military strength until balanced reduction of forces could be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact states."[347] On June 26 NATO specifically called for mutual reductions.[348] Though the invasion of Czechoslovakia later in the year no doubt caused swift reappraisal of this position, the equality of the two organizations had been implicitly voiced.

During the first six years of the Warsaw Pact's existence, the Soviet Union was interested in neither strengthening the satellite forces nor truly integrating them into the Soviet military machine. Only one maneuver was conducted between 1955 and 1961. An integrated bloc

air defense system was formed, technical military assistance was given to the East European countries, and weapons were standardized throughout the bloc,[349] but no reliance was placed on forces other than the Red Army nor does it appear that the satellite forces were considered capable of anything more than delaying or harassing actions. This may be seen even in the command relationships established when the Pact was formed. No integration of command, such as exists in NATO, was envisioned. The forces of each country were considered a separate entity, each headed by its own military organization. Co-ordination was provided only between the Commander-in-Chief, with his supporting staff--which did include representatives from each country--and the Deputy Commanders-in-Chief, one from each member state. This was not the framework of a viable military organization. The USSR did and has continued to maintain complete control of the Joint Command; the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff have always been Soviet.

In 1961 the USSR reversed its former position. Although no changes have been made to the formal command relationships, close military liason now exists at the working level between the Pact members. Joint maneuvers are held frequently and not only at politically propitious times. The swift, decisive invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 indicates how well co-ordinated the Pact's forces have become. The armies of the East European countries have been modernized; although no state has been

permitted to develop an arms industry sufficient in itself, each has been assured modern weapons. The Soviets have armed the East Europeans with nuclear weapon delivery capability though it is assumed that the USSR holds the nuclear weapons.[350]

In the event of a nuclear war, the movement of reinforcements from the Soviet Union to the East European countries would be physically difficult. This alone makes the Warsaw Pact and a capable, integrated military force desirable.[351] The reliability of the non-Soviet forces of the unified command may still be questionable--even despite Czechoslovakia. Though they would no doubt be dependable in a conflict against traditional national adversaries, they are probably politically undependable.[352]

The loss of Albania in 1961 was not particularly damaging to the Warsaw Pact as an alliance, although it did give the Chinese Communists a sympathetic voice in Europe. In fact, the defection of Albania may have contributed to the Soviet decision to reshape the Pact into a capable, integrated military force, in which case the loss of Albania actually contributed to the viability of the alliance.

Beginning in late 1964, the Soviet Union's position in the Warsaw Pact alliance began deteriorating. Perhaps aided by the downfall of Khrushchev and the subsequent inability of the Soviet Politburo to agree on a single replacement--which may have been interpreted as a sign of

weakness of the top Soviet leadership--and encouraged by increased active participation in the Pact, some of the East European states began contemplating more independent policies. Rumania continued her uncommitted role in the Sino-Soviet dispute and announced opposition to all military blocs, including the Warsaw Pact. In 1965 East Germany's Ulbricht pushed the Soviet Union for nuclear sharing and Rumania continued its attack on the Warsaw Pact and criticized the presence of Soviet troops in other states.

The Soviet leadership apparently decided in 1966 to curb the growing loss of control over the East European bloc. Rumania continued her opposition to the Pact and Hungary's Kadar failed to support Ulbricht's statement of support of the Pact. Soviet Party chief Brezhnev, however, in speeches in Czechoslovakia, warned against further attempts to loosen the bonds of the alliance. Both the Foreign Ministers meeting in June and the Eighth Political Consultative Committee meeting in July were rent by arguments on the question of independent policies.

Rumania established relations with West Germany in January, 1967, causing considerable disturbance in the bloc and very real concern on the part of East Germany and Poland. In July she was finally forced to quit her opposition and declare support for the Warsaw Pact. She continued to follow an independent foreign policy line in other matters; specifically, she failed to support the Soviet Union's position in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In the late fall

the Czechoslovak program for democratization began to emerge.

The decision made by the Soviet Union to crush the Czechoslovak democratization process in 1968 must have been difficult to reach. Although expecting support from conservative elements--which failed to materialize--the Soviets did not have a "Czechoslovak Kadar," already selected and instructed, to make the move appear legitimate. At a time when support for NATO was declining and overtures were being made by NATO for mutual force reductions, the Soviets could ill afford so drastic a step as invasion of another country, even one within their "sphere." While supported by East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria, the more moderate Kadar of Hungary was only lukewarm to the idea of invasion, and the Soviet Union knew to expect opposition from Rumania if she were asked to participate. The Soviet Union also had to expect to lose a great amount of prestige and position among the world's uncommitted states and possibly among the Communist Parties in Western nations.

The Soviet reaction to Czechoslovakia stands in contrast to its reaction to Hungary in 1956. In the Hungarian instance the Soviet Union was willing to allow increased internal liberty and democracy but objected to Hungary's attempt to leave the bloc. In the case of Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had genuine assurances of Czechoslovak loyalty to the bloc but was unwilling to allow the desired internal liberalization.

In view of the losses that the Soviet Union stood to suffer, the decision to invade Czechoslovakia can only be understood as a choice made to avoid greater loss--an outbreak of revolution within the bloc or within the Soviet Union itself. The liberalization in Czechoslovakia coupled with the unrest and agitation of the intelligentsia over the past few years, particularly in the Soviet Union, must have been evaluated as a greater risk than the losses to be incurred by invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Since 1961 the Warsaw Pact has grown from a paper military alliance into a capable, integrated armed force. Since 1964 it has evolved from a rubber-stamp congress into a less tightly controlled forum for the discussion of mutual policy. Despite the recent efforts of the Soviet Union to reimpose its uncontested will on the bloc, independence of action continues to appear. Return to a pre-Dubcek Czechoslovakia seems inconceivable. Kadar in Hungary continues to grow more moderate. The events of early 1969 indicate that Rumania still feels no compunction to yield to Soviet pressure.

As the Soviet monolithic hold on the Communist world continues to loosen and the desire within the East European countries for national Communism continues to grow, more dissension in the ranks of the Warsaw Pact can be expected. The Soviets may find that the "consultations envisaged in the Treaty" on a basis of equality among the members--without the pre-eminence of the Soviet Union--will be the

only method by which the USSR can ensure the cooperation of the Communist nations and the maintenance of a unified bloc. The Warsaw Pact will continue to be the scene of important developments in the fate of Communism and the destiny of the East European states.

## NOTES

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Appendix A

(from New Times, No. 21, May 21, 1955, supplement, pp. 65-70)

# TREATY

## of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic

The Contracting Parties,

reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe;

mindful, at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of "Western European Union," with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states;

being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe;

guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs,

have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania: Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic: Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic;

the President of the German Democratic Republic: Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic;

the State Council of the Polish People's Republic: Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.:

the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic,

who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

## Article 4

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

## Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

## Article 6

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

## Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.

Article 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years.

Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force.

Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania
Mehmet Shehu

For the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
Vylko Chervenkov

For the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic
Andras Hegedus

For the President of the German Democratic Republic
Otto Grotewohl

For the State Council of the Polish People's Republic
Jozef Cyrankiewicz

For the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic
Viliam Siroky

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ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMAND
of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to establish a Joint Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defence or other military leaders of the signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Signatory states will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.

## FINAL COMMUNIQUE
## on the Warsaw Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security

From May 11 to 14, 1955, a second Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security took place in Warsaw, with the participation of the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Conference was attended by the following representatives of the participating states:

For the People's Republic of Albania:
Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania (head of the Delegation); Lieutenant General Beqir Balluku, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defence; Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria:
Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (head of the Delegation); General of the Army Pyotr Panchevsky, Minister of Defence; Mincho Neichev, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the Hungarian People's Republic:
Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic (head of the Delegation); Colonel General Istvan Bata, Minister of National Defence; Janos Boldoczky, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Endre Sik, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lajos Dragos, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Hungarian People's Republic in Poland;

For the German Democratic Republic:
Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic (head of the Delegation); Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Prime Minister; Willi Stoph, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior; Dr. Lothar Bolz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Otto Nuschke, Deputy Prime Minister; Dr. Hans Loch, Deputy Prime Minister; Hans Reichelt, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Lieutenant General Heinz Hoffmann, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Stefan Heymann, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Democratic Republic in Poland;

For the Polish People's Republic:
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic (head of the Delegation); Marshal of Poland Konstantin Rokossowski, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defence; Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marian Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the Rumanian People's Republic:
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic (head of the Delegation); General of the Army Emil Bodnaras, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Armed Forces; Simion Bughici, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieutenant General Ion Tutovcanu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Grigore Preoteasa, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marin Florea Ionescu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Rumanian People's Republic in Poland;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R. (head of the Delegation); V. M. Molotov, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R.; Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, Minister of Defence, U.S.S.R.; Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev; A. M. Puzanov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, R.S.F.S.R.; N. T. Kalchenko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ukrainian S.S.R.; K. T. Mazurov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Byelorussian S.S.R.; V. T. Lacis, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Latvian S.S.R.; M. A. Gedvilas, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Lithuanian S.S.R.; A. A. Muurisepp, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Estonian S.S.R.; V. A. Zorin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R; P. K. Ponomarenko, U.S.S.R. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Poland;

For the Czechoslovak Republic:
Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic (head of the Delegation); General of the Army Alexej Cepicka, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence; Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Conference was also attended by an observer from the Chinese People's Republic--Deputy Premier of the Government Council and Minister of Defence, Peng Teh-huai.

The Conference thoroughly examined the changes in the international situation which have arisen as a result of the ratification of the Paris military agreements, and reaffirmed that the ratification of the Paris agreements, providing for the creation of a new military alignment in the form of "Western European Union" with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic bloc, heightens the danger of a new war and threatens the national security of peaceable states.

The states taking part in the Conference decided to take necessary steps to ensure their security and safeguard peace in Europe.

For this purpose a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was concluded at the Conference by the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Conference also adopted a decision to set up a Joint Command of the armed forces of the Treaty states.

The Conference took place in an atmosphere of complete unanimity which reflected the sincere friendship and cooperation of the fraternal peoples of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism.

## Appendix B

I. Communique and Declaration of the First Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee.

Communique (from New York Times, January 29, 1956, p. 43).

The decision on the unified command was discussed and adopted at the proposal of commander in chief of the unified armed forces Marshal I. S. Konev. Organizational problems concerning activities of the unified armed forces made available by countries who signed the Warsaw Treaty were solved.

A proposal of the delegation of the (east) German Democratic Republic that after the formation of the national people's army (its) armed contingents be incorporated in the unified armed forces was adopted.

It was resolved that the Minister of Defense of the German Democratic Republic (Willi Stoph) would become one of the deputy commanders of the unified armed forces.

Under provisions of the Warsaw Treaty stating that the contracting parties would consult each other on international questions affecting their common interests, the political consultative committee discussed the international situation and reached conclusions contained in a declaration signed by representatives of members of the Warsaw Treaty.

It was decided that the Political Consultative Committee would meet whenever necessary, but at least twice a year, to discuss questions arising from implementation of the Warsaw Treaty. Meetings will be presided over by representatives of each country in turn.

Subsidiary organizations shall be established and will have their headquarters in Moscow. They are:

A. A standing commission charged with the task of drafting recommendations concerning problems of foreign policy.

B. A joint secretariat composed of representatives of all members of the Warsaw Treaty.

Declaration of the First Session of the Political Consultative Committee
(from Supplement to New Times, No. 6, February 2, 1955, pp. 33-36)

DECLARATION
of the States Participating in the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

At a meeting in Prague of the Political Consultative Committee set up in pursuance of the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty states, to wit, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the People's Republic of Albania, exchanged views on the international situation and the question of European security. They find that they are fully unanimous in their appraisal both of the general international situation and of the situation that has arisen in Europe. They are likewise unanimous as to the measures that are necessary for further relaxation of international tension, settlement of outstanding international problems, and consolidation of the peace and security of Europe.

The deep desire of the peoples for peace has already led to substantial changes in the international situation and to a definite easing of tension in relations between states. New and hitherto unutilized opportunities have been revealed for improving relations between countries and promoting international cooperation, irrespective of differences in social system. The effectiveness has been demonstrated of the method of settling differences and disputes between countries not by force or the threat of force, but by negotiation, with due respect for the mutual interests of the parties concerned. It is for this reason that the recent meetings of leading statesmen, notably the Geneva Conference of the Four Heads of Government, have been of great positive value in creating a healthier international climate generally and lessening the danger of another war.

International developments in these past years have shown that far from contributing to the settlement of differences between states, the policy of forming aggressive military blocs directed against peaceable countries, such as the North-Atlantic bloc, the Baghdad bloc and the Southeast Asian military bloc (Seato), only tends to aggravate such differences and causes still greater international strain. The result of this policy is an armaments race of unprecedented scale, notably in the field of atomic, hydrogen, rocket and other weapons of mass destruction. It has already led to the material resources of countries being expended on

a vast and ever-increasing scale for the production of hydrogen and atomic weapons, rocket machines, aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, guns and other armaments. This undoubtedly enhances the danger of another war, which would inflict incalculable sacrifice and misery on mankind.

At the same time, for many countries which are forced to participate in these military blocs by outside pressure, by fair means or foul, such participation involves a direct menace to their national independence, the threat of being drawn into conflicts in alien interests; it also involves the threat of the colonial resubjugation of nations which, as a result of persistent struggle, have thrown off the colonial yoke and obtained the opportunity to develop in independence.

It is not without reason that the policy of creating aggressive military blocs and expanding arms production is meeting with the condemnation of an ever-wider range of countries. There is growing support for collective effort in behalf of peace, and for international cooperation based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. This aim is likewise furthered by the tendency on the part of a number of states to pursue a policy of non-participation in aggressive military blocs, a policy of neutrality.

The Warsaw Treaty states welcome this tendency, being convinced that support of such tendencies strengthens the forces of peace and weakens the forces of war.

They express their sympathy with the peoples of Asia and Africa who are upholding their legitimate right to independent national development.

The Warsaw Treaty states affirm their full support of the decisions of the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference, whose participants demonstrated their determination to uphold the cause of peace and progress and condemned the colonial system, another telling blow to which was the victory of the great Chinese people and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, which is today a powerful bulwark of world peace. They note the outstanding part played at this conference by India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt and other countries. They declare their readiness to facilitate the implementation of the Bandung Conference decisions, including the decisions on economic and cultural cooperation on a basis of mutual benefit and without imposition of any political, military or other conditions.

The Warsaw Treaty states naturally attach especial importance to the situation in Europe and to the measures necessary to safeguard European security. In the present situation, when Europe is divided into mutually-opposed military groupings, when the Nato states are arming on an ever-increasing scale, and when Western Germany has been integrated into Nato and is being actively remilitarised, the European nations are understandably concerned for the

peace of Europe. They are fully cognizant of the danger implicit in the expansion of armed forces--of armies, air forces and stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen weapons. They likewise realize that the continuation of this situation in Europe will further increase the burden of military expenditure the nations are bearing in consequence of the arms race.

It is this realization of the danger latent in the policy of forming aggressive military blocs and expanding armaments that explains the support given by the French people in the recent parliamentary elections to the forces advocating international cooperation, peaceful settlement of outstanding problems, and safeguarding of the peace and security of Europe and the world.

The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania declare that they are prepared to cooperate with all other nations in measures designed to strengthen European security and eliminate the menace of war in Europe. They are determined to continue their policy of peace and all-round peaceful cooperation with all countries, big and small. This aspiration springs from their deep conviction that another war would spell for the nations tremendous sacrifice and devastation, primarily of countries converted into battlefields. It springs also from the internal development requirements and the very nature of their countries, whose peoples are engaged in majestic plans for raising national living standards and promoting all-round economic and cultural development, so as to enable the latest achievements of science and technology to be placed at the service of man.

In contradistinction to the desire of the peaceable states to consolidate European security, certain circles in the West fear relaxation of international tension and broader cooperation among the states. They are plainly seeking to foster a war psychosis and continue the "cold war," believing that only in this way can they prevent the disintegration of the military blocs they have formed in Europe, and not only in Europe, maintain the arms drive and ensure the further growth of the already high profits of the capitalist monopolies.

At the same time, the aggressive elements in those countries are seeking, with their broadly advertised military programs and inflammatory statements, to frighten the peaceable countries and compel them to incur excessive military expenditure and curtail their peaceful economic and cultural development. They are afraid of the growing strength of the forces of peace, and of the growing prosperity of the peaceable nations.

All this explains why the Western Powers create one obstacle after another to agreement on general European security, refuse to solve the problem of reducing armaments and banning atomic weapons, and refuse to discontinue arms expansion.

The peoples of our countries, confident in their

strength and inspired by their great achievements in building socialism, are not to be frightened or deceived. Relying on the irrepressible desire of all peoples for peace, and on their combined and growing might, they will continue to pursue their peaceful constructive policy and actively assist in promoting the peace and security of the nations.

Peaceful conditions for the development of the European nations can best be ensured by a system of collective European security that would supplant the existing military alliances in Europe. Desirous of facilitating the establishment of an effective system of European security, the Warsaw Treaty states declare that they are prepared to join with other states in examining proposals to this end.

This object might be furthered by the conclusion of an agreement of this nature first by some of the European countries, including the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France, and also the United States, as well as by the establishment in Europe of a zone in which the size and location of armed forces would be determined by special agreement of the countries concerned. The proposals on this score advanced by the British government at the Geneva Conference of the Four Heads of Government might be examined in this connection.

Worthy of particular attention is the question of establishing such a special zone of limited and controlled armaments in Europe that would include both parts of Germany, and an agreement between the states to this effect. Such an agreement might provide for the withdrawal, or for limitation of the size, of the foreign forces in both parts of Germany, and for limitation of the armed contingents of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, with the establishment of the necessary control to ensure the observance of the agreement. Such an agreement would go a long way towards further relaxation of tension in Europe. It would likewise create more favourable conditions for the solution of the German question in accordance with the requirements of European security.

Pursuing their policy of armaments expansion, the North-Atlantic bloc countries, in December last, pronounced in favour of equipping their armies with atomic weapons and increasing the size of the Nato air forces in Europe by one third. It is plain that the purpose of this step is to aggravate the strain in Europe, continue the arms drive, and increase the already inflated military budgets. This is being done despite the fact that the peaceable countries of Europe have already carried out a series of measures to reduce their armed forces and military budgets.

Inasmuch as the decision of the North-Atlantic bloc runs counter to the demand of the peoples to end the armaments race and remove the threat of atomic war, the Warsaw Treaty states emphatically condemn this decision as incompatible with European security. They propose that, pending an agreement prohibiting atomic weapons, the states concerned shall agree that the armed forces stationed in German

territory, including the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, shall not be armed with atomic weapons. Such an agreement would be a step forward in easing European tension, and would accord with the interests of the German people.

The exchanges of opinion between leading statesmen of the Four Powers in Geneva last July and October revealed a desire by the parties to resolve existing disagreements peacefully, through negotiation. In this connection, it would be of great value if the Warsaw Treaty states, on the one hand, and the North-Atlantic Treaty states, on the other, undertook to settle all disputes and disagreements that might arise solely by peaceful means.

The Warsaw Treaty states are of the opinion that the establishment of good relations and the settlement of controversial issues between countries, irrespective of whether they may be associated at the present time with one or other military alliance, would be of great importance for the promotion of peace. This especially applies to neighbouring countries. Of great value, in particular, would be the establishment of good-neighbour relations between the Soviet Union, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Italy, Czechoslovakia and the German Federal Republic. Of great value, likewise, would be the establishment of normal relations between countries which still do not maintain such relations.

Pending agreement on an effective system of European security, a substantial contribution to strengthening security and creating the necessary confidence among the European states would be the conclusion of non-aggression treaties by the various states, and a pledge on their part to settle all disputes solely by peaceful means.

The governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania declare their determination to dedicate their efforts to the noble cause of promoting peace among the nations. They express their readiness to join with the other countries concerned in examining the urgent problems of European security and other outstanding international problems, including measures for ending the arms race and delivering mankind from the menace of atomic war. At the same time, they will continue to display the necessary concern for safeguarding their security, and are determined to do all that is required to protect the peaceful labours of their citizens, to ensure the conditions for the peace and prosperity of their peoples.

People's Republic of Albania:
M. SHEHU, B. BALLUKU

People's Republic of Bulgaria:
R. DAVYKNOV, P. PANCHEVSKY

Hungarian People's Republic:
A. HEGEDUS, I. BATA

German Democratic Republic:
W. ULBRICHT, W. STOPH

Polish People's Republic:
J. CYRANKIEWICZ, K. ROKOSSOWSKI

Rumanian People's Republic:
S. CHIVU, L. SALADJEAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
V. MOLOTOV, G. ZHUKOV

Czechoslovak Republic:
A. CEPICKA, V. DAVID

Prague, January 28, 1956

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II. Declaration of the Second Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. X, No. 21, July 2, 1958, pp. 16-19)

DECLARATION OF CONFERENCE OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda and Izvestia, May 27, pp. 1-2. 6500 words. Condensed text:) Guided by the interests of assuring peace in Europe and developing peaceful cooperation among states, which is the primary task of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the governments of the Albanian People's Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic called a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states on May 24, 1958, to consider the international situation and work out new joint measures to reduce international tension.

The exchange of views--in which observers from the Chinese People's Republic also participated--confirmed the unanimity of the governments represented at the conference concerning both the assessment of the international situation and ways to strengthen peace.

The unceasing efforts of the countries of the socialist camp to develop international cooperation on the basis of peaceful co-existence among states with differing social systems, to settle disputes through negotiations between states and to put an end to the arms race and eliminate the threat of atomic war exert an ever-greater influence on the state of affairs in the world.

Participants at the conference noted with satisfaction that not only the socialist countries but also the majority of the countries of Asia and Africa that have freed themselves

from age-old colonial dependence are acting in the interests of strengthening peace. Popular masses, influential public circles, many parties and trade unions that heed the demands of the working people, scientists, cultural figures, clergymen, and people of various political views in the countries of Western Europe, America and other continents are also taking a stand on the side of peace. The states which conduct a policy of neutrality are also making a positive contribution to the struggle for peace.

The course of international events shows again and again that the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, which was signed three years ago, not only affords reliable protection to the security and independence of the peoples of these states, but also acts as a powerful deterrent to the activities--inimical to the cause of peace--of the military alignments of the Western powers, particularly the North Atlantic Bloc. ...

At present, NATO military agencies are drawing up new plans for increasing the armed forces and military expenditures of these countries, and the NATO Defense Ministers' conference in April, 1958, discussed the question of doubling the armed forces under the American Supreme Commander of NATO. It is further known that on May 1, 1958, the permanent NATO Council adopted a decision on supplying atomic weapons to those members of the North Atlantic bloc that do not have such weapons at present. The governments of a number of NATO countries--Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and others--made land available for American launching sites for atomic-armed missiles and for atomic weapons depots, despite the vigorous protests of the peoples of these countries.

Military preparations in the Federal German Republic, whose Bundestag passed a resolution authorizing the F.G.R. government to equip the West German armed forces with nuclear weapons and missiles, are becoming particularly dangerous. Thus, the most dangerous types of weapons are being placed in the hands of militarist and revanchist circles making territorial claims on other states.

By supporting the policy of arming the F.G.R. and undertaking to supply West Germany with nuclear weapons and missiles, the U.S. government is in fact encouraging these circles to pursue a policy jeopardizing peace and involving disastrous consequences for the German people themselves. At the same time, measures are being taken to enlist West Germany in the production and development of the latest types of weapons; one such measure is the tripartite agreement between France, Italy and the F.G.R. on cooperation in military research and arms production--an agreement that has been quite widely publicized.

These military preparations are provoking grave apprehension in West Germany itself and are encountering constantly increasing popular resistance there. ...

One cannot but note with satisfaction that certain NATO member-states, aware of the consequences of a policy

of preparing for atomic war and juggling atomic weapons--a policy pursued by the leading powers in the alignment--are taking a more sober stand, a stand that cannot but be a definite positive contribution to the easing of international tension, especially in Europe. This demonstrates that, despite aggressive military alignments and the commitments that the initiators of such alignments have imposed on the other members, there are still untapped possibilities for achieving a detente in Europe and for reducing international tension. ...

The participants in the conference express deep concern over the continuing attempts of the governments of the U.S.A., Britain, France and other colonial powers to interfere in the affairs of the countries of Asia and Africa and to set up regimes and governments in those areas that are alien to the people and that are prepared once again to sell out to the colonizers countries that have only recently embarked on the road of national independence. If guns are roaring and the blood of patriots is being spilled in Indonesia, Algeria, Lebanon, Yemen and Oman, the responsible parties are those selfsame imperialist circles whose policy is being carried out by NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and who are attempting to grab up the natural riches of these countries and throttle the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia and Africa through pressure and gross interference in the internal affairs of other states. Just as in the summer of 1957 storm clouds gathered over Syria, so today dangerous plots are being hatched against Lebanon, but this time the U.S.A., citing the notorious "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine," which has been rejected by the Arab peoples, is preparing to send its armed forces into action against a people that wants only to be master of its own house and free from foreign dictation.

One might well ask who gave anyone the right to impose various sorts of doctrines on other countries. Indeed, the time is long past when force and whim could ignore right or even pass itself off as such. The obvious aim of the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" is interference in the affairs of other states, and its authors have made so bold as to declare this fact openly. All this is taking place in plain view of the U.N., which, it would seem, should take action against interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the East, since this amounts to a violation of international law and is condemned by the U.N. Charter. However, because of the stand taken by certain Western powers, the U.N. stands paralyzed and is taking no steps to defend the independence of Lebanon or of the other states that are the objects of the imperialist circles' plot.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states are convinced of the fact that depriving the Chinese People's Republic of the opportunity of taking its rightful place in the U.N. seriously damages the work of that organization. They are equally profoundly convinced that the participation of people's China in the work of the U.N. would have immense

positive importance for the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and also of world peace.

For a number of years now, France has waged a bloody war against the Algerian people, who are fighting for self-determination and independence. The war in Algeria is not only a monstrous injustice to the freedom-loving Algerian people, but also creates a dangerous hotbed of international tension and conflict in that part of the world.

The founders of NATO and the other blocs of the Western powers allied to it are attempting to cover up their expanding military preparations and interference in the internal affairs of other countries by attributing them falsely to the "threat of international Communism." ...

Who does not recall that Hitlerite Germany's preparation for the second World War was also conducted under the banner of fighting the "danger" of communism? Millions upon millions of people who allowed themselves to be taken in by this false propaganda paid for their error with their lives during the past war. One must assume that the peoples of the world have drawn their conclusions from these tragic lessons and have learned from their own experience to recognize the source of the real war threat. ...

The Warsaw Treaty member-states have nothing to fear from a reduction in international tensions; they are united not by the "cold war" atmosphere and not by the state of war hysteria in which the advocates of military preparations want to keep the world, but by a community of ideals and aims for building a new socialist society and strengthening peace among all peoples. ...

The countries signatory to the Warsaw Pact resolutely condemn the policy of exacerbating international tension and preparing for atomic war which has been pursued in NATO by the leading states of that aggressive alignment. They call upon the governments of the countries of the North Atlantic alliance to take no steps at the present crucial moment that might increase the already tense situation in Europe and certain other parts of the world. In order to decrease the danger of war rather than increase it and to replace mistrust and suspicion between states with confidence and businesslike cooperation, it is necessary above all to refrain from such senseless actions as those engaged in by the American Air Force or as the decision to equip West Germany with atomic weapons, which amounts to a challenge to all the peoples of Europe.

The socialist countries of Europe and Asia have given many proofs of their good will and desire for cooperation with other states in the interests of strengthening peace among all peoples. All the Warsaw Treaty member-states have frequently made unilateral reductions in their armed forces. These forces have been reduced by a total of 2,477,000 men since 1955. These countries' armaments, military facilities and equipment and expenditures for defense were correspondingly reduced. During the same period the armed forces of the Soviet Union were reduced

by 2,140,000 men, of the Polish People's Republic by 141,500 men, of the Czechoslovak Republic by 24,000 men, of the German Democratic Republic by 30,000 men, of the Rumanian People's Republic by 60,000 men, of the Bulgarian People's Republic by 18,000 men, of the Hungarian People's Republic by 35,000 men and of the Albanian People's Republic by 9000 men.

No one can deny that states that make such large cuts in their armed forces are preparing for peaceful cooperation, not for war. And conversely, when states increase their armaments and the size of their armed forces, this is a sure sign that they--or, more accurately, those who determine their policy--are thinking not of peace, but of war.

Thus, one sees that the NATO countries are responding to the Warsaw Treaty states' reduction of armed forces and of armaments expenditures by increasing their armed forces, expanding their military budgets and building up their armaments. Through conducting such a policy the leaders of NATO would like to block any reduction in international tension or the attainment of any agreement among states that would assure peaceful coexistence, and thus force the Warsaw Treaty member-states to participate in the arms race and "cold war" in order to slow down peaceful construction and delay a rise in the living standards of the peoples of the socialist countries. All this compels peoples to be on the alert and to take a more active part in the struggle against forces that are preparing for war. ...

The conference participants declare that the peoples of the countries they represent, peoples determined to use every means to strengthen peace and avert a new world-wide war conflagration, are interested in establishing a zone free of atomic, hydrogen and rocket weapons in Central Europe, in an area including both German states--the G.D.R. and the F.G.R.-- as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In supporting the proposal of the Polish People's Republic to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles, the participants seek no military advantages whatsoever for themselves.

If comparison is made of the size of the territories of the states that would be included in the atom-free zone, it is seen that the area comprising the G.D.R., Czechoslovakia and Poland is more than twice as large as that of the fourth participant in this zone, West Germany. Moreover, the size of the population of the states to be included in this zone from among the Warsaw Treaty member-states also exceeds the size of the population of the NATO state to be included in this zone.

As for the production of nuclear weapons, as is known, neither the G.D.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland nor the F.G.R. would produce such weapons. What is more, the government of the F.G.R. at one time assumed an international commitment not to produce such weapons. All this shows that there is no reason to assume that the creation of an atom-free

zone represents some sort of one-sided military gain for the countries of the Warsaw Treaty to the detriment of the interests of the NATO states. On the contrary, the position of the proposal to create an atom-free zone in Europe lies precisely in the fact that the Warsaw Treaty states and the NATO states must, according to this proposal, take joint steps in the field of atomic disarmament that are, on the whole, equivalent in military importance. ...

The implementation of this initiative, as an effort to arrive at a partial agreement, would smooth the way for broader disarmament agreements and would promote the chief aim of all peoples--the elimination of the threat of atomic war in Europe, and consequently of war in general. It should be said that the proposal was understood in precisely this way by broad public circles and by diverse political circles in the West.

The ruling circles of certain NATO powers, declaring in words their desire to conduct successful negotiations, in actual fact do everything possible to complicate the calling of a summit meeting, if not to rule it out altogether.

For this purpose they advance the trumped-up question of the so-called situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, i.e., a question that in fact does not exist. The conference participants resolutely reject any discussion whatsoever of this question as an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states incompatible with international law and the U.N. Charter. ...

As for the attempts to put the question of German unification on the agenda of a summit conference, such attempts can only be of use to those who oppose the convening of such a conference and who do not wish a successful settlement of this question. ...

Other states, regardless of the rights they might claim for themselves, are not competent to solve this problem over the heads of the German people and the representatives of their governments, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal German Republic.

The conference participants fully share the view of the Soviet government that a summit meeting should discuss that aspect of the German question for which the four powers are responsible, i.e., the question of a German peace treaty. Enlisting the representatives of both German states in the preparation of a peace treaty--as has been proposed by the Soviet Union--would give the German people clear prospects for the future development of Germany and would serve to unite the efforts of the G.D.R. and the F.G.R. in the matter of restoring the national and state unity of the German people.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states attach great significance to the participation of neutral states in the summit meeting, states that have no military commitments to either of the opposed military alignments and that have demonstrated their dedication to the cause of peace and international cooperation. The conference participants

found no support among the Western powers.

In view of the fact that the Western powers are unwilling to conduct a broad conference, the governments of the Warsaw Treaty member-states are willing, in the interest of achieving the necessary understanding, not to insist that representatives of all the member-states of the North Atlantic pact and the states signatory to the Warsaw Treaty participate in the conference. They agree, at the present stage, to a more limited circle of participants, which would include three (or four) countries each from NATO and the Warsaw Pact group. To this end they empower, on behalf of the countries signatory to the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic (and the Rumanian People's Republic) to participate in the summit meeting. ...

The conference participants heard and discussed a proposal by the Soviet government--agreed to by the government of the Rumanian People's Republic--that the Soviet troops stationed in Rumania under the Warsaw Treaty be withdrawn. The conference participants approve this suggestion and express the conviction that it will be interpreted by all peoples as a new proof of the consistent peace-loving policy of the socialist countries.

The governments of the Warsaw Treaty member-states express the hope that the U.S.A., Britain, France and the other NATO countries will take steps of their own to cut their armed forces and armaments and thus substantiate in acts their stated desire to strengthen peace and security in Europe. The adherence of the NATO member-states to the socialist countries' measures to reduce armed forces and armaments would not only serve to reduce tension in relations among European countries and put an end to the arms race, but would also enable the peoples of Europe to rid themselves of inflated military budgets, which consume an ever-greater portion of the states' material resources, and open the way for the economic and cultural flourishing of these peoples.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states are in favor of doing away with all military blocs and alignments, since their existence leads to strained relations between states and creates a constant danger of military conflict between them. However, in view of the fact that the Western powers are not prepared to dissolve the military alignments which they have created and replace them with an effective system of collective security in Europe and in a number of other areas of the world, the conference participants consider it necessary to take precautionary measures to relax the tensions that arise and to prevent the contradictions between the two major alignments of powers from developing into a military conflict. To this end they propose the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic pact to be

based, respectively, on the following mutual obligations:

1. Not to resort to force or the threat of force against each other;

2. To confirm their non-interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs;

3. To resolve all disputes that might arise between them through negotiations between the interested parties;

4. To hold mutual consultations in the event of a situation arising that might comprise a threat to peace in Europe.

The conference drafted a nonaggression pact between the member-states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and has decided to submit the draft to the NATO countries.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states urge the NATO countries to accept their proposal for conclusion of a nonaggression pact. They are convinced that if the NATO powers found it possible, finally, to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Warsaw Treaty states, this act might well be the beginning of the desired turn in the development of the international situation in favor of confidence and peaceful cooperation between states that presently oppose each other as parties to military alignments. It is clear to everyone that a new war could arise only out of a conflict between these two alignments. On the other hand, it is no less clear that if the machinery of these military alliances, which include 23 of the most highly developed military and industrial states in the world, is not set in motion for an attack against each other, there will be no such war.

Moreover, a nonaggression agreement is a true deterrent, and the violation of such an agreement, as historical experience shows, places the aggressor in a position of international isolation and facilitates the rallying of the forces opposing the aggression, thus effecting the rout of the aggressor.

The conference participants note as a positive contribution the fact that the British government has taken a favorable view of the idea of a nonaggression pact, as was announced recently by British Prime Minister Macmillan.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states are prepared at any time to send their representatives for an exchange of views with representatives of the NATO member-states on questions concerning the proposed nonaggression pact. Such an exchange of opinions might take place immediately, before the summit meeting. This might facilitate the adoption of a final decision to conclude such a pact at the summit conference.

The international situation is such that in undertaking new steps to end the "cold war," reduce armed forces and create conditions for peaceful coexistence, we must all display a soberness of mind and a responsibility for the security of our socialist countries. ...

The states represented at the conference declare that they are doing everything in their power to consistently defend the peace and prevent a new war. They feel that

states do not have and cannot possibly have any more urgent and noble task than that of establishing a lasting peace and freeing all peoples from the threat of a devastating nuclear war. They also feel that governments must proceed in international affairs not from what divides countries but from what brings them closer together in order, in this way, to achieve peace in Europe--and, consequently, throughout the world--through their mutual efforts. ...

M. SHEHU, Chairman of the Albanian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
A. YUGOV, Chairman of the Bulgarian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
J. KADAR, Hungarian People's Republic Minister of State.
O. GROTEWOHL, Chairman of the German Democratic Republic Council of Ministers.
J. CYRANKIEWICZ, Chairman of the Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers.
C. STOICA, Chairman of the Rumanian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
V. SIROKY, Chairman of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Moscow, May 24, 1958.

## WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE

COMMUNIQUE ON CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF MEMBER-STATES OF WARSAW TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL AID. (Pravda and Izvestia, May 27, p. 1. Complete text:) A conference of the Political Consultative Committee of member-states of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid was held in Moscow on May 24, 1958.

The following representatives took part in the conference of the Political Consultative Committee:

from the Albanian People's Republic--Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee; Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Maj. Gen. Arif Hasko, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of the Albanian People's Republic;

from the Bulgarian People's Republic--Anton Yugov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee; Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General of the Army Peter Panchevski, Minister of National Defense;

from the Hungarian People's Republic--Janos Kadar, Minister of State and First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee; Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Col. Gen. Geza Revesz, Minister of Defense;

from the German Democratic Republic --Otto Grotewohl,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the German Socialist Unity Party Central Committee; Col. Gen. Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense; Bruno Leuschner, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Otto Winzer, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;

from the Polish People's Republic--Josef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee; Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Col. Gen. Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense;

from the Rumanian People's Republic--Chivu Stoica, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Rumanian Workers' Party Central Committee; Emil Bodnaras, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Col. Gen. Leontin Salajan, Minister of the Armed Forces;

from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee; A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, Minister of Defense;

from the Czechoslovak Republic--Viliam Siroky, Chairman of the Government; Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Col. Gen. Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense.

Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun, Deputy Premiers of the Chinese People's Republic State Council, participated as observers for that country.

Anton Yugov, Chairman of the Bulgarian People's Republic Council of Ministers, presided over the meetings.

In accord with Article 3 of the Warsaw Treaty, which calls for consultations between member-states of the treaty on all important international questions affecting their common interests, there was an exchange of opinions on the present international situation at the conference of the Consultative Committee. The Political Consultative Committee noted with satisfaction the complete unanimity of the socialist countries participating at the conference both in their analysis of the international situation and on their common tasks in the struggle for peace and the security of nations. The Political Consultative Committee unanimously adopted a declaration of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, which is published in the press.

The Political Consultative Committee heard a report by Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, on a new reduction in the armed forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty and on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Rumanian People's Republic.

In addition to the Soviet Union's further reduction of its armed forces by 300,000 men in 1958, which has already been announced, the Warsaw Treaty member-states have decided to cut their armed forces by a total of 119,000 men in 1958

In addition to the significant reductions that have already been made, this reduction will be effected by cuts of 55,000 men in the Rumanian People's Republic, 23,000 in the Bulgarian People's Republic, 20,000 in the Polish People's Republic, 20,000 in the Czechoslovak Republic and 1000 in the Albanian People's Republic. Thus in 1958 the Warsaw Treaty member-states will cut their armed forces by 419,000 men.

The Political Consultative Committee approved a proposal by the government of the Soviet Union, agreed upon by the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, on the withdrawal in the near future of Soviet troops stationed in the Rumanian People's Republic under the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty.

By agreement with the Hungarian government, the Soviet government has decided to reduce the number of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary by an additional division, which is to be withdrawn from Hungarian territory in 1958.

The Political Consultative Committee approved this decision by the Soviet government.

Decisions were also taken on certain organizational questions concerning the activities of the joint armed forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty.

The Political Consultative Committee adopted a resolution to propose to the member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty and the member-states of NATO. The text of this nonaggression pact is published separately.

The work of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states demonstrated the complete unanimity and indestructible fraternal friendship and cooperation of the socialist countries. These countries are making every effort to ease international tension, create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and businesslike cooperation among all states, and to further strengthen peace.

III. Communique of the Third Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee

(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 5, March 2, 1960, pp. 8-12)

DECLARATION OF CONFERENCE OF WARSAW PACT STATES

COMMUNIQUE ON CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF MEMBER STATES OF WARSAW PACT ON FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL AID. (Pravda and Izvestia, Feb. 5, p. 1. Complete text:) In accordance with Art. 3 of the Warsaw Pact, a regular conference of the Political Consultative Committee was held in Moscow Feb. 4, 1960.

Participating in the work of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee as representatives were:

From the People's Republic of Albania: Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party; Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Beqir Balluku, Minister of National Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Nesti Nase, Ambassador of the Albanian People's Republic in Moscow.

From the Bulgarian People's Republic: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee; Anton Yugov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ivan Mihailov, Minister of National Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Kamlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Lyuben Gerasimov, Ambassador of the Bulgarian People's Republic to the U.S.S.R.

From the Hungarian People's Republic: Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Ferenc Munnich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Geza Revesz, Minister of Defense; and Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the German Democratic Republic: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party; Otto Grotewohl, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Willi Stoph, Minister of National Defense; and Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the Polish People's Republic: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense; and Boleslaw Jaszczuk, Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic to the U.S.S.R.

From the Rumanian People's Republic: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party; Chivu Stoica, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Leontin Salajan, Minister of the Armed Forces; Avram Bunaciu, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Mihai Dalea, Ambassador of the Rumanian People's Republic to the U.S.S.R.

From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Ya. Malinovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense.

From the Czechoslovak Republic: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and President of the Czechoslovak Republic; Viliam Siroky, Chairman of the Government; Otokar Simunek, Vice-Chairman of the Government; Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense; and Richard Dvorak, Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic to the U.S.S.R.

The following took part as observers from the Chinese People's Republic: Kang Sheng, candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Party; Liu Shao-chi, leader of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee delegation of the Chinese People's Republic to the U.S.S.R.; and Po I-po, member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.

The following took part as observers from the Korean People's Democratic Republic: Kim Il, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party and First Vice-Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers; Pak Sung Chul, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Ho Bon Hak, Deputy Minister of National Defense.

The following took part as observers from the Mongolian People's Republic: Yu. Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; L. Tsenda, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; B. Shagdarsuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Zh. Lkhagvasuren, Minister of Defense.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, commander in chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states, took part in the work of the conference.

Ferenc Munnich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, presided over the meeting.

The conference discussed major problems of the present-day international situation and exchanged views on such important problems as universal and total disarmament and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, delivered a report on the substantial new reduction of the armed forces undertaken by the Soviet Union and on the U.S.S.R.'s position at the forthcoming summit meeting.

In the course of the comprehensive exchange of views, the representatives of the countries participating in the conference coordinated their future actions to consolidate and develop the relaxation of international tension that has begun.

The conferees resolved to continue mutual consultations in the course of preparations for the heads-of-government meeting in Paris.

The conference of the Political Consultative Committee took place in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and firm friendship. The exchange of views revealed complete unanimity both in the evaluation of the international situation and with respect to the specific questions discussed. The Political Consultative Committee adopted a declaration of the Warsaw Pact states.

DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. (Pravda and Izvestia, Jan. 5, pp. 1-2. Complete text:) The Warsaw Pact states note with satisfaction that since the previous conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization, held in May, 1958, a definite

change for the better has taken place in the international situation. After many years of "cold war" between the states that make up the groupings opposed to each other, normal peaceful relations are beginning to be established for the first time, tension has relaxed noticeably and ways of strengthening mutual trust are opening up. The world has now entered a phase of negotiations on settlement of the fundamental disputed international issues with a view to establishing lasting peace; the proponents of the "cold war" are suffering defeat.

This improvement in the international situation is based on important changes that have occurred in recent years in the correlation of forces in the world arena.

These years have seen the tempestuous growth of the economic might of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the other socialist countries and their increased unity within the framework of the united socialist camp. These have been years marked by the great achievements of the Soviet Union in science and technology. The placing in orbit of the first artificial earth satellite, the launching of a rocket to the moon's surface and penetration of the secret of the other side of the moon, which is never turned toward the earth--these are the grand results of these achievements by the world's first socialist state, which have raised mankind to a new level in its struggle to know and subjugate the forces of nature.

Finally, the past few years have been marked by a new upsurge in the activity of all the countries in the socialist camp aimed at strengthening peace and also by a further growth of the international role of the peace-loving countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that have liberated themselves from colonial and semicolonial dependence.

As a result, the balance of forces in the world is shifting more and more in favor of those who advocate termination of the race in nuclear rockets and other arms, liquidation of the "cold war" and peaceful coexistence among all states, regardless of their social systems and ideologies. A situation has developed in which any attempt on the part of an aggressive state to resort to arms in solving disputed international problems, to embark on the path of war, would result in the immediate and total rout of the violator of the peace.

In the minds of the peoples and of many political figures and statesmen, including those of the West, the opinion is gaining ground that given the present level of development of weapons of mass annihilation and of the means of their instantaneous delivery to any point on the globe, war in general can no longer serve as a method of settling international disputes and that the only practically possible road is to build relations among states on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

The fact that contacts among states in the form of meetings and negotiations among the leading statesmen of

the various countries of the East and Europe are assuming increasing importance evokes the deep satisfaction of the participants in the conference. Experience shows that these contacts, the development of which has always been advocated by the Warsaw Pact states, are of great positive importance.

An especially outstanding role in this respect was played by the historic trip of N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, to the United States and his talks with U.S. President D. Eisenhower. As a result of this trip, the "cold war" ice was broken in relations between the two mightiest powers of the world--the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.--and a new stage was opened up in the development of international relations as a whole. As is well known, the talks between the leaders of the Soviet and British governments, held during British Prime Minister H. Macmillan's visit to Moscow, were also of great importance for improving the international atmosphere.

The conference participants voice the hope that Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to France and the visit of President G. Gronchi of the Italian Republic to the U.S.S.R. will lead to a further strengthening of mutual understanding among states, above all among the states of Europe, and will help to strengthen peace throughour the world.

It is the common and unanimous wish of the conference participants that U.S. President D. Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union this coming summer will lead to the further development of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. along the road of friendship and cooperation; this would be an important guarantee of the inviolability of world peace.

The exchange of visits by statesmen, which has expanded of late, has become a stable factor in bringing the states in the socialist camp closer to the independent peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The friendly meetings and talks that the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic and other Warsaw Pact states have had with the leaders of such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea and others have fostered the successful practical development of peaceful coexistence in vast areas of the world. All the participants in the conference declare their resolve to continue strengthening and developing friendship with the peace-loving states of Asia, Africa and Latin America on the basis of equality and mutual respect and in the interest of peace.

The improvement in the international situation is already bearing fruit on many sectors of international relations.

An important agreement was concluded at the end of

1959 among 12 states, among them the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and France, on the peaceful use of the Antarctic, in accordance with which this vast, though as yet unpopulated, continent is entirely removed from the sphere of military preparations in any form, including nuclear tests, and is declared a zone of peaceful research and scientific cooperation among states. Another useful step in the right direction was the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the participants of which include seven member states of the Warsaw Pact organization--Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.

At the same time the conference participants note that influential forces in the Western countries are continuing their stubborn opposition to the strengthening of peace. These are either circles who fail to see behind the profits they reap from the manufacture of arms the mortal danger threatening them in the event of war, or politicians who are so ice-bound by the "cold war" that they cannot conceive of normal peaceful relations among states.

The NATO states not only continue to maintain swollen armies but are increasing the size of these armies even more, paying special attention to the West German Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Hitlerite generals and officers. The Bundeswehr is equipped with rockets. The road to the production of these weapons has been opened to the Federal German Republic; moreover, further steps are being taken in the direction of arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. It is a fact, after all, that the NATO Council session in December, 1959, considered plans for a further build-up of the armed forces of the members of this bloc.

Paralleling the growth of West German militarism is an obvious resurgence of militarist forces in Japan and that country's further involvement in military preparations, as evidenced by the recent signing of a new military treaty between Japan and the United States.

The continuation of the arms race by the members of NATO, SEATO and CENTO and their allies can in no way be justified or explained by purposes of defense. It testifies that the adversaries of peaceful coexistence have not yet laid down their arms. This is also borne out by the continuing systematic propaganda of mistrust and hostility among states with different socialist systems on the part of influential political and military figures of the Western powers and a portion of the press. Those who oppose strengthening the peace do not want negotiations on the settlement of disputed international issues and are trying to prevent agreement from being reached even where the possibility of agreement is already definitely in evidence.

But no attempts made by the "cold war" advocates can alter the fact that awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence in our times is becoming a determining factor in the development of international relations. The alignment of forces in the international arena ensures the

preponderance of the peace-loving states, and the forces of peace far exceed the forces of war. This creates favorable conditions for the attainment of the goals for which the Warsaw Pact states have consistently and invariably fought--a relaxation of international tension and the development of friendly cooperation among all countries.

Naturally the problem of disarmament takes precedence. This is the main question of international life in our times. Whether the possibility of a new war can be completely excluded, a war which in present conditions would lead to the loss of hundreds of millions of people and the destruction of entire states, depends on the solution of this question.

The interests of mankind demand that nuclear rockets, which possess untold destructive force, never be allowed to be brought into play. The surest way to achieve this purpose is the destruction of all types of weapons, all the instruments of war, i.e., the universal and total disarmament of all states. This is precisely why the proposal on such disarmament submitted to the U.N. by the Soviet Union accords with mankind's deepest and most vital interests. This accounts for the great impact which the U.S.S.R.'s proposal is having on the peoples. The unanimity with which the U.N. member states approved the idea of universal and total disarmament at the past 14th session of the General Assembly is significant. The fact that this decision was adopted on a draft resolution drawn up jointly by two such powers as the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is also heartening.

If an agreement among states on disarmament is to become a reality for the first time in history, the first thing that must be done is to proceed from words to practical deeds. This is the most important historical task of the present generation. The Warsaw Pact states, having at this conference exchanged opinions on the prospects for the forthcoming disarmament negotiations, have come to the conclusion that now as never before there exist favorable conditions for fruitful disarmament negotiations among the states of the East and the West.

The disarmament proposal put forward in the U.N. by the Soviet government expresses the common position of the Warsaw Pact states and of all the socialist countries. All the member states of the Warsaw Pact declare their eagerness to take part in a future agreement on universal and total disarmament.

The states represented at the conference feel a sense of satisfaction that a state which is a member of the Warsaw Pact organization--the Soviet Union--should have been the first to take practical steps toward implementation of the above-mentioned U.N. resolution by adopting a decision to reduce its armed forces unilaterally by 1,200,000 men. The numerical strength of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces will now be below the level that the Western powers themselves suggested for the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. in 1956

and also less than the actual numerical strength of the American armed forces, although the territory and boundaries of the U.S.A. are considerably smaller than those of the U.S.S.R. The reduction of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces by one-third its present size at a time when the military blocs of the Western powers are continuing the arms race represents an act of good will that should induce other states in turn to take steps in the field of disarmament, answering trust with trust.

There are some people in the West who are ready to misinterpret and distort any good deed, any good initiative in international affairs. This is precisely how the opponents of disarmament are now behaving in claiming that the new reduction of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces is not a step toward disarmament but a step toward rearmament. Only deliberate unscrupulousness in the face of practical deeds in the field of disarmament can prompt such light assertions.

It is clear to everyone that only a state which has no aggressive intentions can undertake to reduce its armed forces unilaterally. In today's conditions big armies and military bases on foreign territories are not needed to defend a country. Would a state harboring aggressive plans really undertake voluntarily to cut its armed forces? Even in reorganizing these armed forces with a view to increasing their fighting power it would clearly not be to its interest to reduce their numerical strength.

The states represented at the conference regard the Soviet Union's decision on a major new reduction of its armed forces, adopted by agreement with the other countries in the socialist camp, as the Warsaw Pact organization's common contribution to the cause of disarmament, as initiative facilitating the negotiation of an agreement on universal and total disarmament between the states of the East and the West. The states united in the Warsaw Pact organization are consistently and steadfastly pursuing a policy aimed at ending the arms race. Since its founding the Warsaw Pact organization has reduced the total numerical strength of the armed forces of the member countries by 2,596,500 men, and the current unilateral reduction of the army in the U.S.S.R. will bring this figure to 3,796,500.

Can the NATO states boast of similar measures, whose importance for the strengthening of peace is obvious to all? Unfortunately, NATO's measures have so far been along the lines of stepping up military preparations and building up armed forces and armaments.

The Warsaw Pact countries deem it necessary to stress the good example of the German Democratic Republic, which voluntarily reduced its armed forces to 90,000 men and refused to introduce compulsory military service. This stand of the G.D.R., dictated by the desire to do everything it can to promote a relaxation of tension, meets with the full support of all the Warsaw Pact states. Of great importance for the cause of peace and for Germany's future is the fact that the G.D.R. is proving by its policy that

if Germany abandons atomic armament and the policy of revanchism, revision of borders and militarism, it can live in peace and prosperity and occupy a worthy place in the family of nations.

The states represented at the conference appeal to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly to those with the greatest military power, to respond to the unilateral reduction of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces by cutting their own armed forces, to follow the Soviet Union's example.

The conference participants proceed from the position that the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals should be comprehensively examined in the Committee of Ten, which will begin its work on March 15, 1960. In this connection, they have come to an understanding that the governments of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria, i.e., members of the Warsaw Pact, which are on the Committee of Ten, will issue to their representatives on this committee a directive to do everything possible to further the fruitful work of the committee and to work for the speediest drafting of a treaty on universal and total disarmament.

The successful and rapid solution of the problem of universal and total disarmament naturally demands efforts not only on the part of the Warsaw Pact states. Such efforts are demanded on the part of the Western powers as well. The conference participants express the hope that the Western powers will also make their contribution to the speediest possible solution of the disarmament problem.

An honest mutual desire for agreement will make it possible to avoid a repetition of the situation in which efforts to reach terms on disarmament have drowned in torrents of speeches and resolutions.

The successful implementation of universal and total disarmament will require an effective system of international control over such disarmament. In present conditions control that is isolated from practical steps in the field of disarmament might be used for purposes directly opposed to disarmament--to look for gaps in the defense systems of other countries and to obtain information making it easier to formulate plans for an attack on a given country. Therefore states which do not have aggressive intentions are naturally concerned that the extent of international control correspond to the actual degree of disarmament of states. In the conditions of universal and total disarmament, however, the states will have no reason to fear one another. All the possibilities will exist for carrying out a check-up or inspection. When disarmament becomes universal and total, control also will be universal and total.

The states represented at the conference consider it necessary to re-emphasize their interest in such a disarmament agreement as will ensure absolute certainty that no party will violate its obligations to implement

disarmament [illegible] securely.

The Warsaw Pact states note as a favorable fact that for an extended period not a single atomic or hydrogen bomb has been exploded in any part of the globe. However, although no nuclear explosions are taking place for the time being, an international agreement has not been reached on their prohibition. It is not just an armistice on the front of nuclear tests that the peoples want; they are awaiting the discontinuation of these tests once and for all. Also disquieting are the definite attempts to cancel the practical progress already made on the path to the termination of nuclear testing.

If one of the sides were actually to resume testing, this might entail a kind of chain reaction that would once more turn our planet into an arena of competition in test explosions of nuclear weapons, with all their dangerous consequences. It would also be most difficult to reconcile this with the resolution of the U.N., which unanimously called upon the participants in the Geneva negotiations--the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain--to refrain from resuming nuclear weapons tests and to speed the conclusion of an international agreement on this matter.

The Soviet government's decision not to conduct nuclear tests in the future either, provided the Western powers do not resume these test explosions, ensures favorable conditions for completing the drafting of a treaty on the discontinuation of nuclear weapons tests. The states represented at the conference express the hope that all the participants in the Geneva talks will make a supreme effort to secure the cessation in the immediate future of all types of nuclear weapons tests in the air, on land, underground and underwater.

The conference participants have had a thorough exchange of opinions on the German question.

The states represented in the Warsaw Pact organization know by their own experience and have time and again suffered what German aggression inflicts upon peoples. The common interest of all these states in preventing German militarism from ever again jeopardizing the security of its neighbors or world peace impels them to advocate resolutely that a peace treaty be signed with Germany. The elimination of the vestiges of the second world war and the conclusion of a peace treaty are necessary for the peaceful development of all Germany and for assuring the peoples that firm barriers have been erected against the outbreak of a new war in Europe.

While the German Democratic Republic expresses its complete readiness to begin negotiations and conclude a peace treaty at any moment, the other German state--the Federal German Republic--opposes the conclusion of this treaty. An abnormal and unprecedented situation has developed in which a state which is a legal successor of the vanquished side--the aggressor, which surrendered unconditionally 15 years ago--refuses to conclude a peace treaty.

The F.G.R.'s policy is aimed at blocking successful negotiations among the powers and the settlement of unsolved international issues. Attempts are even being made to nullify the results already achieved in the course of negotiations such as the approximation of the viewpoints of the sides on several questions reached by the participants in the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference in 1959.

Why is the F.G.R. government so persistently impeding the conclusion of a peace treaty? It is doing this primarily because the aim of a peace treaty is to consolidate the situation that has developed as the result of the war, including the German state borders, and the F.G.R. government is against this. One can reach only one conclusion: The F.G.R. government is counting on a convenient moment arriving for altering the borders established in Europe as a result of fascist Germany's defeat. But what this actually implies in the present conditions is a course aimed at unleashing a new war, for none of the states against which the F.G.R. is trying to advance territorial claims will ever relinquish its lands, and the F.G.R. must face this fact. All sober-minded people realize that these borders are inviolable.

The Warsaw Pact states declare with the utmost resolve that these calculations of the West German government are doomed to failure. As a reliable bulwark of peace, the German Democratic Republic is barring the German militarists' way to new aggressive adventures. The Warsaw Pact states declare their support for the measures adopted by the G.D.R. government with a view to ensuring peace against the revanchist policy of the Adenauer government. The combined might of the socialist camp is a reliable guarantee that neither encroachments on the G.D.R.'s independence, nor a new seizure of Poland's western lands, nor violations of the integrity of Czechoslovakia's borders, will be permitted.

The conference participants express confidence that the plans of the West German revanchists will meet no support even from the F.G.R.'s present allies. It is the profound conviction of the conference participants that the people of the F.G.R., who thirst for peace, likewise cannot and will not back the plans of the West German revanchists. The participants are convinced that the people of West Germany deserve a better lot than to be a tool in the hands of peace violators. The Germans have time and again in the past been allowed into this by the covetous imperialist policy of their rulers, and the German people have paid for this more than once with heavy sacrifices.

The conclusion of a peace treaty, the renunciation of all ideas of revanchism and border revision and the repudiation of the policy of German remilitarization and atomic armament are the best way to ensure the security of all European peoples and a peaceful future for the German people. The German Democratic Republic has consistently advocated this course. If the Federal German Republic

took a stand for it also, this would be a most convincing contribution on its part to strengthening peace and facilitating universal and total disarmament.

The F.G.R. government rejects the proposal for a peace treaty because it does not want the problem of West Berlin to be settled by making it a free city. It has gone so far as to put forth a demand that West Berlin, which is situated inside the G.D.R.'s territory, be annexed to West Germany, but, since this cannot be done, it prefers to preserve the occupation regime there, which makes it possible for West Berlin to be used as a breeding ground of unrest and war danger.

The F.G.R. is the enemy of a peace settlement with Germany because it does not want the problem of German unity to be solved peacefully through negotiations between the two German states and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Contrary to common sense, it refuses to see that for more than ten years now there have existed two German states that have chosen different paths of development. Refusing to take account of the fundamental interests of the German people, the government of the F.G.R. is rejecting the only possible way of uniting the country through negotiations with the G.D.R., which the G.D.R. government has repeatedly offered it. The F.G.R. government is thereby demonstrating its hostility to the cause of German unity.

The F.G.R. will not hear of a peace treaty because it is afraid that the conclusion of a treaty might do away with the situation that has developed in West Germany, a situation which makes it possible to bring people to trial merely for having the courage to uphold their progressive convictions and take a stand in defense of the national rights of the German people and the interests of peace. All the actions of the F.G.R. government indicate that it is step by step clearing the way to the establishment in West Germany of a regime which is designed to create the impression of being democratic but which is essentially close to the regime which plunged the world into a bloody war and led the German people to an unprecedented national disaster. If conditions were otherwise, could matters really have gone so far as the brazen Nazi and anti-Semitic sorties by pro-fascist elements in West Germany which the world recently witnessed? The government of the F.G.R. was not ashamed to extend its protection to the organizers of those disgraceful acts, while some F.G.R. officials, falling back on a favorite method of Hitlerites, are trying provocatively to shift the blame to the Communists.

All this can only serve to intensify the peoples' mistrust of the F.G.R.'s policy. In this situation it becomes essential to wage an even more vigorous struggle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

The countries represented at the present conference advocate peaceful cooperation and good-neighbor relations with all states, including the Federal German Republic, and are making no efforts to see to it that such cooperation is actually established.

The Warsaw Pact states are striving to reach a peace settlement with Germany along with the other allied and united powers that participated in the war against Germany. This means concluding a peace treaty, which in the present circumstances can be signed by both German States. At the same time, they [illegible] that the solution of these problems be postponed indefinitely; this would only encourage the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany.

If the efforts directed toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states fail to gain support and the solution of this problem runs up against procrastination, the states represented at this conference will have no alternative left but to conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, along with other states prepared to do so, and, on this basis, to settle the question of West Berlin also.

The states represented at this conference reaffirm their steadfast desire to improve relations between the states of East and West, strengthen trust between them and develop all forms of international cooperation. As before, they favor the unimpeded development of international trade, increased contacts among state and public persons and organizations, and an exchange of cultural, scientific and technical achievements that enriches the peoples of all countries.

The cessation of war propaganda, provocative exhortations and attempts to threaten the use of force would be of enormous importance for normalizing the international situation and removing suspicion in relations among states.

As far as the Warsaw Pact countries are concerned, war propaganda has been banned in them, and they are prepared for their part to take further measures so that the atmosphere of mutual guardedness and aggravated polemics will make way for good will and trust.

In the conditions of a noticeable relaxation of international tension, the proposal for a conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the two groupings of states--the Warsaw Pact organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--which has not yet been favorably acted upon, assumes even greater importance than in preceding years. Convinced that the urgency of concluding a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization is not only not diminishing but is growing with every year, the conference participants deem it essential to state that this proposal remains in force and that they are ready at any time to sign a nonaggression pact with the NATO states.

The conclusion of bilateral treaties of nonaggression between states belonging to various military groupings and the establishment of zones in Europe free of atomic and rocket weapons could also play a large role in improving the international situation.

The conference participants welcome with great satisfaction the agreement reached by the Soviet Union,

the U.S.A., Great Britain and France on the convening of a summit conference in Paris in May of this year. The governments of the Warsaw Pact countries have long sought to have such a conference called, regarding it, as their May 24, 1958, declaration stated, as "a major means, under the present conditions, of protecting mankind from a military catastrophe and directing the development of events in the world arena toward the strengthening of peace."

The Warsaw Pact states consider that the forthcoming conference of heads of government should take up such major and urgent issues as the problem of universal and total disarmament, the question of a German peace treaty, including the question of making West Berlin a free city, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, and relations between East and West. Proceeding from the conviction that if the interests of the parties are given intelligent consideration and if there is a common striving for peace, any disputed international issue, however complex it may seem, can be settled, the conference participants voice the hope that the heads of the governments will succeed in finding the right paths to the successful solution of the above-mentioned problems in the interest of strengthening universal peace and that the forthcoming summit conference will become the turning point in the relations between the states of the East and the West.

At present, on the eve of highly important negotiations between the statesmen of the East and the West, on the eve of the summit conference, it is particularly important, in the opinion of the members of the Warsaw Pact organization, for all states to do everything they can to create an atmosphere conducive to the successful outcome of the coming negotiations. The states represented at this conference declare that they will act precisely in this direction and call upon all other countries to contribute to the success of the negotiations between East and West and refrain from any steps that might complicate these talks.

The governments of the Warsaw Pact states note with satisfaction that their untiring efforts aimed at ending the arms race, eliminating dangerous seats of international conflicts and liquidating the "cold war" are meeting with ever wider support from the peoples of the world and yielding good results. They are unanimously agreed that in our time states do not and cannot have any task greater or more noble than to cooperate in ensuring lasting peace on earth.

For the Albanian People's Republic:
ENVER HOXHA, First Secretary of Albanian Labor Party Central Committee.
MEHMET SHEHU, Chairman of Albanian People's Republic Council of Ministers.

For the Bulgarian People's Republic:
TODOR ZHIVKOV, First Secretary of Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee.
ANTON YUGOV, Chairman of Bulgarian People's Republic Council of Ministers.

For the Hungarian People's Republic:
JANOS KADAR, First Secretary of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.
FERENC MUNNICH, Chairman of Hungarian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
For the German Democratic Republic:
WALTER ULBRICHT, First Secretary of Central Committee of Socialist Unity Party of Germany.
OTTO GROTEWOHL, Chairman of German Democratic Republic Council of Ministers.
For the Polish People's Republic:
WLADYSLAW GOMULKA, First Secretary of Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee.
JOSEF CYRANKIEWICZ, Chairman of Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers.
For the Rumanian People's Republic:
GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ, First Secretary of Rumanian Workers' Party Central Committee.
CHIVU STOICA, Chairman of Rumanian People's Republic Council of Ministers.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, First Secretary of C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
For the Czechoslovak Republic:
ANTONIN NOVOTNY, First Secretary of Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee and President of Czechoslovak Republic.
VILIAM SIROKY, Chairman of Government of Czechoslovak Republic.

Moscow, Feb. 4, 1960.

IV. Communique of the Fourth Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIII, No. 13, April 26, 1961, pp. 7-8)

COMMUNIQUE ON WARSAW PACT MEETING IN MOSCOW

MEETING OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES. (Pravda and Izvestia, March 29, p. 1. Complete text.) A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Member States opened in Moscow on March 28. (Pravda and Izvestia carried reports of meetings between Khrushchev and the following delegations to the Warsaw Pact committee meeting: Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Mongolian, Korean and Czech.)

COMMUNIQUE ON MEETING OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF MEMBER STATES OF WARSAW PACT ON FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL AID. (Pravda and Izvestia, March 31, p. 1. Complete

tees: A regular session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Cooperation and Mutual Aid was held in Moscow March 28 and 29, 1961.

The following took part in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee as representatives:

From the People's Republic of Albania, Beqir Balluku, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense; Koco Tashko, Chairman of the State Planning Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Behar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the People's Republic of Bulgaria--Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee; Anton Yugov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ivan Mikhailov, Minister of National Defense and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Tsuko Lonov, Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee.

From the Hungarian People's Republic--Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Ferenc Munnich, Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government; Endre Sik, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lajos Csinege, Minister of Defense; Ervin Javor, Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee; and Tot Lajos, Acting Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army.

From the German Democratic Republic--Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the State Council; Erich Honecker, Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party; Lothar Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Heinz Hoffman, Minister of National Defense.

From the Polish People's Republic--Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Stefan Jedrychowski, Chairman of the State Planning Committee; Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense; and Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the Rumanian People's Republic--Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party; Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Leontin Salajan, Minister of the Armed Forces; Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Chairman of the State Planning Committee; and Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the U.S.S.R.--N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, Minister of Defense; and V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Czechoslovak Communist Party and President of the Czechoslovak Republic; Vilém Siroky, Chairman of the Government; Otakar Simunek, Chairman of the State Planning Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Government; Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense; and Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The following took part in the meeting as observers:

From the Chinese People's Republic--Liu Shao-chi, member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Ambassador of the Chinese People's Republic to the U.S.S.R.

From the Korean People's Democratic Republic--Kim Myon Ho, member of the Presidium of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of National Defense; Tsoi Yong Gon, Deputy Minister of National Defense and commander of the air force; and Liu Dan Sik, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the Mongolian People's Republic--Yu. Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Zh. Lkhagvasuren, Minister of People's Forces; and P. Shirendarsuren, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states, took part in the meeting.

Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, presided over the meeting.

In an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and unanimity the participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee conducted a broad exchange of views on questions connected with the development of international events in the recent period, and in this connection examined further measures of the Warsaw Pact states for safeguarding peace in Europe and throughout the world.

Here the Political Consultative Committee was guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of the November Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties and by its historic documents, which provide answers to the most burning and vitally important questions of the struggle for peace and for averting war.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee noted with satisfaction that in the period since the previous conference of the Political Consultative Committee (February, 1969), outstanding new successes had been achieved by the countries in the socialist camp in developing their economy, culture, science and technology, in raising the living standard of their peoples and in the peaceful economic competition between the two systems. Thanks to the peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist camp countries, the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has won major new victories; under the blows of the national-liberation movement of the enslaved peoples, who are fighting for their

national enlightenment, the colonial system continues to disintegrate.

The great forces of socialism and peace are capable of disrupting the aggressive imperialist plans and winning a lasting peace have grown immeasurably.

At the same time the participants in the meeting note that the aggressive circles continue to impede improvement of the international situation and are opposing the efforts of the peace-loving states directed at maintaining and strengthening peace.

The imperialist states--members of NATO and other aggressive military groupings--are continuing the arms race, expanding military preparations, seeking to establish new military bases in Europe and other parts of the world, stockpiling atomic and rocket weapons and turning NATO into the fourth atomic power.

With the help of the U.S.A., Britain and France, the restoration of the aggressive West German army under the command of Hitlerite generals and its equipment with nuclear missiles and other modern means of mass annihilation are being accelerated. West Germany is being given military bases in other countries.

All these steps assume an especially dangerous character in view of the fact that the West German government does not cease to put forth territorial claims on other states, as well as to wage revanchist propaganda among the West German public. West Germany is becoming the chief center of war danger in Europe.

The aggressive imperialist circles are making desperate efforts to impede the movement of the peoples along the path of peace, democracy and progress. The imperialist powers are resorting more and more often to outright military force in an attempt to suppress the growing national-liberation movement in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as is evidenced by the bloody crimes of the colonialists in the Congo, Algeria, Angola and Laos and the incessant provocations against the Cuban Republic.

The Warsaw Pact countries cannot remain indifferent witnesses to the growing military preparations on the part of the imperialist states. The socialist states have not ceased and will not cease their efforts on behalf of universal and total disarmament, a cessation of the arms race and a relaxation of international tension.

However, proceeding from the situation that is developing in connection with the new military preparations of the Western powers, the Warsaw Pact states, in the course of a comprehensive exchange of views, have agreed on measures which they consider it necessary to carry out in the interests of further strengthening their defense capacity and consolidating peace throughout the world. They proceed from the conclusion of the November Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties that it is possible, through the joint efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national-liberation

movement, all countries opposing war, and all peace-loving forces, to prevent a world war. In the interests of safeguarding peace it is extremely essential to remove the vestiges of World War II by concluding a peace treaty with both German states and thereby rendering harmless the focal center of danger in West Berlin, making the latter a demilitarized free city.

The Warsaw Pact states triumphantly declare that they will continue undeviatingly to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence and are ready at any moment to undertake the implementation of the broadest measures agreed upon with other states for the purpose of ensuring peace and the security of peoples.

V. Declaration of the Fifth Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, No. 23, July 4, 1962, pp. 4-5)

WARSAW PACT COMMITTEE SESSION

DECLARATION. (Pravda, June 10, p. 1. Complete text:) A session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states was held in Moscow on June 7, 1962. Taking part in the session were:

from the Bulgarian People's Republic--T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and A. Yugov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Bulgarian People's Republic;

from the Hungarian People's Republic--J. Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government;

from the German Democratic Republic--W. Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council, and W. Stoph, Acting Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of Ministers;

from the Polish People's Republic--W. Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, and J. Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;

from the Rumanian People's Republic--G. Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Rumanian People's Republic, and I. G. Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;

from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers;

from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--A. Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak

Communist Party and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and V. Siroky, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Republic Government.

The session of the Political Consultative Committee heard a report by A. A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the talks between the Soviet government and the government of the United States on the question of a German peace settlement. The participants exchanged opinions on the Soviet-American talks and expressed full approval of the Soviet stand on these talks, which is also the general stand of the Warsaw Pact states.

It was unanimously affirmed that a German peace settlement effected through the conclusion of a peace treaty and the elimination on its basis of the occupation regime in West Berlin and the creation of a free city of West Berlin is in accord with the interests of European security, and in equal measure with the interests of general peace.

All the participants agreed on the necessity of continuing talks between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. with the aim of further clarification of the possibilities of finding a concerted solution to the problem.

At the same time the participants in the Political Consultative Committee noted that during the course of the talks it had become clear that the Western Powers desired to delay an agreement artificially. This applies chiefly to the main question--the necessity of withdrawing the occupation forces of the three powers from West Berlin and eliminating the occupation regime there. This indicates that the Western powers are not prepared to seek a solution on a mutually acceptable basis to the question of normalizing the situation in West Berlin and eliminating the occupation regime in that city.

Further talks should clarify whether the occupation powers intend to continue avoiding a concerted solution to the question of a German peace settlement or whether they are prepared to adopt a mutually agreeable solution to this question, to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin and, consequently, a lessening of the dangerous tension in Europe and the elimination of the threat of armed clashes between the powers.

If the further talks indicate that procrastination is a deliberate policy of the Western powers, indicating their unwillingness to seek a concerted solution to the task of a German peace settlement and the solution in this connection of a number of questions considered during the Soviet-American exchange of views, the Warsaw Pact member states will be obliged to draw the appropriate conclusions.

The participants in the Political Consultative Committee declare unanimously that the unwillingness of the Western powers to cooperate in eliminating the vestiges of World War II will not deter the states that fought against Hitlerite Germany and that now stand for the conclusion of

a peace treaty with Germany from signing such a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, with all the ensuing consequences for West Berlin, which would be considered a free, demilitarized city.

The Warsaw Pact member states declare that, as before, they stand for solving peacefully, through negotiations, the problems that divide states, and they hope that the Western powers will also adopt this sober approach to solving these problems. In the event that the answer to their peaceful policy is in the form of actions directed against the interests of their security, against the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and against the interests of peace, they are determined to defend their security in a worthy manner and to defend peace with all the means at their disposal.

VI. Communique of the Sixth Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(Cf. Pravda, July 28, 1963, pg. 1 and U.S. Congress, Senate, The Warsaw Pact: Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs, pp. 45-46)

The 450-word Communique of the Political Consultative Committee meeting on July 26, 1963, included little of substance. It stated only that questions concerning the size and strength of the Pact forces were discussed, that Marshal Grechko presented a report, that decisions were made on the basis of his report, and that the proceedings were conducted in an atmosphere of complete accord by the participants.

The most significant representatives of the countries attending were:

Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary , Bulgarian Communist Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers;

Czechoslovakia: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, Czechoslovak Communist Party;

East Germany: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, Socialist Unity Party; Chairman, Council of State;

Hungary: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Premier;

Poland: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party;

Rumania: Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary, Rumanian Workers' Party; Chairman, Council of State;

USSR: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Council of Ministers.

VII. Communique of the Seventh Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 3, February 10, 1965, pp. 14-15)

# WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE

COMMUNIQUE ON SESSION OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda, Jan. 22, p. 1. Complete text:) The Political Consultative Committee of the partners to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, which was in session in Warsaw on Jan. 19 and 20, 1964, discussed the new situation arising in connection with the plans of several North Atlantic Pact states to form a NATO multilateral nuclear force, as well as the possible consequences for the world that a realization of these plans would entail.

The major tendency of the present-day development of international events is a growth of the forces that favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. The might of the socialist countries, which consistently pursue a peace-loving policy, is growing constantly. The Communist Parties and popular masses of the states of Europe and other countries fight resolutely for improvement in the international atmosphere. The independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America actively contribute to the strengthening of peace.

At the same time, imperialist forces manifest considerable energy and stubbornness in their attempts to aggravate the international atmosphere in various regions of the world. The hostile policy of the U.S.A. against the Rupublic of Cuba has not ceased. The dangerous provocations of the U.S.A. against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam continue. This aggressive policy is resolutely condemned by the Warsaw Treaty states, as well as all other socialist countries.

The imperialist forces interfere in the domestic affairs of independent states and use methods of economic, military and political pressure. They use their military grouping for the suppression of national-liberation movements. Examples are provided by the continuing war against the people of South Vietnam, the intervention in the Congo and the aggressive actions of the colonialists in Malaysia. The Warsaw Treaty states declare their solidarity with the peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence or for the strengthening of their independence.

The plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force are to play a special role in implementing the aggressive policy of imperialism. The Warsaw Treaty states regard the plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force, which are favored by the ruling circles of the U.S.A. and of West Germany, as a grave threat to peace in Europe and the world over. The formation of a multilateral nuclear force in any form would mean a proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the presentation of these weapons to the West German militarists.

This applies to the U.S. plan for a multilateral nuclear force, supported by the F.R.G., as well as to the

British plan for an "Atlantic nuclear force." Both variants are incompatible with the desires of the peoples and of the peace-loving states, which favor a cessation of the nuclear arms race, elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the realization of general and complete disarmament. They are incompatible with the efforts of many states toward creating nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.

A NATO multilateral nuclear force aims at the consolidation of a separate American-West German bloc within the North Atlantic Alliance. It is a sort of a deal, through which the U.S.A. wants to ensure its military and political hegemony in Western Europe and the F.R.G., in return for its willingness to support this American line, will gain access to nuclear weapons.

F.R.G. access to nuclear weapons, whether within the framework of the "multilateral" or the "Atlantic" nuclear force, is viewed by the West German militarists merely as a step on the way to obtaining their own nuclear weapons.

When the F.R.G. became a member of the North Atlantic Pact, it gained an opportunity to create, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements concluded after the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, an aggressive military force. Access to nuclear weapons would undoubtedly stimulate the desire of the West German revanchist forces to change the situation that came about in Europe after the end of the second world war and to realize territorial claims upon the German Democratic Republic and other states. No assurances from the Western powers can serve as a guarantee against this threat to peace.

The true intentions of the F.R.G. are indicated by facts such as the provocational plan, proposed by the leadership of the Bundeswehr, for creating an atomic-mine belt along the eastern frontiers and by the announcement of the so-called "front-line strategy," which requires the use of nuclear weapons from the very outset of any military conflict in Central Europe. This attests to the desires of the F.R.G. revanchist forces to make the U.S.A. and other NATO countries party to their adventurous plans.

But any attempts to effect the West German revanchist demands with the help of nuclear weapons are of the greatest danger to the German people, because such attempts would inevitably lead to a nuclear war, resulting not in the reunification of Germany but in its reduction to an atomic desert.

The Warsaw Treaty states resolutely oppose giving nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany in any form whatever--directly or indirectly, through groupings of states, for its exclusive use or in any form of participation in the use of these weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states fully support the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic and consider that participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force to mean that

the F.R.G. government is writing off the unification of Germany. A relaxation of tension and effective agreements on disarmament in Germany and in Europe are the only ways to create conditions for the unification of the two existing sovereign and equal German states in the spirit of the principles of the Potsdam Agreements.

The formation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is aimed not only against the interests of peace and security in Europe. It would also increase imperialist and neocolonialist pressure on the newly liberated peoples and those fighting for their independence.

The basic interests of all peoples demand a renunciation of the plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force. But if the NATO states, acting contrary to the interests of peace, realize their plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force, no matter in what form this may be done, then the Warsaw Treaty states, faced with the grave dangers this would entail for peace and security in Europe, will be compelled to take the necessary defensive measures to ensure their security.

The chief goal of the policy of the Warsaw Treaty states is to ensure peaceful conditions for building socialism and communism in their countries and for the liberation of mankind from the threat of a nuclear world war through the joint efforts of all the peace-loving peoples.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty states have submitted a whole series of proposals for improving the international situation. The Warsaw Treaty states will continue to support measures leading toward an easing of international tension and the creation of favorable conditions for a cessation of the arms race and the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states considers that an urgent demand of our time is to ensure European security, which is threatened by the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force. This goal would be served by the realization of the proposal for freezing nuclear armaments and the proposal for creating an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

Supporting the initiative of the Polish People's Republic, the Political Consultative Committee proposes the convocation of a conference of European states to discuss measures ensuring collective security in Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty states remain willing to conclude a non-aggression pact with the NATO states that would greatly contribute to a relaxation of tension in Europe and the world over.

The Warsaw Treaty states support the efforts toward attaining a German peace settlement in the interests of ensuring peace in Europe. The attainment of this goal would be furthered by legal recognition of the existing frontiers, the liquidation of the remnants of the second world war and pledges by the two German states not to add nuclear weapons to their armed forces and to carry out measures toward disarmament.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states also supports the proposal of the G.D.R. that the two German states renounce nuclear weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states support the proposal of the government of the Chinese People's Republic for calling a conference of world heads of state on the complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, on prohibiting the use of these weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states also support the convocation of a world conference on disarmament, which was proposed by the Cairo conference of nonaligned states.

The Political Consultative Committee declares that the socialist countries are in complete unity and solidarity in the face of the imperialist threat and that any attempts by imperialist circles to undermine this solidarity are doomed to failure.

The Warsaw Treaty states will continue to exert their efforts toward universally contributing to a relaxation of tension, to disarmament, to peaceful coexistence and to ensuring a peaceful future to all the peoples.
Warsaw, Jan. 20, 1965.

VIII. Communique, Declaration on European Security, and Statement on Vietnam of the Eighth Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee

(Communique from New Times, No. 29, July 20, 1966, pp. 31-32; Declaration and Statement from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, No. 27, July 27, 1966, pp. 3-8)

COMMUNIQUE
on the Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the member nations of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held from July 4 to 6, 1966, in Bucharest.

The meeting was attended:

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria--by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, CC, Bulgarian Communist Party, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Stanko Todorov, Political Bureau member, CC BCP, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ivan Bashev, member, CC BCP, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; General of the Army Dobri Jurov, member, CC BCP, and Minister of National Defence; Ivan Popov, Deputy Foreign Minister; Colonel General Atanas Semerjiyev, alternate member, CC BCP, and Chief of General Staff; and Georgi Bogdanov, member of the Central Auditing Commission of the BCP and Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Rumania;

For the Hungarian People's Republic--by Janos Kadar, First Secretary, CC, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Gyula Kallai, Political Bureau member, CC HSWP, and

Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker and Peasant Government; Colonel General Lajos Czinege, alternate Political Bureau member, CC HSWP, and Minister of National Defence; and Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the German Democratic Republic--by Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, CC, Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and Chairman of the State Council of the G.D.R.; Willi Stoph, Political Bureau member, CC SUPG, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Erich Honecker, Political Bureau member, CC SUPG, and Secretary, CC SUPG; Hermann Axen, alternate Political Bureau member, CC SUPG, and Secretary, CC SUPG; Gerhard Weiss, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Otto Winzer, member, CC SUPG, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; and General of the Army Heinz Hoffman, member, CC SUPG, and Minister of Defence;

For the Polish People's Republic--by Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, CC, Polish United Workers' Party; Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Secretary, CC PUWP; Adam Rapacki, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal Marian Spychalski, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Minister of National Defence; Marian Naszkowski, member, CC PUWP, and Deputy Foreign Minister; and Lieutenant General Wojcech Jaruzelski, member, CC PUWP, Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of General Staff;

For the Socialist Republic of Rumania--by Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary, CC, Rumanian Communist Party; Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Executive and Permanent Presidium member, CC RCP, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Executive and Permanent Presidium member and Secretary, CC RCP; General of the Army Leontin Salajan, Executive member, CC RCP, and Minister of Armed Forces; Mihai Dalea, Secretary, CC RCP; and Corneliu Manescu, member, CC RCP, and Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, CC, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; A. N. Kosygin, Political Bureau member, CC CPSU, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; A. A. Gromyko, member, CC CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky, member, CC CPSU, and Minister of Defence; K. V. Rusakov, member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU and assistant department head, CC CPSU; and A. V. Basov, member, CC CPSU, and Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Rumania;

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--by Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, CC, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and President of the C.S.R.; Jozef Lenart, Presidium member, CC CPC, and Chairman of the Government; Otakar Simunek, Presidium member, CC CPC, and Deputy Chairman of the Government; Vaclav David, member, CC CPC, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; and General of the Army

Bogumir Lomsky, member, CC CPC, and Minister of National Defence.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, took part in the meeting.

A broad exchange of views was held during the meeting on the problems of peace and security in Europe. The member nations of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee adopted a Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe.

The meeting discussed the situation created by the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, with special reference to the latest criminal acts of the U.S. armed forces, calculated to extend the war against the Vietnamese people.

The states represented at the meeting unanimously adopted a Statement on the U.S. Aggression in Vietnam.

The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was held in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship and complete mutual understanding which contributed towards further strengthening the unity and co-operation among the socialist countries.

Bucharest, July 6, 1966

## WARSAW ALLIANCE DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. (Pravda and Izvestia, July 9, pp. 1-2. Complete test:) The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--the member states of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid represented at the Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee--adopt the following Declaration:

### I.

The ensuring of lasting peace and security in Europe accords with the ardent desires of all peoples of the European continent and with the interests of universal peace.

The peoples of Europe, who have made and are making an immense contribution to the cause of the progress of mankind, can and must create in that part of the world a climate of detente and international mutual understanding that will make it possible to utilize in full measure the material and spiritual resources of each people, of each country in conformity with their will and decision.

The state of the relations between the European countries exerts a great influence on the state of affairs throughout the world. It should not be forgotten that two world wars, which cost tens of millions of human lives and

caused vast devastation, arose on the European continent.

The problem of European security did not arise today or yesterday. Half a century ago it was placed on the agenda with the outbreak of World War I. It rose before the peoples in all its vital significance two decades later, when Europe and the world came face to face with a brutal fascism that crushed one country after another under its feet.

The peoples who entered the mortal combat imposed on them were inspired by the hope that they were fighting the last world war.

In 1945 the goal of ensuring European security appeared close; the roads to it seemed open. German fascism had been defeated and was awaiting judgment. Justice was celebrating victory. The peoples who had just lived through a war of unprededented savagery with Hitler's Germany were demanding that everything possible be done to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from ever again disrupting the peaceful life and creative labor of the present and future generations.

The Potsdam Agreement, which crowned the allied relations of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, proclaimed a broad program, aimed at the future, for establishing peace. For the first time in history Europe had a real chance of solving the problem of its own security. It was generally recognized that the chief condition for security in Europe was to prevent a resurgence of German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors or the preservation of peace throughout the world. Nor was there any disagreement that the fulfillment of this chief condition called for honest and friendly cooperation among the states of Europe, among all states interested in the preservation of European and universal peace.

But events did not justify these aspirations. The hopes of the peoples of Europe did not materialize, their desire for a life free of the fear of war has not been realized to this day. The responsibility for this devolves on the powers which immediately after the defeat of the German aggressors renounced the cooperation that had been forged in the great anti-Hitler coalition, which did not follow the common path of building peace in Europe and, moreover, became themselves the bearers of an aggressive policy.

Now, two decades after the end of World War II, its consequences have not yet been liquidated in Europe; there is no German peace treaty, there are hotbeds of tension, abnormal situations in the relations between states.

The socialist states that have signed the present Declaration believe that if this situation is to be eliminated and a firm foundation is to be laid for peace and security in Europe, relations between states must proceed from the renunciation of the threat of force or the use of force, from recognition of the need to solve international

disputes only through peaceful means, on the principles of sovereignty and national independence, of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, on respect for territorial inviolability. The European states must strive for the adoption of effective measures for preventing the danger of the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe and for strengthening European collective security. The realization of the common desire of all European nations presupposes the responsibility of and a contribution from each state, big or small, irrespective of its social and political system, in establishing worthy cooperation between sovereign, independent and equal states.

In the opinion of the states participating in the present conference, today's situation requires of all the peoples of Europe, of all peace-loving forces even greater determination and vigor in the struggle for strengthening peace and security in Europe.

II.

One of the decisive features of the present-day international situation is the growth of the forces that favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. Against the imperialist policy of aggression and for ensuring the security of peoples are resolutely ranged the socialist states with their vast economic, political and military might, the international working class headed by its Communist Parties, the national-liberation movement, the new states that have attained independence in the last few years, the progressive and democratic forces of the whole world. Tendencies are increasingly arising and developing in Europe toward liquidating the sediment of the cold war and the obstacles standing in the way of the normal development of all-European cooperation, toward solving disputed issues through mutual understanding, toward the normalization of international life and the rapprochement of peoples.

This course is opposed by imperialist reactionary circles, which, pursuing aggressive goals, are striving to fan tensions, to poison relations between European states.

A direct threat to peace in Europe and the security of the European peoples is presented by the present policy of the United States of America, that same policy which in another part of the world--Southeast Asia--has already led to the unleashing of an aggressive war against the Vietnamese people and which in recent years has more than once exacerbated relations between states to the point of international crises. The United States interferes in the domestic affairs of other states, violates the sacred right of each people to decide its own destiny, resorts to colonial repressions and armed interventions, stages plots in various parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and everywhere supports reactionary forces and venal regimes hated by the peoples.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the goals of U.S. policy in Europe have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples, with the tasks of Europe's security. The American ruling circles would like to impose their will on their allies in Western Europe with a view to making Western Europe a tool of the global policy of the U.S.A., which is based on a desire to halt or even turn back the historical process of the national and social liberation of peoples. Hence the attempts to draw some West European states into military ventures even in other regions of the world, in particular Asia.

The aggressive circles of the U.S.A., which are supported by the reactionary forces of Western Europe, are trying, with the help of the North Atlantic military bloc and the war machine it has created, to deepen ever further the division of Europe, to fan the arms race, to increase international tension and to frustrate the establishment and development of normal ties between the West European and East European states.

In pursuit of these ends, which are alien to the genuine interests of the security of the European peoples, troops of the United States are still kept in Europe, their military bases are located in West European countries, stockpiles of nuclear weapons are being created, nuclear submarines are sent to the seas that wash Europe, the American Sixth Fleet sails in the Mediterranean Sea and planes carrying nuclear bombs fly in the skies over European countries.

The policy pursued by the U.S.A. in Europe in the postwar decades is all the more dangerous for the European peoples in that it is increasingly based on collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany. These forces are directly prodding the U.S.A. to a still more dangerous course in Europe.

This policy finds its expression in the projected creation of a sort of alliance between the American imperialists and the West German revanchists.

The militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany refuse to consider the vital interests of the German people themselves and are pursuing aggressive goals that manifest themselves in all their actions in the switching of the country's economic potential to military rails, in the creation of a 500,000-strong Bundeswehr, in the glorification of the history of German conquests, and in the nurturing of hatred against other peoples, whose lands are again coveted by the above-mentioned circles of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At present this policy is focused on the demand for nuclear weapons. In the F.R.G. the creation of a scientific-technological and industrial base that could at some time serve for the production of its own atomic and hydrogen bombs is being openly and secretly pushed. The combined efforts of the peace-loving countries and peoples have so far succeeded in delaying the creation of a joint NATO

nuclear force that would give the F.R.G. access to nuclear weapons. However, plans to this effect have not been abandoned.

The fundamental interests of all peoples demand the renunciation of plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force. But if the NATO members, acting in disregard of the interests of peace, embark on the path of implementing the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force or for giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, in that case the Warsaw Treaty member-states, faced with the grave consequences that this would entail for the cause of peace and security in Europe, would be compelled to carry out the necessary defensive measures to ensure their security.

The territorial demands of the West German revanchists must be decisively rejected. They are totally unfounded and hopeless. The question of the frontiers in Europe has been solved finally and irrevocably, and the peoples of Europe will know how to bar the path to revanchism.

One of the chief conditions for ensuring European security is the inviolability of the existing borders between the European states, including the borders of the sovereign German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The states represented at this conference reaffirm their resolve to crush any aggression against them on the part of the forces of imperialism and reaction.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states declare for their part that they have no territorial claims with respect to any state in Europe.

The policy of revanchism and militarism pursued by German imperialism has always suffered bankruptcy. Given the present correlation of forces in the world arena and in Europe, it not only will fail to bring any advantages or benefits to the F.R.G. but is fraught with irreparable consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany.

The interests of peace and security in Europe and in the whole world, like the interests of the German people, demand that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany take into account the actually existing situation in Europe. And this means that they must proceed from the fact of the existence of two German states, renounce their claims for the redrawing of the map of Europe, their claims to the exclusive right to represent the whole of Germany and the attempts to exert pressure on states that recognize the German Democratic Republic, renounce the criminal Munich <u>diktat</u> and recognize that it has been invalid from the very beginning. They must prove in deeds that they are really taking the lessons of history to heart, are putting an end to militarism and revanchism and will pursue a policy of normalizing relations between states and developing cooperation and friendship among peoples.

The German Democratic Republic, which is an important

factor in ensuring peace in Europe, has addressed constructive proposals to the F.R.G. government and the Bundestag: to renounce nuclear arms on a reciprocal basis, to reduce the armies of both German states, to pledge not to use force against each other, to sit down at a table and confer on the solution of urgent national questions of interest to both the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. However, the F.R.G. government has displayed no interest in these proposals. The states that have signed the present Declaration support the above-mentioned initiative of the G.D.R.

Having comprehensively reviewed the present situation in Europe and weighed the basic factors determining its development, the states represented at the conference arrived at the conclusion that in Europe, where almost half of the states are socialist, there are chances for preventing an undesirable development of events. The problem of European security can be solved through the joint efforts of all the European states, of all social forces that are for peace, regardless of their ideological views and religious and other persuasions. The more quickly the influence of the forces that would like to continue kindling tension in relations between European states is paralyzed, the more successfully will this task be solved.

In the postwar years it has more than once been possible to thwart plans aimed at undermining peace in Europe. Of decisive importance in this have been the unity and solidarity of the European socialist states, of all the countries of socialism, their pursuit of a peace-loving foreign policy while maintaining vigilance with respect to potential violators of peace, their willingness to cooperate with all states that are ready to make their contibution to the strengthening of European security. The efforts of the working class of the West European countries, of its advanced detachments, of democratic progressive organizations and the movement of peace partisans, which mold the public opinion of the broad working masses, are directed with all vigor to the same end.

A major factor that is increasingly complicating the implementation of military ventures in Europe is the growing influence of forces in the West European states that are aware of the need to rise above differences in political views and convictions and to take steps toward a relaxation of international tension, toward the all-round development of mutually advantageous relations among all the states of Europe without discrimination, toward the complete independence of their countries and the preservation of their national identities.

The states that have signed the present Declaration note as a positive phenomenon the presence in the Federal Republic of Germany of circles that oppose revanchism and militarism, demand the establishment of normal relations with the countries of both West and East, including normal relations between the two German states, and strive for a

relaxation of international tension and the ensuring of European security so that all Germans may enjoy the blessings of peace.

The influence of those who are for peace and security in Europe is becoming more marked each day, while the proponents of an aggressive course are beginning to lose their positions. More and more European countries and peoples are coming to understand the real source of the threat to each of them and to Europe as a whole and what is needed to protect the security of all European states.

The participants in the conference proceed from the premise that each European state is called upon to play a worthy role in international affairs and to become a full-fledged partner in building in Europe a system of relations between peoples and relations between states whereby the security of each would at the same time be the security of all. The European states are capable of solving questions of the relations among them without outside interference.

The socialist countries believe that one of the basic conditions for the realization of European security is the affirmation and development of normal relations between states based on observance of the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage. The situation in Europe proves that, despite various obstacles, these principles are being more and more broadly recognized as a reasonable basis for cooperation between peoples and for improving the international situation.

It is very important to strengthen political relations between states, regardless of their social systems, aimed at the defense of peace.

The European countries, bound by traditional trade relations, can only gain from the development of their economic cooperation on a reciprocal basis. A broadening of economic relations between European states, and the elimination of the discrimination and obstacles existing in this area, is an especially important factor for rapprochement and for the establishment of an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding among peoples. The development of economic relations among European countries makes it possible to broaden their trade with partners in other parts of the world. These relations, together with the all-round development of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation which makes possible the better mutual acquaintance of peoples, may provide as they develop a material base for European security and for the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

Despite all the differences in social-political systems, ideologies and political views, the European states and peoples have a common cause, conforming to the vital national interests of all--it is the task of preventing a disturbance of peace in Europe, of curbing the forces of aggression.

III.

The states that have signed the present Declaration believe that the situation as it is now developing demands of all European states vigorous actions toward strengthening European peace.

The governments of the European states cannot rely on the soothing assurances of those who are hatching plans of aggression, cannot take on faith the declarations of those who want to revise the results of World War II while claiming that they need nuclear weapons for their own security, cannot remain passive, thereby willingly or unwillingly encouraging the forces that are preparing for Europe the fate of being a springboard for a devastating nuclear conflict.

Conscious of their lofty responsibility before the peoples, the governments of the European states must undertake steps capable of ensuring a turn toward a relaxation of tension in Europe, the strengthening of security and the development of peaceful mutually advantageous cooperation among the European states.

This is not the first time Europe has been confronted with this task. The first and second world wars were prepared by the aggressive forces in deep secrecy, under the cover of deceptive declarations about peaceful intentions. A gigantic apparatus of propaganda and misinformation was used each time to lull the vigilance of the peoples. The peoples' eyes did open, but not before millions of people were already dying, and flourishing cities and villages lay in ruins. This cannot be permitted to happen for a third time--in the age of nuclear energy and mighty rockets.

The countries participating in the conference resolutely favor the speediest implementation of constructive measures for strengthening security in Europe. They are convinced that in present-day conditions it is actually possible to undertake such steps. To this end they are ready to cooperate with other states.

The creation of stable guarantees for the cause of peace and security in Europe is an important task demanding the participation of all European states, the patient and constructive discussion of points of view with the aim of reaching decisions that would enjoy general approval.

The European socialist countries have repeatedly submitted well-grounded proposals constituting a concrete program of action.

The states that have signed the Declaration believe that measures for strengthening security in Europe can and must be carried out above all in the following chief directions:

First. The states participating in the conference appeal to all European states to develop good-neighbor relations on the basis of the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage--on the basis of the principles

of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Proceeding from this premise, they favor the strengthening of economic and trade ties and the multiplication of contacts and forms of cooperation in the fields of science, technology, culture and art, as well as in other fields that provide new opportunities for the cooperation of European countries.

There is no field of peaceful cooperation where the European states could not find opportunities for undertaking further mutually advantageous steps.

The development of all-European cooperation demands from all European states the renunciation of any kind of discrimination and pressure, whether it be economic or political in nature, aimed against other countries, equal cooperation among them and the establishment of normal relations between them, including the establishment of normal relations with both German states.

The establishment and development of good-neighbor relations between European states that have different social systems could intensify their economic and cultural ties and thus increase the possibilities of the European states for making an effective contribution to the cause of the improvement of the atmosphere in Europe and the development of mutual confidence and respect.

Second. The socialist countries have always consistently stood against the division of the world into military blocs and alliances and for the elimination of the dangers for universal peace and security stemming from this.

In reply to the formation of the military aggressive NATO grouping and to the inclusion in it of West Germany, the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid--a defensive pact of sovereign and equal states that is an instrument for the defense of the security of the treaty's member-states and of peace in Europe--was concluded.

But the members of the Warsaw Treaty have been and are of the opinion that the military blocs imposed by the imperialist forces and the presence of military bases on the territories of other states constitute an obstacle to cooperation among states. The security and progress of each European country can be genuinely guaranteed not by the existence of military groupings, which do not correspond to the present-day healthy tendencies of international life, but by the establishment in Europe of an effective security system based on relations of equality and mutual respect among all the states of the continent, on the joint efforts of all the European nations.

The countries that have signed the present Declaration believe that the necessity for measures toward the easing first of all of military tension in Europe has become ripe. A radical way to achieve this would be the simultaneous dissolution of the existing military alliances, and the present situation makes this possible. The governments of our states have pointed out more than once that

should the North Atlantic alliance halt its activities the Warsaw Treaty will become invalid, and that the two would be replaced by a system of European security. They now formally reaffirm their readiness for the simultaneous liquidation of the above-mentioned alliances.

If, however, the members of the North Atlantic alliance are not yet ready for the simultaneous dissolution of the two groupings, the states that have signed the present Declaration consider it feasible even now to reach agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of both the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty. At the same time they declare that as long as the North Atlantic bloc exists and the aggressive imperialist circles jeopardize peace throughout the world, the socialist countries represented at the conference, maintaining high vigilance, are fully resolved to strengthen their might and defense capability. At the same time we consider it necessary that all the member-states of the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty, as well as countries that do not participate in any military alliance, undertake bilateral and multilateral efforts to advance the cause of European security.

Third. At present it is also very important to adopt such partial measures toward a military detente on the European continent as:

the liquidation of foreign military bases;

the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories to within their national frontiers;

a reduction, in agreed-upon numbers and according to agreed-upon schedules, of the armed forces of the two German states;

measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict: the creation of denuclearized zones, a pledge by all powers possessing nuclear weapons not to use these weapons against states belonging to these zones, etc.;

the cessation of flights by foreign aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of European states and of the entry into these states' ports of submarines and surface vessels with nuclear weapons on board.

Fourth. In view of the danger to the cause of peace in Europe of the F.R.G.'s nuclear claims, states must direct their efforts to precluding the possibility of the F.R.G.'s access to nuclear arms in any form whatever--directly or indirectly through groupings of states, of its exclusive command or its participation in any form in command over such arms. The way in which this question is solved will to a large extent decide the future of the European, and not only the European, peoples. And half-hearted solutions to this question are impermissible.

Fifth. The inviolability of frontiers is the foundation of a durable peace in Europe. The interests of a normalization of the situation in Europe demand that all states, both those in Europe and those outside the European continent, base their foreign-policy actions on

the recognition of the actually existing frontiers between European states that were established after the most devastating war in the history of mankind, including the Polish frontier along the Oder-Neisse and the frontiers between the two German states.

Sixth. A German peace settlement accords with the interests of peace in Europe. The socialist states represented at the conference are willing to continue searches for the solution to this problem. This solution must take into account the interests of the security of all the countries concerned, the security of Europe as a whole.

A constructive approach to this question, as to other aspects of security in Europe, is possible only proceeding from reality, in the first place the existence of the two German states--the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time such a settlement calls for recognition of the existing frontiers and for the renunciation by both German states of the possession of nuclear weapons.

The equal participation of the two German states in efforts aimed at the development and strengthening of relations of all-European cooperation in various fields of activity--political, economic, scientific-technical, cultural--will enable their working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, their entire population, to make their contribution, to the measure of their possibilities and creative abilities, to progress and peace jointly with the other European peoples.

As for the unification of the two German states, the road to this goal lies through a relaxation of tension, a gradual rapprochement of the two sovereign German states and agreement between them, through agreements on disarmament in Germany and Europe and on the basis of the principle that once the unification of Germany is achieved, the united German state will be genuinely peace-loving and democratic and will never again pose a threat to its neighbors or to peace in Europe.

Seventh. It is of great positive importance to convene an all-European conference to discuss questions of ensuring security in Europe and establishing all-European cooperation. The accord reached at the conference could be expressed, for example, in the form of an all-European declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security. This declaration could provide for pledges on the part of the signatory states to be guided in their relations with one another by the interests of peace, to settle disputed questions only by peaceful means, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest and to assist in the comprehensive development of economic, scientific-technical and cultural ties with one another. The declaration should be open for all interested states to join.

The convocation of a conference on questions of European security and cooperation could promote the creation

of a system of collective security in Europe and would be a major landmark in contemporary European history. Our countries are ready to participate in such a conference at any time convenient for the other interested states, both North Atlantic and Treaty members and neutrals. The neutral European countries could also play a positive role in the convocation of such a conference.

Naturally, the agenda and other questions relating to the preparation of such a meeting or conference should be established jointly by all the participating states, keeping in mind the proposals submitted by each one of them.

The countries represented at the present conference are also prepared to employ other possible methods for discussing problems of European security: negotiations through diplomatic channels, meetings of Foreign Ministers or special representatives on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and contacts at the highest level. They believe that the considerations presented above cover the chief and most important aspects of ensuring European security. They are also prepared to discuss other proposals for the solution of this problem that have been or may be advanced by any states.

As for the participants in such a discussion, the Warsaw Treaty states make no exceptions. It is for each state to decide whether or not to participate in the discussion and solution of European problems.

The peoples, of course, are not indifferent to the political course this or that state may choose--one corresponding to the interests of peace and security or one running counter to these interests.

The participants in this conference are convinced that the countries of other continents as well cannot be indifferent to the direction in which affairs in Europe develop. The flames of two world wars broke out on European soil, but they scorched almost the whole planet. Devastation and death was visited on many countries, including some on continents far from Europe. Therefore any government that is concerned for the destiny of the world cannot but welcome each step that leads to a detente and to an improvement of the situation in Europe, cannot but support such efforts.

In expressing this concern for the strengthening of European security and their willingness to participate in the implementation of appropriate steps directed toward this goal, our countries are convinced that it is the duty of all European states to contribute to the solution of problems of worldwide significance, the adjustment of which will unquestionably have a beneficial effect on the situation in Europe as well. These include the problems of ensuring noninterference in the internal affairs of states, the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of force in international relations, disarmament, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and other major measures aimed

at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict, the final liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the dismantling of foreign military bases on other countries' territory and the development of international economic cooperation on equal terms. For their part, the states represented at this conference will continue to do everything in their power to promote the earliest possible solution of these world problems. They attach great importance to the strengthening of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of its Charter, ensuring the universality of the U.N. and bringing its activity in line with the changes that have taken place in the world, and will help in every way to raise the effectiveness of the organization with a view to the preservation of universal peace and security and to the development of friendly relations among peoples.

The states that have signed the present Declaration express a readiness to seek jointly with other states for mutually acceptable ways to strengthen peace in Europe. They are fully resolved to defend in the international arena the line of peace, the international cooperation of states and the rallying of all freedom-loving and progressive forces, to fight against imperialist aggression and a policy of diktat and violence, to support the cause of freedom, national independence and social progress.

The participants in the conference appeal to all European governments and nations, to all the forces of peace and progress on our continent, regardless of their ideological, political or religious persuasion, to join forces in making Europe--one of the most important centers of world civilization--a continent of all-round and fruitful cooperation between equal nations, a mighty factor for the stability of peace and of mutual understanding throughout the world.--(Signed) For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Todor ZHIVKOV, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; for the Hungarian People's Republic: Janos KADAR, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Gyula KALLAI, Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government; for the German Democratic Republic: Walter ULBRICHT, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the German Democratic Republic State Council; Willi STOPH, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic; for the Polish People's Republic: Wladyslaw GOMULKA, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic; for the Socialist Republic of Rumania: Nicolae CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party; Ion Gheorghe MAURER, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Rumania; for the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; A. N. KOSYGIN, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Antonin NOVOTNY, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Jozef LENART, Chairman of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Bucharest, July 5, 1966.

## STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM. (Pravda and Izvestia, July 8, p. 1. Complete test:)
The Warsaw Treaty member-states represented at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee--the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--have discussed the situation created as a result of the aggression of the United States of America in Vietnam, especially in light of the new criminal actions of the American armed forces aimed at expanding the war against the Vietnamese people.

The participants in the conference consider the bombings of the suburbs of Hanoi and the port of Haiphong--the largest population centers of North Vietnam--to be a new and even more dangerous stage in the American policy of "escalating" the war in Vietnam. As a consequence, the war in Vietnam, which seriously complicates the international atmosphere, is taking on a new character still more dangerous for peace and general security.

The participants in the conference angrily condemn these criminal actions and declare their full support for the courageous struggle of the fraternal people of Vietnam in defense of freedom and independence, for the unity and integrity of their homeland.

### I.

The U.S. war in Vietnam is the most cynical manifestation of the aggressive policy of American imperialism. It is an outrage against international law, against international agreements, a flagrant trampling of the United Nations Charter. It was the U.S.A. that frustrated the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, which provided for the holding of all-Vietnamese elections and the unification of Vietnam without any foreign interference.

The American troops arrived in Vietnam as invaders, as stranglers of the freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people. In the war of plunder that it is waging against Vietnam, the U.S.A. is increasingly resorting to

brutal and inhuman means, destroying the peaceful population, not hesitating to use napalm and poisonous substances. Those who are committing these atrocities are following the path of the Hitlerite war criminals. The actions committed by American troops and their satellites in Vietnam are a crime against peace and humanity that entails the gravest international responsibility. The aggressors should consider the lessons of history and not forget that they will not escape responsibility for their atrocities.

The American aggressors will not escape retribution for the vast material devastation and losses caused to the Vietnamese people, for the destroyed cities and villages, for the burned hospitals and schools, for the destroyed communications routes, for all the barbarity visited on the peaceful population.

The U.S. government should know that the more crimes are committed against the Vietnamese people, the heavier will be the burden of guilt, the harsher the retribution for it will be.

The U.S. government is attempting by force of arms to impose its system on the population of South Vietnam, to preserve there a corrupt regime of military dictatorship that is deeply hated by the people and that is holding on only because of American bayonets. No one has the right to dictate his will to the Vietnamese people or the people of any other country. Only the people of Vietnam can decide what system to establish in their country, and this is their inalienable right.

The United States of America would also like to enslave other countries of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. It is intensifying its gross interference in the internal affairs of Laos, subjecting its territory to bombardment, and is continuing provocations against independent Cambodia.

All of this bears witness that American imperialism is trying to suppress the national-liberation movement of the peoples, to deprive them of their sacred right to decide their own destinies, to choose a path of development in accordance with their own aspirations.

The danger arising from the aggressive actions of the U.S. government is increasing even more in connection with the fact that it is striving to drag its allies into the war. Australia and New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as the South Korean puppet regime, have already sent or are sending military contingents to participate in the war against the Vietnamese people. The Federal Republic of Germany is giving political and material support to the United States of America in Vietnam. Those countries that are helping the aggressors with deliveries of arms or by permitting the U.S.A. to use their territory for the transfer and supply of American troops in Vietnam are accomplices in the aggression. Sooner or later the governments of all such countries will have to answer to the peoples for these actions.

No one will be taken in by the American government's

assertions of its readiness to hold talks on a settlement of the Vietnam problem. These statements on "peaceful intentions" and "peaceful negotiations" are false through and through, since they are accompanied not only by the continuation but by the expansion of military actions.

There is a glaring inconsistency between the continuation of the war in Vietnam and the U.S. assertions of its desire to take steps along the path of disarmament.

The parties, governments and peoples of our countries express admiration for the courage, staunchness and determination of the heroic Vietnamese people to achieve victory in the struggle against the invaders. No matter how the aggressors persist, no matter what new atrocities they commit, they will be unable to break the will of the Vietnamese people for freedom and independence. The participants in the conference believe that by their struggle against American imperialism, the Vietnamese people are not only defending their own national rights but are also making an important contribution to the struggle of the countries of the world socialist system, of all peoples for peace, independence, democracy and socialism. The just cause of the Vietnamese people enjoys the deep sympathy and complete solidarity of the socialist countries, of the international working class and the Communist and workers' parties, of the national-liberation movement, of all forces of peace and progress.

II.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states that have signed the present statement most resolutely confirm their position on the Vietnam question.

The American government must immediately halt the aggressive war in Vietnam and respect the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, national independence, territorial unity and integrity provided for by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Proceeding from the premise that the right to decide their affairs belongs exclusively to the Vietnamese people, the states participating in the present conference fully support the four-point program of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-point program advanced by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, which are a just basis for a political settlement of the Vietnamese question. They fully conform to the 1954 Geneva Agreements and meet the interests of peace in Southeast Asia and throughout the world.

The United States of America must take a course toward strict fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, stop the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by putting an immediate, final and unconditional end to the bombing raids over its territory, halt the armed intervention in South Vietnam, withdraw its troops and those of its satellites from South Vietnam, liquidate all American

military bases in that country, recognize the National Liberation Front as the only true representative of the population of South Vietnam and recognize the right of the people of Vietnam to determine their own destiny without outside interference, to decide for themselves the question of the peaceful unification of the country.

III.

Having discussed the situation created in Vietnam as a result of the expansion of military actions by the United States of America, the Warsaw Treaty member-states:

(1.) Most vigorously warn the U.S. government of the responsibility it assumes before all mankind by continuing and expanding this war, for all the unforeseeable consequences that might result from it, including for the United States of America itself.

(2.) Are giving and will continue to give the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ever-increasing moral and political support and diversified aid, including economic aid and the means of defense, materials, equipment and specialists needed for victoriously repelling the American aggression, taking into account the requirements arising out of the new phase of the war in Vietnam.

(3.) Declare their readiness, should the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so request, to send volunteers to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American aggressors.

(4.) Vigorously condemn the U. S. actions aimed at spreading the war to Laos and Cambodia; express their solidarity with the peoples of these countries, demand strict observance by the United States of America of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements concerning these states and respect for their sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity.

IV.

The parties and governments of our countries consider that united actions on the part of the socialist states are necessary to achieve victory for the Vietnamese people. Each of our countries is fully resolved to spare no efforts in the future as well, to take all the necessary steps to help the Vietnamese people put an end to the American aggression.

The countries participating in the present conference appeal to all states that cherish the cause of peace, to all progressive and peace-loving forces, to the world public, to the international workers' movement, to the Communist and workers' parties to consolidate the front of struggle against the American aggression, to come out vigorously against the barbaric war in Vietnam and in support of the courageous struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty

appeal to the governments of all states to do everything they can to put an end to the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, to eliminate the breeding ground of war in Southeast Asia, to strive for a relaxation of tension and the normalization of international relations. Not one state, not one government concerned with the fate of the world can or should be indifferent to the U.S. actions in Vietnam. These actions not only are a threat to the independence and freedom of the Vietnamese people but also create an ever more serious threat to universal peace.

Our countries express their conviction that the forces of peace, by supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people, will make the American imperialists stop the aggression in Vietnam and thereby make a great contribution to the cause of ensuring peace throughout the world.

The just cause for which the Vietnamese people are fighting will triumph! The people of Vietnam will win!--(Signed) For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Todor ZHIVKOV, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; for the Hungarian People's Republic: Janos KADAR, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Byula KALLAI, Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government; for the German Democratic Republic: Walter ULBRICHT, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the German Democratic Republic State Council; Willi STOPH, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic; for the Polish People's Republic: Wladyslaw GOMULKA, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic; for the Socialist Republic of Rumania: Nicolae CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party; Ion Gheorghe MAURER, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Rumania; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; A. N. KOSYGIN, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Antonin NOVOTNY, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Jozef LENART, Chairman of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Bucharest, July 6, 1966.

IX. Communique and Statement of the Ninth Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XX, No. 10, pp. 5-6)

## WARSAW TREATY CONFERENCE

COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. (Pravda, March 9, p. 1; Izvestia, March 10, p. 1. Complete text:) Sofia, March 7--A regular conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid took place on March 6 and 7, 1968, in Sofia.

The following took part in the conference:

from the People's Republic of Bulgaria--Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers and head of the delegation; Stanko Todorov, member of the Politburo of the B.C.P. Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee; Zhivko Zhivkov, member of the Politburo of the B.C.P. Central Committee and First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General of the Army Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense;

from the Hungarian People's Republic--Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee and head of the delegation; Jenoe Fock, Chairman of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government; Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieut. Gen. Lajos Czinege, Minister of Defense;

from the German Democratic Republic--Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council and head of the delegation; Willi Stoph, Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of Ministers; Erich Honecker, member of the Politburo of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee; General of the Army Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense; Gunter Kort, State Secretary and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;

from the Polish People's Republic--Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and head of the delegation; Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko, member of the Politburo of the P.U.W.P. Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee; Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal of Poland Marian Spychalski, Minister of National Defense; Marian Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieut. Gen. Wojcech Jaruzelski, Deputy Minister of National Defense; Ryszard Neszporek, P.P.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

from the Socialist Republic of Rumania--Nicolae Ceausescu , General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee, Chairman of the S.R.R. State

Council and head of the delegation; Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the S.R.R. Council of Ministers; Corneliu Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieut. Gen. Ion Ionita, Minister of the Armed Forces; Nicolae Blejan, S.R.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and head of the delegation; A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; A. A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense; K. V. Rusakov, First Deputy Director of a C.P.S.U. Central Committee department; A. M. Puzanov, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;

from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and head of the delegation; Jozef Lenart, Chairman of the C.S.R. government; General of the Army Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National Defense; Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Pavol Majling, C.S.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, also took part in the work of the conference.

The participants in the conference examined all aspects of the situation that has taken shape as a result of further intensification of U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese people and its influence on the overall international situation. They noted that the U.S. government is continuing its adventurist policy of expanding the scale of the war and refuses to halt the bombing and other aggressive actions against the D.R.V., thereby obstructing the creation of conditions for talks aimed at a political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

In this connection the participants in the conference expressed unanimous condemnation of the criminal actions of the American imperialists, who are trying by force of arms to suppress the national-liberation struggle in South Vietnam and to hinder the construction of socialism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The participants in the conference adopted a Declaration on the Threat to Peace Created as a Result of Expansion of American Aggression in Vietnam. The text of the declaration has been published separately.

A thorough exchange of opinions on the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons took place at the conference.

The participants in the conference, proceeding on the basis of the position collectively elaborated by the Warsaw and Bucharest Conferences of the Political Consultative Committee, confirmed the special significance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the importance of solving this problem. They examined the draft treaty

on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that was drawn up in the course of talks and discussion in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, and expressed their respective positions on this question.

The conference proceeded in a candid, comradely atmosphere.

STATEMENT. (Pravda, March 9, p. 1; Izvestia, March 10, p. 1. Complete text:) Sofia, March 7--The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in a spirit of full unanimity, set forth their position on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as follows.

Proceeding on the basis of the socialist states' policy in the struggle to strengthen international peace and security, the said countries believe that the task of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is an urgent one and is of pressing importance for the cause of strengthening peace. They are convinced that settlement of the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and conclusion of a corresponding international treaty will create more favorable conditions for the further struggle to halt the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and to implement effective measures for banning and destroying nuclear weapons. They express their resolve to continue the struggle to achieve these goals.

The above-named states believe this task is fulfilled by the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that was submitted by the Soviet Union on Jan. 18, 1968, for the consideration of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and that was, at various stages of the talks, the subject of intensified consultations among many states. They declare their support for this draft and favor terminating the talks in the Committee of 18 by the established deadline (March 15, 1968), gaining the approval of the elaborated draft by the United Nations General Assembly and signing and putting into effect the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The above-named states express the hope that all countries will make their contribution to the solution of the important problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and, thereby, to the consolidation of international peace.

# Appendix C

I. Text of Soviet-Polish Agreement on the Stationing of Troops, December 17, 1956.
(from New York Times, December 18, 1956, p. 18)

## TEXT OF SOVIET-POLISH AGREEMENT ON THE STATIONING OF TROOPS

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Polish People's Republic, in conformity with the point statement signed in Moscow on Nov. 18, 1956, have decided to conclude the present treaty and have appointed for this purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; G. K. Zhukov, Minister of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic--A. Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic; M. Spychalski, Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic.

Having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

### Article 1

The temporary stay of Soviet troops in Poland can in no way affect the sovereignty of the Polish state and canot lead to their interference in the domestic affairs of the Polish People's Republic.

### Article 2

The strength of the Soviet troops stationed temporarily in the territory of the Polish People's Republic and the places of their dislocation shall be determined on the basis of special agreements between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The movement of Soviet troops in the territory of the Polish People's Republic outside the places of their dislocation shall in each case require the consent of the Government of the Polish People's Republic or Polish authorities empowered by it.

Training and exercises of Soviet troops outside of the places of thir dislocation shall be held on the basis either of plans agreed with the Polish authorities or in each case with the consent of the Government of the Polish People's Republic or Polish authorities empowered by it.

### Article 3

Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the

Polish People's Republic, persons serving with these troops, and members of the families of these persons must respect and observe the provisions of Polish law.

Article 4

Servicemen of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Polish Republic wear their respective uniforms, have and carry weapons in conformity with the procedure established in the Soviet Army.

Motor vehicles and motorcycles of Soviet military units must have a license number and a distinct identification mark. The license numbers and marks shall be established by the command of the Soviet troops and communicated to the competent Polish agencies.

Competent Polish agencies recognize as valid, without any tests or fee, drivers' licenses issued by the competent Soviet agencies to persons serving with the Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 5

The procedure for entry into Poland and exit from Poland of Soviet military units, as well as of persons serving with the Soviet troops and members of the families of these persons, questions connected with their stay in the territory of the Polish People's Republic and the types of appropriate documents shall be determined by special agreement of the contracting parties.

Article 6

The procedure for and terms of use by Soviet troops of barrack settlements, airdromes, drill grounds, firing grounds with equipment and installations, buildings, transport and communication facilities, electric power, public utilities and trade services, including also the terms of payment for them, shall be determined by special agreements of the competent agencies of the contracting parties.

Article 7

Construction in places of dislocation of Soviet troops of buildings, airdromes, roads, bridges, permanent radio communication installations, including the determination of their frequencies and capacities, requires the consent of the competent Polish authorities. Such consent is also required for setting up, outside of the places of dislocation of Soviet troops, regular service establishments for persons serving with the Soviet troops.

Article 8

In case barrack settlements, airdromes, drill grounds

and firing grounds with stationary equipment and installations are vacated by Soviet troops, the aforementioned establishments shall be returned to the Polish authorities in good condition.

Questions related to the handing over to the Polish authorities of establishments vacated by Soviet troops in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, including those built by Soviet troops, shall be settled through special agreements.

Article 9

Matters of jurisdiction, related to the stay of Soviet troops in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, shall be governed as follows:

1. As a general rule, in cases of crimes and misdemeanors committed by persons serving with the Soviet troops or members of their families in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, Polish laws shall apply and Polish courts, the prosecutor's office and other Polish agencies competent in prosecuting crimes and misdemeanors shall operate.

Cases of crimes committed by Soviet servicemen shall be investigated by the military prosecutor's office and tried by military justice agencies of the Polish People's Republic.

2. The provisions of the first paragraph of the present article shall not apply:

(A) In case of persons, serving with the Soviet troops or members of their families, committing crimes or misdemeanors only against the Soviet Union and also against persons serving with the Soviet troops or members of their families;

(B) In case of persons, serving with the Soviet troops, committing crimes or misdemeanors while discharging their duties.

In cases indicated in sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) the competent Soviet court and other agencies shall act on the basis of Soviet law.

3. The competent Soviet and Polish agencies may ask each other to transfer or accept jurisdiction with reference to some cases stipulated in the present article. Such requests shall be given favorable consideration.

Article 10

In case of crimes committed against Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic as well as against their servicemen, the persons committing such crimes shall bear the same responsibility as for crimes against the Polish armed forces and Polish servicemen.

Article 11

1. The Competent Soviet and Polish agencies shall

render each other assistance of all kinds, including legal assistance, in prosecuting crimes and misdemeanors referred to in Articles 9 and 10 of the present treaty.

2. A special agreement of the contracting parties shall lay down the principles and procedures for rendering the assistance mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the present article.

Article 12

At the request of the competent Polish authorities a person serving with the Soviet troops, guilty of violating Polish law and order shall be recalled from the territory of the Polish People's Republic.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to compensate the Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic for material damage which may be caused to the Polish state by actions or neglect of Soviet military units or persons serving with them, as well as damage which may be caused by Soviet military units or thir servicemen while discharging their duties to Polish institutions and citizens or citizens of third countries in the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic, in both cases in amounts to be fixed, on the basis of the claims presented and with due regard for the provision of Polish law by a mixed commission formed in compliance with Article 19 of the present treaty.

Disputes which may arise from obligations of Soviet military units shall also be subject to examination by the mixed commission on the same basis.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also agrees to compensate the Government of the Polish People's Republic for damage caused to Polish institutions or citizens or citizens of third countries in the territory of the Polish People's Republic as a result of actions or neglect of persons serving with the Soviet troops which took place not during the discharge of their duties and also as a result of actions or neglect of members of the families of such persons, in both cases in amounts to be fixed by the competent Polish court on the basis of claims presented to persons which caused the damage.

The compensations of damage shall be made by the Soviet side within three months after the decision of the mixed commission or the entry into force of the court sentence.

Payments of amounts by decisions of the mixed commission or a court to the persons or institutions which suffered the damage shall be made by the appropriate Polish agencies.

Claims for compensation of damage, not satisfied prior to the entry of the present treaty into force, shall be considered by the mixed commission.

Article 14

The Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees to compensate the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for damage to property of Soviet military units stationed in the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic and persons serving with the Soviet troops which may be caused by actions or neglect of Polish state institutions, in amounts to be fixed by the mixed commission formed in compliance with Article 19 of the present treaty on the basis of the claims presented and with account of the provisions of Polish law.

Disputes which may arise from obligations of Polish state institutions to Soviet military units shall also be subject to consideration by the mixed commission on the same basis.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic also agrees to compensate the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the damage caused to Soviet military units stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, to persons serving with the Soviet troops and members of the families of these persons as a result of actions or neglect of Polish citizens, in amounts to be fixed by a Polish court on the basis of claims presented to persons who caused the damage.

Article 15

The communication lines, dates, procedure and terms of payment for the transit of Soviet troops and military property through the territory of the Polish People's Republic as well as military shipments in the territory of the Polish People's Republic shall be governed by special agreements.

The provisions of the present treaty and, specifically, the provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and responsibility for damage caused, shall apply correspondingly to Soviet troops in transit through the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic.

Article 16

The application of tax, custom and foreign exchange regulations operating in Poland as well as the import and export provisions with regard to Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, persons serving with these troops and members of their families, shall be governed by special agreements.

Article 17

With the object of adequately adjusting current problems pertaining to the stay of Soviet troops in Poland, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic shall

appoint their plenipotentiaries to deal with matters related to the stay of Soviet troops in Poland.

Article 18

In interpreting the present treaty:

"A person serving with the Soviet troops" is:

(a) A serviceman of the Soviet Army;

(b) A civilian who is a Soviet citizen and is employed in units of the Soviet troops in the Polish Peoples' Republic;

"A place of dislocation" is the territory placed at the disposal of Soviet troops, including the places of quartering the military units with drill grounds, shooting ranges, firing grounds and other establishments used by these units.

Article 19

To settle questions pertaining to the interpretation or application of the present treaty and the agreements envisaged by this treaty a Soviet-Polish Mixed Commission shall be set up, to which each of the contracting parties shall appoint three representatives.

The Mixed Commission shall be governed by the rules it shall adopt.

The Mixed Commission shall have its headquarters in Warsaw.

In case the Mixed Commission is unable to settle a question submitted to it, that question shall be settled through diplomatic channels as soon as possible.

Article 20

The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into effect on the day of the exchange of ratification instruments which shall be done in Moscow.

Article 21

The present treaty shall remain in force for the duration of the stay of the Soviet troops in the territory of the Polish People's Republic and may be changed with the consent of the contracting parties.

Done in Warsaw on the 17th of December 1956; two copies, each in the Russian and Polish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

In witness whereof the aforementioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

For the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics: D. Shepilov.
G. Zhukov.

For the Government of the Polish People's Republic:
A. Rapacki.
M. Spychalski.

II. Text of Communique of Meeting of First Secretaries of Communist Parties of Warsaw Pact Nations, August 3-5, 1961
(from New York Times, August 6, 1961, p. 3)

COMMUNIQUE OF WARSAW PACT SESSION

A meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries was held in Moscow on Aug. 3 to 5 to discuss questions connected with the preparations for the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the Communist and Workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries and also by representatives of the fraternal parties of the Socialist countries of Asia.

Threat to Peace Cited

The participants in the meeting had a broad exchange of opinions on foreign policy and economic questions concerning preparations for the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

All the participants agreed unanimously that the question of the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the normalization through it of the situation in West Berlin is long ripe for solution and brooks no delay.

It was emphasized that to delay the conclusion of the German peace treaty for an indefinite period is deliberately to contribute to an intensification of the threat of a new war in Europe and not only in Europe.

The meeting's participants expressed readiness to contribute by every means to the attainment of a peaceful settlement with the two German states, coordinated with the Western powers. The German peace treaty should record the situation which has developed in Europe after the war, record in legal form the immutability of the present German frontiers, normalize the situation in West Berlin, create better requisites for rapprochement and cooperation between the two German states, secure conditions for the peaceful development of both Germany herself and all the countries of Europe.

The meeting's participants proceed from the fact that such a peaceful settlement would not prejudice any country and would conform to the interests of all those who really seek to preserve and consolidate universal peace.

Free Access Pledged

The participants in the meeting unanimously reaffirmed that West Berlin, as a free, demilitarized city, would be able to maintain its unhindered communications with the outside world in case of the conclusion of a

peace treaty with both German states. Not a single Socialist country presses for a change in the social order existing in West Berlin. Reliable and effective guarantees will be furnished by the peace treaty to insure strict nonintervention in the affairs of West Berlin and access to it.

The meeting expressed the inflexible determination of all its participants to achieve a peace settlement with Germany before the end of this year. At the same time it was unanimously resolved that, should the Western powers continue to evade the conclusion of a German peace treaty, the states concerned will be impelled to conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) which will draw a line beneath the last war and safeguard conditions for stabilization of the situation in that part of Europe.

Protection of Rights

A peace treaty will also resolutely protect the sovereign right of the German Democratic Republic, including her rights on land, water and in the air.

The situation in West Berlin will also be settled on the basis of the above mentioned peace treaty. As a free city, it must lead its independent life and enjoy, in conformity with agreements which will be concluded with the German Democratic Republic, the rights to unhindered communications with the outside world.

The meeting instructed the appropriate competent bodies to prepare all necessary foreign political and economic measures ensuring the conclusion of a German peace treaty and observance of its provisions, including those provisions which refer to West Berlin as a free city.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of a complete unanimity and demonstrated the unshaken determination of the Socialist countries to liquidate the vestiges of World War II.

III. Texts of Warsaw Pact Communique on Berlin and East German Decree on Berlin, August 13, 1961
(from New York Times, August 14, 1961, p. 6)

WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE

The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states have been striving for a peaceful settlement with Germany for a number of years. In so doing, they are guided by the fact that this question has been ripe long since and brooks no further delays.

It is generally known that the Government of the U.S.S.R., with the full agreement and support of all member states of the Warsaw Treaty organization, approached the Governments of the countries which had participated in the war against Hitler Germany with a proposal to conclude a

peace treaty with two German states and to settle on this basis the question of West Berlin by granting it the status of a demilitarized, free city.

This proposal took into account the situation obtaining practically in Germany and Europe in the post-war period. This proposal is not directed against anybody's interests, and its only aim is to do away with the left-overs of World War II and to consolidate world peace.

The governments of the Western Powers have not so far shown willingness to achieve an agreed solution of this question through negotiations between all sides concerned. Moreover, to the peaceful proposals of the Socialist countries, the Western powers reply by stepping up their military preparations, fanning up war hysteria and by threatening to use armed forces.

## NATO Build-Up Deplored

Official spokesmen of a number of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries have announced an increase in the numerical strength of their armed forces, and plans for partial military mobilization. Even plans for a military invasion of the G.D.R. (East German) territory have been made public in some of the NATO countries.

Availing themselves of the absence of a peace treaty, the aggressive forces are increasing the pace of Western Germany's militarization and are creating the Bundeswehr (West German Army) at a high pace, equipping it with the latest types of armaments. The West German revanchists openly demand that nuclear and rocket weapons be placed at their disposal.

The Governments of the Western powers, in every way encouraging the arming of Western Germany, grossly violate the most important international agreements envisaging eradication of German militarism and prevention of its revival in any form.

The Western powers, far from having made any efforts to normalize the situation in West Berlin, on the contrary continue using it intensively as a center of subversive activities against the G.D.R. and all other countries of the Socialist commonwealth.

In no other point of the world are so many espionage and subversive centers of foreign states to be found as in West Berlin, where they can act with such impunity. These numerous subversive centers are smuggling their agents to the G.D.R. for all sorts of subversion, recruiting spies and inciting hostile elements to organize sabotage and to provoke disturbances in the G.D.R.

The present situation regarding the traffic on the borders of West Berlin, is being used by the F.R.G. (West German) ruling quarters and intelligence agencies of the NATO countries for undermining the G.D.R.'s economy.

The government bodies and military concerns of the F.R.G., through deceit, bribery, and blackmail, make some

unstable elements in the G.D.R. leave for Western Germany. These deceived people are compelled to serve with the Bundeswehr, or recruited to the intelligence agencies of different countries to be sent back to the G.D.R. as spies and saboteurs.

A special fund has even been formed for such subversive activities against the G.D.R. and other Socialist countries. Recently West German Chancellor Adenauer asked the NATO Governments to increase this fund.

It is highly indicative that the subversive activities directed from West Berlin have greatly increased of late, right after the Soviet Union, the G.D.R. and other Socialist countries have advanced proposals for immediate peaceful settlement with Germany. This subversive activity inflicts damage not only on the German Democratic Republic but also affects the interests of other countries of the Socialist camp.

In the face of the aggressive aspirations of the reactionary forces of the F.R.G. and its NATO allies, the Warsaw Treaty member states cannot but take necessary measures for insuring their security, and primarily the security of the German Democratic Republic in the interests of the German peoples themselves.

The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states address the People's Chamber and the Government of the G.D.R., and all working people of the German Democratic Republic, with a proposal to establish such an order on the borders of West Berlin which would securely block the way for the subversive activity against the Socialist camp countries, so, that reliable safeguards and effective control can be established around the whole territory of West Berlin including its border with Democratic Berlin.

It goes without saying that these measures must not affect the existing order of traffic and control on the ways of communication between West Berlin and Western Germany.

The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states understand, of course, that protective measures along the borders of West Berlin will somewhat inconvenience the population. But the entire responsibility for the obtaining situation rests exclusively with the Western powers, and with the F.R.G. in the first place.

If so far the borders of West Berlin have remained opened, this was done in the hope that the Western powers would not abuse the goodwill of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. But they, disregarding the interests of the German people and Berlin population, used the order now operating on the border of West Berlin for their own perfidious, subversive aims.

Stronger protection and control on the border with West Berlin must put an end to the present abnormal situation.

At the same time, the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states find it necessary to emphasize that

this necessity will disappear when a peaceful settlement with Germany is achieved, and the questions awaiting their solution will be settled on this basis.

## EAST GERMAN DECREE

On the basis of the statement by the Warsaw Treaty member countries and the decision of the People's Chamber, the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic adopted the following decree:

The interests of preserving peace demand that an end be put to the machinations of the West German revanchists and militarists and that the way be opened, through conclusion of a German peace treaty, to the preservation of peace and the revival of Germany as a peaceful, anti-imperialist, neutral state.

The viewpoint of the Bonn Government that World War II is not yet formally ended is tantamount to demanding freedom for militarist provocations and civil war measures.

This imperialist policy, which is being carried out under the signboard of anti-communism, constitutes continuation of the aggressive aims of the Fascist German imperialism of the time of the Third Reich.

## Piratical Policy Charged

From the defeat of Hitler Germany in World War II, the Bonn Government has drawn the conclusion that the piratical policy of the German monopoly capital and its Hitler generals must be tried once more through rejection of a German national state policy and conversion of Western Germany into a NATO member state, into a satellite country of the United States.

This fresh threat to the German and other European peoples on the part of German militarism could become a grave danger, because the provisions of principles of the Potsdam agreement on eradication of militarism and nazism were constantly violated in the West German Federal Republic and the front-line city of West Berlin.

The revanchist policy, with its increasing territorial claims to the German Democratic Repuolic (East Germany) and Germany's neighbor states, has been intensified in Western Germany, which is closely connected with speedy armament and atomic arming of the West German Bundeswehr.

The Adenauer Government is systematically carrying out, with regard to the German Democratic Republic, preparations for a civil war.

The citizens of the German Democratic Republic visiting Western Germany are being increasingly subjected to terroristic persecutions.

West German and West Berlin espionage organizations are systematically luring citizens of the German Democratic Republic and organizing regular slave traffic.

## Called Plot for NATO

As follows from official (West German) Government documents and a principled statement by the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Socialist Union, C.D.R.-C.S.U. party leadership, the aim of this aggressive policy and sabotage is to include the whole of Germany into the NATO Western military bloc and to extend the militarists' domination from the Federal Republic of Germany to the German Democratic Republic as well.

The West German militarists want, with the help of all sorts of fraudulent maneuvers, as, for instance, free elections, at first to extend their military base to the Oder (River) and then start another big war.

The West German revanchists and militarists are abusing the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Treaty states on the German question, in order to damage not only the German Democratic Republic but also other states of the Socialist camp by means of rampant, hostile propaganda, by enticing people and by sabotage.

For all these reasons, the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, in accordance with the decision of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, and with a view of insuring peace in Europe, protecting the German Democratic Republic and in the interests of the security of the Socialist camp states, decided to take the following measures:

To put an end to the hostile activities of the revanchist and militarist forces of Western Germany and West Berlin, such control is to be introduced on the borders of the German Democratic Republic, including the border with the Western sectors of Greater Berlin, which is usually introduced along the borders of every sovereign state.

Reliable safeguards and effective control must be insured on the West Berlin borders in order to block the way to the subversive activities.

The citizens of the German Democratic Republic may cross these borders only with special permission.

Until West Berlin is turned into a demilitarized neutral free city, the citizens of the capital of the German Democratic Republic will have to have a special permit for crossing the border to West Berlin.

The West Berlin civilians may visit the capital of the German Democratic Republic (Democratic Berlin) on presenting West Berlin identity cards.

Revanchist politicians and agents of West German militarism are not permitted to enter the territory of the G.D.R. capital (Democratic Berlin).

As regards visits to Democratic Berlin by the citizens of the West German Federal Republic, former decisions on control remain valid.

These decisions do not affect the visits of the citizens of other states to the capital of the German Democratic Republic.

As regards the traveling of West Berlin citizens abroad along the communication lines in the German Democratic Republic, former decisions remain valid.

This decree in no way revises former decisions on transit between West Berlin and West Germany via the German Democratic Republic.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Transport and Mayor of Greater Berlin are instructed to issue appropriate instructions on the enactment of this decree.

This decree on the measures for insuring peace, protecting the German Democratic Republic and its capital of Berlin in particular, and for insuring the security of other Socialist states, remains valid till the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

IV. Text of Decision of Conference of First Secretaries of Communist Parties of Warsaw Pact Nations, July25, 1963

(from Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XV, No. 30, August 21, 1963, pp. 3-4)

DECISION OF CONFERENCE OF FIRST SECRETARIES OF CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda, July 27, p. 1; Izvestia, July 28. Complete text:) Having heard a report by Comrade Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the discussions between the government of the U.S.S.R. and the governments of the U.S.A. and Britain on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the conference of First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and heads of government of the Warsaw Treaty states approves the results of these talks, which have led to an agreement on a treaty banning nuclear explosions in three areas: in space, in the atmosphere and under water.

The reaching of an agreement on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests is the result of the consistent peace-loving course of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries, a success of the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The conference feels that this treaty will further the relaxation of international tension and will be a positive factor in the struggle of the peoples for peace and against the threat of a new world war. (Adopted July 25, 1963.)

# Appendix D

## Table 1

### 1959 Strength of Soviet Union Armed Forces

(Information taken from The Soviet Union and The NATO Powers: The Military Balance by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1959)

| | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soviet Union | 2,350,000 | 500,000 | 700,000 | 3,550,000 |

Table 2

missing

Table 3

1961 Strength of the Armed Forces
of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Communist Bloc and The Western Alliances: The Military Balance, 1961-1962 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| | |
|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 120,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 185,000 |
| East Germany | 100,000 |
| Hungary | 80,500 |
| Poland | 255,000 |
| Rumania | 222,000 |
| Soviet Union | 3,800,000 |
| Total | 4,762,500 |
| | |
| Albania | 27,800 |

Table 4

1962 Strength by Country and Military Branch of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Communist Bloc and The Western Alliances: The Military Balance, 1962-1963 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 100,000 | 5,000 | 15,000 | 120,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 150,000 | | 35,000 | 185,000 |
| East Germany | 65,000 | 11,000 | 9,000 | 85,000 |
| Hungary | 75,000 | | 5,500 | 80,500 |
| Poland | 200,000 | 12,000 | 45,000 | 257,000 |
| Rumania | 200,000 | 7,000 | 15,000 | 222,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,500,000 | 500,000 | 600,000 | 3,600,000 |
| Totals | 3,290,000 | 535,000 | 724,500 | 4,549,500 |
| Albania | 25,000 | 3,000 | 1,500 | 29,500 |

Table 5

1963 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1963-1964 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 110,000 | 5,000 | 20,000 | 135,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 150,000 | | 35,000 | 185,000 |
| East Germany | 90,000 | 11,000 | 15,000 | 116,000 |
| Hungary | 90,000 | | 9,000 | 99,000 |
| Poland | 200,000 | 12,000 | 45,000 | 257,000 |
| Rumania | 200,000 | 7,000 | 20,000 | 227,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,300,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 3,300,000 |
| Totals | 3,140,000 | 535,000 | 644,000 | 4,319,000 |
| Albania | 25,000 | 2,800 | 7,200 | 35,000 |

Table 6

1964 Strength by Country and Military Branch of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1964-65 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 125,000 | 5,000 | 20,000 | 150,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 200,000 | | 35,000 | 235,000 |
| East Germany | 80,000 | 15,000 | 15,000 | 110,000 |
| Hungary | 95,000 | | 9,000 | 104,000 |
| Poland | 215,000 | 12,000 | 45,000 | 272,000 |
| Rumania | 200,000 | 7,000 | 15,000 | 222,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,200,000 | 460,000 | 620,000 | 3,280,000 |
| Totals | 3,115,000 | 499,000 | 759,000 | 4,373,000 |
| Albania | 30,000 | 2,800 | 5,000 | 37,800 |

Table 7

1965 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1965-1966 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 125,000 | 7,000 | 20,000 | 152,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 200,000 | | 35,000 | 235,000 |
| East Germany | 80,000 | 17,000 | 15,000 | 112,000 |
| Hungary | 100,000 | | 9,000 | 109,000 |
| Poland | 215,000 | 17,000 | 45,000 | 277,000 |
| Rumania | 175,000 | 8,000 | 15,000 | 198,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,000,000 | 450,000 | 690,000 | 3,140,000 |
| Totals | 2,895,000 | 499,000 | 829,000 | 4,223,000 |
| Albania | 30,000 | 3,000 | 5,000 | 38,000 |

Table 8

1966 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1966-1967 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 125,000 | 7,000 | 24,000 | 156,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 175,000 | | 45,000 | 220,000 |
| East Germany | 85,000 | 17,000 | 20,000 | 122,000 |
| Hungary | 100,000 | | 9,000 | 109,000 |
| Poland | 185,000 | 15,000 | 60,000 | 260,000 |
| Rumania | 175,000 | 8,000 | 18,000 | 201,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,000,000 | 465,000 | 700,000 | 3,165,000 |
| Totals | 2,845,000 | 512,000 | 876,000 | 4,233,000 |
| Albania | 30,000 | 3,000 | 6,000 | 39,000 |

Table 9

1967 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1967-1968 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 125,000 | 7,000 | 22,000 | 154,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 175,000 | | 50,000 | 225,000 |
| East Germany | 85,000 | 17,000 | 25,000 | 127,000 |
| Hungary | 95,000 | | 7,000 | 102,000 |
| Poland | 185,000 | 15,000 | 70,000 | 270,000 |
| Rumania | 150,000 | 8,000 | 15,000 | 173,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,000,000 | 465,000 | 755,000 | 3,220,000 |
| Totals | 2,815,000 | 512,000 | 944,000 | 4,271,000 |
| Albania | 30,000 | 3,000 | 5,000 | 38,000 |

Table 10

1968 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries

(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1968-1969 by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

| Country | Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 125,000 | 6,000 | 22,000 | 153,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 175,000 | | 50,000 | 225,000 |
| East Germany | 85,000 | 16,000 | 25,000 | 126,000 |
| Hungary | 95,000 | | 7,000 | 102,000 |
| Poland | 185,000 | 19,000 | 70,000 | 274,000 |
| Rumania | 150,000 | 8,000 | 15,000 | 173,000 |
| Soviet Union | 2,000,000 | 465,000 | 755,000 | 3,220,000 |
| Totals | 2,815,000 | 514,000 | 944,000 | 4,273,000 |
| Albania | 30,000 | 3,000 | 5,000 | 38,000 |

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